THE LAST COMMAND - CUSTER'S LAST STAND by Stirnweis Limited edition Art Print

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THE LAST COMMAND - CUSTER AND THE 7TH CAVALRY AT THE LITTLE BIG HORN - BATTLE OF THE LITTLE BIGHORN JUNE 25, 1876 by Kirk Stirnweis. Signed, numbered, limited edition art print. Limited to only 950 in the edition. Measures 25" x 18".  Insured delivery in the continental US. Originally sold for $ 150.00. Mint condition accompanied by the Certificate of Authenticity. The print you received will be a different number than the one pictured. 

The Battle of the Little Bighorn, known to the Lakota and other Plains Indians as the Battle of the Greasy Grass[12] and also commonly referred to as Custer's Last Stand, was an armed engagement between combined forces of the Lakota, Northern Cheyenne, and Arapaho tribes and the 7th Cavalry Regiment of the United States Army. The battle, which resulted in the defeat of U.S. forces, was the most significant action of the Great Sioux War of 1876. It took place on June 25–26, 1876, along the Little Bighorn River in the Crow Indian Reservation in southeastern Montana Territory.[13]

The fight was an overwhelming victory for the Lakota, Northern Cheyenne, and Arapaho, who were led by several major war leaders, including Crazy Horse and Chief Gall, and had been inspired by the visions of Sitting Bull (Tȟatȟáŋka Íyotake). The U.S. 7th Cavalry, a force of 700 men, suffered a major defeat while commanded by Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer (formerly a brevetted major general during the American Civil War). Five of the 7th Cavalry's twelve companies were annihilated and Custer was killed, as were two of his brothers, a nephew and a brother-in-law. The total U.S. casualty count included 268 dead and 55 severely wounded (six died later from their wounds),[14]:244 including four Crow Indian scouts and at least two Arikara Indian scouts.

Public response to the Great Sioux War varied in the immediate aftermath of the battle. Libbie Custer, Custer's widow, soon worked to burnish her husband's memory, and during the following decades Custer and his troops came to be considered iconic, even heroic, figures in American history. The battle, and Custer's actions in particular, have been studied extensively by historians.[15] Little Bighorn Battlefield National Monument honors those who fought on both sides.

Contents

1 Background

1.1 Battlefield and surrounding areas

1.2 1876 Sun Dance ceremony

1.3 1876 U.S. military campaign

1.3.1 7th Cavalry organization

1.3.2 Battle of the Rosebud

1.3.3 Little Bighorn

2 Prelude

2.1 Military assumptions prior to the battle

2.1.1 Number of Indian warriors

2.1.2 Role of Indian noncombatants in Custer's strategy

2.2 Lone Teepee

3 Battle

3.1 Reno's attack

3.1.1 Reno and Benteen on Reno Hill

3.2 Custer's fight

3.2.1 Custer at Minneconjou Ford

3.2.2 Other views of Custer's actions at Minneconjou Ford

3.3 Last stand

3.3.1 Custer's final resistance

3.3.2 Last break-out attempt

4 Aftermath

5 Participants

5.1 7th Cavalry officers

5.2 Native American leaders and "warriors"

5.3 Arapaho participation

5.4 Notable scouts/interpreters

6 Order of battle

7 Casualties

7.1 Native American warriors

7.2 Native American noncombatants

7.3 7th Cavalry

7.4 Civilians killed (armed and embedded within the Army)

8 Legacy

8.1 Reconstitution of the 7th Cavalry

8.2 Expansion of the U.S. Army

8.3 "Sell or Starve"

9 Controversies

9.1 Reno's conduct

9.2 Custer's errors

9.3 Admiration for Custer

9.4 Gatling gun controversy

10 Weapons

10.1 Lakota and Cheyenne

10.2 7th Cavalry

10.3 Lever-action repeaters vs. single-shot breechloaders

10.3.1 Model 1873 / 1884 Springfield carbine and the U.S. Army

10.3.2 Malfunction of the Springfield carbine extractor mechanism

11 Survivor claims

12 Battlefield preservation

13 In popular culture

14 See also

15 Notes

16 References

17 Further reading

18 External links

Background[edit]

Battlefield and surrounding areas[edit]

In 1805, fur trader François Antoine Larocque reported joining a Crow camp in the Yellowstone area. On the way he noted that the Crow hunted buffalo on the "Small Horn River".[16] St. Louis-based fur trader Manuel Lisa built Fort Raymond in 1807 for trade with the Crow. It was located near the confluence of the Yellowstone and the Bighorn River, about 40 miles (64 km) north of the future battlefield.[17] The area is first noted in the 1851 Treaty of Fort Laramie.[18]

In the latter half of the 19th century, tensions increased between the Native inhabitants of the Great Plains of the US and encroaching settlers. This resulted in a series of conflicts known as the Sioux Wars, which took place from 1854 to 1890. While some of the indigenous people eventually agreed to relocate to ever-shrinking reservations, a number of them resisted, sometimes fiercely.[19]

On May 7, 1868, the valley of the Little Bighorn became a tract in the eastern part of the new Crow Indian Reservation in the center of the old Crow country.[20] There were numerous skirmishes between the Sioux and Crow tribes[21] so when the Sioux were in the valley in 1876 without the consent of the Crow tribe,[22] the Crow supported the US Army to expel them (e.g., Crows enlisted as Army scouts[23] and Crow warriors would fight in the nearby Battle of the Rosebud[24]).

The battlefield is known as "Greasy Grass" to the Lakota, Dakota, Cheyenne, and most other Plains Indians; however, in contemporary accounts by participants, it was referred to as the "Valley of Chieftains".[25]

1876 Sun Dance ceremony[edit]

Among the Plains Tribes, the long-standing ceremonial tradition known as the Sun Dance was the most important religious event of the year. It is a time for prayer and personal sacrifice for the community, as well as making personal vows. Towards the end of spring in 1876, the Lakota and the Cheyenne held a Sun Dance that was also attended by a number of "Agency Indians" who had slipped away from their reservations.[26] During a Sun Dance around June 5, 1876, on Rosebud Creek in Montana, Sitting Bull, the spiritual leader of the Hunkpapa Lakota, reportedly had a vision of "soldiers falling into his camp like grasshoppers from the sky."[27] At the same time US military officials were conducting a summer campaign to force the Lakota and the Cheyenne back to their reservations, using infantry and cavalry in a so-called "three-pronged approach".

A Cheyenne Sun Dance gathering, circa 1909

1876 U.S. military campaign[edit]

1876 Army Campaign against the Sioux

Col. John Gibbon's column of six companies (A, B, E, H, I, and K) of the 7th Infantry and four companies (F, G, H, and L) of the 2nd Cavalry marched east from Fort Ellis in western Montana on March 30 to patrol the Yellowstone River. Brig. Gen. George Crook's column of ten companies (A, B, C, D, E, F, G, I, L, and M) of the 3rd Cavalry, five companies (A, B, D, E, and I) of the 2nd Cavalry, two companies (D and F) of the 4th Infantry, and three companies (C, G, and H) of the 9th Infantry moved north from Fort Fetterman in the Wyoming Territory on May 29, marching toward the Powder River area. Brig. Gen. Alfred Terry's column, including twelve companies (A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, K, L, and M) of the 7th Cavalry under Lt. Col. George Armstrong Custer's immediate command,[28] Companies C and G of the 17th U.S. Infantry, and the Gatling gun detachment of the 20th Infantry departed westward from Fort Abraham Lincoln in the Dakota Territory on May 17. They were accompanied by teamsters and packers with 150 wagons and a large contingent of pack mules that reinforced Custer. Companies C, D, and I of the 6th U.S. Infantry moved along the Yellowstone River from Fort Buford on the Missouri River to set up a supply depot and joined Terry on May 29 at the mouth of the Powder River. They were later joined there by the steamboat Far West, which was loaded with 200 tons of supplies from Fort Lincoln.[29]

7th Cavalry organization[edit]

The 7th Cavalry had been created just after the American Civil War. Many men were veterans of the war, including most of the leading officers. A significant portion of the regiment had previously served 4½ years at Fort Riley, Kansas, during which time it fought one major engagement and numerous skirmishes, experiencing casualties of 36 killed and 27 wounded. Six other troopers had died of drowning and 51 in cholera epidemics. In November 1868, while stationed in Kansas, the 7th Cavalry under Custer had successfully routed Black Kettle's Southern Cheyenne camp on the Washita River in the Battle of Washita River, an attack which was at the time labeled a "massacre of innocent Indians" by the Indian Bureau.[30]

7th Cavalry Regiment Troop "I" guidon recovered at the camp of American Horse the Elder

By the time of the Little Bighorn, half of the 7th Cavalry's companies had just returned from 18 months of constabulary duty in the Deep South, having been recalled to Fort Abraham Lincoln, Dakota Territory to reassemble the regiment for the campaign. About 20% of the troopers had been enlisted in the prior seven months (139 of an enlisted roll of 718), were only marginally trained and had no combat or frontier experience. About 60% of these recruits were American, the rest were European immigrants (Most were Irish and German)—just as many of the veteran troopers had been before their enlistments. Archaeological evidence suggests that many of these troopers were malnourished and in poor physical condition, despite being the best-equipped and supplied regiment in the Army.[31][32]

Of the 45 officers and 718 troopers then assigned to the 7th Cavalry (including a second lieutenant detached from the 20th Infantry and serving in Company L), 14 officers (including the regimental commander) and 152 troopers did not accompany the 7th during the campaign. The regimental commander, Colonel Samuel D. Sturgis, was on detached duty as the Superintendent of Mounted Recruiting Service and commander of the Cavalry Depot in St. Louis, Missouri,[33] which left Lieutenant Colonel Custer in command of the regiment. The ratio of troops detached for other duty (approximately 22%) was not unusual for an expedition of this size,[34] and part of the officer shortage was chronic, due to the Army's rigid seniority system: three of the regiment's 12 captains were permanently detached, and two had never served a day with the 7th since their appointment in July 1866.[note 1] Three second lieutenant vacancies (in E, H, and L Companies) were also unfilled.

Battle of the Rosebud[edit]

The Army's coordination and planning began to go awry on June 17, 1876, when Crook's column retreated after the Battle of the Rosebud, just 30 miles (48 km) to the southeast of the eventual Little Bighorn battlefield. Surprised and according to some accounts astonished by the unusually large numbers of Native Americans, Crook held the field at the end of the battle but felt compelled by his losses to pull back, regroup, and wait for reinforcements. Unaware of Crook's battle, Gibbon and Terry proceeded, joining forces in early June near the mouth of Rosebud Creek. They reviewed Terry's plan calling for Custer's regiment to proceed south along the Rosebud while Terry and Gibbon's united forces would move in a westerly direction toward the Bighorn and Little Bighorn rivers. As this was the likely location of native encampments, all army elements had been instructed to converge there around June 26 or 27 in an attempt to engulf the Native Americans. On June 22, Terry ordered the 7th Cavalry, composed of 31 officers and 566 enlisted men under Custer, to begin a reconnaissance in force and pursuit along the Rosebud, with the prerogative to "depart" from orders if Custer saw "sufficient reason". Custer had been offered the use of Gatling guns but declined, believing they would slow his rate of march.[28]

Little Bighorn[edit]

External video

Chief Gall ca1880s.jpg Gall

video icon C-SPAN Cities Tour – Billings: Battle of the Little Bighorn, 38:44, C-SPAN[35] Park Ranger Steve Adelson describes the battle on-site

While the Terry-Gibbon column was marching toward the mouth of the Little Bighorn, on the evening of June 24, Custer's Indian scouts arrived at an overlook known as the Crow's Nest, 14 miles (23 km) east of the Little Bighorn River. At sunrise on June 25, Custer's scouts reported they could see a massive pony herd and signs of the Native American village[note 2] roughly 15 miles (24 km) in the distance. After a night's march, the tired officer who was sent with the scouts could see neither, and when Custer joined them, he was also unable to make the sighting. Custer's scouts also spotted the regimental cooking fires that could be seen from 10 mi (16 km) away, disclosing the regiment's position.[citation needed]

Custer contemplated a surprise attack against the encampment the following morning of June 26, but he then received a report informing him several hostiles had discovered the trail left by his troops.[37] Assuming his presence had been exposed, Custer decided to attack the village without further delay. On the morning of June 25, Custer divided his 12 companies into three battalions in anticipation of the forthcoming engagement. Three companies were placed under the command of Major Marcus Reno (A, G, and M) and three were placed under the command of Captain Frederick Benteen (H, D, and K). Five companies (C, E, F, I, and L) remained under Custer's immediate command. The 12th, Company B under Captain Thomas McDougall, had been assigned to escort the slower pack train carrying provisions and additional ammunition.[28]

Unknown to Custer, the group of Native Americans seen on his trail was actually leaving the encampment and did not alert the rest of the village. Custer's scouts warned him about the size of the village, with Mitch Bouyer reportedly saying, "General, I have been with these Indians for 30 years, and this is the largest village I have ever heard of."[note 3][39] Custer's overriding concern was that the Native American group would break up and scatter. The command began its approach to the village at noon and prepared to attack in full daylight.[40]

With an impending sense of doom, the Crow scout Half Yellow Face prophetically warned Custer (speaking through the interpreter Mitch Bouyer), "You and I are going home today by a road we do not know."[41]

Prelude[edit]

Military assumptions prior to the battle[edit]

Number of Indian warriors[edit]

A Cheyenne artist's depiction of the Battle of the Little Bighorn

As the Army moved into the field on its expedition, it was operating with incorrect assumptions as to the number of Indians it would encounter. These assumptions were based on inaccurate information provided by the Indian Agents that no more than 800 "hostiles" were in the area. The Indian Agents based this estimate on the number of Lakota that Sitting Bull and other leaders had reportedly led off the reservation in protest of U.S. government policies. It was in fact a correct estimate until several weeks before the battle, when the "reservation Indians" joined Sitting Bull's ranks for the summer buffalo hunt. The agents did not consider the many thousands of these "reservation Indians" who had unofficially left the reservation to join their "uncooperative non-reservation cousins led by Sitting Bull". Thus, Custer unknowingly faced thousands of Indians, including the 800 non-reservation "hostiles". All Army plans were based on the incorrect numbers. Although Custer was criticized after the battle for not having accepted reinforcements and for dividing his forces, it appears that he had accepted the same official government estimates of hostiles in the area which Terry and Gibbon had also accepted. Historian James Donovan notes, however, that when Custer later asked interpreter Fred Gerard for his opinion on the size of the opposition, he estimated the force at between 1,500 to 2,500 warriors.[42]

Additionally, Custer was more concerned with preventing the escape of the Lakota and Cheyenne than with fighting them. From his observation, as reported by his bugler John Martin (Giovanni Martino),[43] Custer assumed the warriors had been sleeping in on the morning of the battle, to which virtually every native account attested later, giving Custer a false estimate of what he was up against. When he and his scouts first looked down on the village from the Crow's Nest across the Little Bighorn River, they could only see the herd of ponies. Later, looking from a hill 2½ miles away after parting with Reno's command, Custer could observe only women preparing for the day, and young boys taking thousands of horses out to graze south of the village. Custer's Crow scouts told him it was the largest native village they had ever seen. When the scouts began changing back into their native dress right before the battle, Custer released them from his command. While the village was enormous, Custer still thought there were far fewer warriors to defend the village.

Finally, Custer may have assumed when he encountered the Native Americans that his subordinate Benteen, who was with the pack train, would provide support. Rifle volleys were a standard way of telling supporting units to come to another unit's aid. In a subsequent official 1879 Army investigation requested by Major Reno, the Reno Board of Inquiry (RCOI), Benteen and Reno's men testified that they heard distinct rifle volleys as late as 4:30 pm during the battle.[44]

Custer had initially wanted to take a day to scout the village before attacking; however, when men went back looking for supplies accidentally dropped by the pack train, they discovered that their track had already been discovered by Indians. Reports from his scouts also revealed fresh pony tracks from ridges overlooking his formation. It became apparent that the warriors in the village were either aware of or would soon be aware of his approach.[45] Fearing that the village would break up into small bands that he would have to chase, Custer began to prepare for an immediate attack.[46]

Role of Indian noncombatants in Custer's strategy[edit]

Custer's field strategy was designed to engage noncombatants at the encampments on the Little Bighorn to capture women, children, and the elderly or disabled[47]:297 to serve as hostages to convince the warriors to surrender and comply with federal orders to relocate. Custer's battalions were poised to "ride into the camp and secure noncombatant hostages",[48] and "forc[e] the warriors to surrender".[49] Author Evan S. Connell observed that if Custer could occupy the village before widespread resistance developed, the Sioux and Cheyenne warriors "would be obliged to surrender, because if they started to fight, they would be endangering their families."[47]:312[50]

In Custer's book My Life on the Plains, published two years before the Battle of the Little Bighorn, he asserted:

Indians contemplating a battle, either offensive or defensive, are always anxious to have their women and children removed from all danger ... For this reason I decided to locate our [military] camp as close as convenient to [Chief Black Kettle's Cheyenne] village, knowing that the close proximity of their women and children, and their necessary exposure in case of conflict, would operate as a powerful argument in favor of peace, when the question of peace or war came to be discussed.[51]

On Custer's decision to advance up the bluffs and descend on the village from the east, Lt. Edward Godfrey of Company K surmised:

[Custer] expected to find the squaws and children fleeing to the bluffs on the north, for in no other way do I account for his wide detour. He must have counted upon Reno's success, and fully expected the "scatteration" of the non-combatants with the pony herds. The probable attack upon the families and capture of the herds were in that event counted upon to strike consternation in the hearts of the warriors, and were elements for success upon which General Custer fully counted.[52]:379

The Sioux and Cheyenne fighters were acutely aware of the danger posed by the military engagement of noncombatants and that "even a semblance of an attack on the women and children" would draw the warriors back to the village, according to historian John S. Gray.[53] Such was their concern that an apparent reconnaissance by Capt. Yates' E and F Companies at the mouth of Medicine Tail Coulee (Minneconjou Ford) caused hundreds of warriors to disengage from the Reno valley fight and return to deal with the threat to the village.[53]

Some authors and historians, based on archaeological evidence and reviews of native testimony, speculate that Custer attempted to cross the river at a point further north they refer to as Ford D. According to Richard A. Fox, James Donovan, and others, Custer proceeded with a wing of his battalion (Yates' Troops E and F) north and opposite the Cheyenne circle at that crossing,[47]:176–77 which provided "access to the [women and children] fugitives."[47]:306 Yates's force "posed an immediate threat to fugitive Indian families..." gathering at the north end of the huge encampment;[47]:299 he then persisted in his efforts to "seize women and children" even as hundreds of warriors were massing around Keogh's wing on the bluffs.[54] Yates' wing, descending to the Little Bighorn River at Ford D, encountered "light resistance",[47]:297 undetected by the Indian forces ascending the bluffs east of the village.[47]:298 Custer was almost within "striking distance of the refugees" before abandoning the ford and returning to Custer Ridge.[55]

Lone Teepee[edit]

The Lone Teepee (or Tipi) was a landmark along the 7th Cavalry's march. It was where the Indian encampment had been a week earlier, during the Battle of the Rosebud on June 17, 1876. The Indians had left a single teepee standing (some reports mention a second that had been partially dismantled), and in it was the body of a Sans Arc warrior, Old She-Bear, who had been wounded in the battle. He had died a couple of days after the Rosebud battle, and it was the custom of the Indians to move camp when a warrior died and leave the body with its possessions. The Lone Teepee was an important location during the Battle of the Little Bighorn for several reasons, including:[56][57][58]

It is where Custer gave Reno his final orders to attack the village ahead. It is also where some Indians who had been following the command were seen and Custer assumed he had been discovered.

Many of the survivors' accounts use the Lone Teepee as a point of reference for event times or distances.

Knowing this location helps establish the pattern of the Indians' movements to the encampment on the river where the soldiers found them.

Battle[edit]

Reno's attack[edit]

Movements of the 7th Cavalry

A: Custer B: Reno C: Benteen D: Yates E: Weir

Movement of Major Reno's three companies

The first group to attack was Major Reno's second detachment (Companies A, G and M) after receiving orders from Custer written out by Lt. William W. Cooke, as Custer's Crow scouts reported Sioux tribe members were alerting the village. Ordered to charge, Reno began that phase of the battle. The orders, made without accurate knowledge of the village's size, location, or the warriors' propensity to stand and fight, had been to pursue the Native Americans and "bring them to battle." Reno's force crossed the Little Bighorn at the mouth of what is today Reno Creek around 3:00 pm on June 25. They immediately realized that the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne were present "in force and not running away."

Reno advanced rapidly across the open field towards the northwest, his movements masked by the thick bramble of trees that ran along the southern banks of the Little Bighorn River. The same trees on his front right shielded his movements across the wide field over which his men rapidly rode, first with two approximately forty-man companies abreast and eventually with all three charging abreast. The trees also obscured Reno's view of the Native American village until his force had passed that bend on his right front and was suddenly within arrow-shot of the village. The tepees in that area were occupied by the Hunkpapa Sioux. Neither Custer nor Reno had much idea of the length, depth and size of the encampment they were attacking, as the village was hidden by the trees.[citation needed] When Reno came into the open in front of the south end of the village, he sent his Arikara/Ree and Crow Indian scouts forward on his exposed left flank.[59] Realizing the full extent of the village's width, Reno quickly suspected what he would later call "a trap" and stopped a few hundred yards short of the encampment.

He ordered his troopers to dismount and deploy in a skirmish line, according to standard army doctrine. In this formation, every fourth trooper held the horses for the troopers in firing position, with five to ten yards separating each trooper, officers to their rear and troopers with horses behind the officers. This formation reduced Reno's firepower by 25 percent. As Reno's men fired into the village and killed, by some accounts, several wives and children of the Sioux leader, Chief Gall (in Lakota, Phizí), the mounted warriors began streaming out to meet the attack. With Reno's men anchored on their right by the protection of the tree line and bend in the river, the Indians rode against the center and exposed left end of Reno's line. After about 20 minutes of long-distance firing, Reno had taken only one casualty, but the odds against him had risen (Reno estimated five to one), and Custer had not reinforced him. Trooper Billy Jackson reported that by then, the Indians had begun massing in the open area shielded by a small hill to the left of Reno's line and to the right of the Indian village.[60] From this position the Indians mounted an attack of more than 500 warriors against the left and rear of Reno's line,[61] turning Reno's exposed left flank. This forced a hasty withdrawal into the timber along the bend in the river.[62] Here the Native Americans pinned Reno and his men down and tried to set fire to the brush to try to drive the soldiers out of their position.

After giving orders to mount, dismount and mount again, Reno told his men within earshot, "All those who wish to make their escape follow me," and led a disorderly rout across the river toward the bluffs on the other side. The retreat was immediately disrupted by Cheyenne attacks at close quarters. Later, Reno reported that three officers and 29 troopers had been killed during the retreat and subsequent fording of the river. Another officer and 13–18 men were missing. Most of these missing men were left behind in the timber, although many eventually rejoined the detachment. Reno's hasty retreat may have been precipitated by the death of Reno's Arikara scout Bloody Knife, who had been shot in the head as he sat on his horse next to Reno.

Reno and Benteen on Reno Hill[edit]

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Bloody Knife

Atop the bluffs, known today as Reno Hill, Reno's depleted and shaken troops were joined by Captain Benteen's column (Companies D, H and K), arriving from the south. This force had been returning from a lateral scouting mission when it had been summoned by Custer's messenger, Italian bugler John Martin (Giovanni Martino) with the handwritten message "Benteen. Come on, Big Village, Be quick, Bring packs. P.S. Bring Packs."[44] Benteen's coincidental arrival on the bluffs was just in time to save Reno's men from possible annihilation. Their detachments were later reinforced by McDougall's Company B and the pack train. The 14 officers and 340 troopers on the bluffs organized an all-around defense and dug rifle pits using whatever implements they had among them, including knives. This practice had become standard during the last year of the American Civil War, with both Union and Confederate troops utilizing knives, eating utensils, mess plates and pans to dig effective battlefield fortifications.[63]

Reno–Benteen defensive position

Despite hearing heavy gunfire from the north, including distinct volleys at 4:20 pm, Benteen concentrated on reinforcing Reno's badly wounded and hard-pressed detachment rather than continuing on toward Custer's position. Benteen's apparent reluctance to reach Custer prompted later criticism that he had failed to follow orders. Around 5:00 pm, Capt. Thomas Weir and Company D moved out to contact Custer.[44] They advanced a mile, to what is today Weir Ridge or Weir Point, and could see in the distance native warriors on horseback shooting at objects on the ground. By this time, roughly 5:25 pm, Custer's battle may have concluded. The conventional historical understanding is that what Weir witnessed was most likely warriors killing the wounded soldiers and shooting at dead bodies on the "Last Stand Hill" at the northern end of the Custer battlefield. Some contemporary historians have suggested instead that what Weir witnessed was a fight on what is now called Calhoun Hill, some minutes earlier. The destruction of Keogh's battalion may have begun with the collapse of L, I and C Company (half of it) following the combined assaults led by Crazy Horse, White Bull, Hump, Chief Gall and others.[64]:240 Other native accounts contradict this understanding, however, and the time element remains a subject of debate. The other entrenched companies eventually left Reno Hill and followed Weir by assigned battalions, first Benteen, then Reno, and finally the pack train. Growing attacks around Weir Ridge by natives coming from the apparently concluded Custer engagement forced all seven companies to return to the bluff before the pack train, with the ammunition, had moved even a quarter mile. The companies remained pinned down on the bluff for another day, but the natives were unable to breach the tightly held position.

Benteen was hit in the heel of his boot by an Indian bullet. At one point, he led a counterattack to push back Indians who had continued to crawl through the grass closer to the soldier's positions.[citation needed]

Custer's fight[edit]

The precise details of Custer's fight are largely conjectural since none of the men who went forward with Custer's battalion (the five companies under his immediate command) survived the battle. Later accounts from surviving Indians are useful but are sometimes conflicting and unclear.

While the gunfire heard on the bluffs by Reno and Benteen's men during the afternoon of June 25 was probably from Custer's fight, the soldiers on Reno Hill were unaware of what had happened to Custer until General Terry's arrival two days later on June 27. They were reportedly stunned by the news. When the army examined the Custer battle site, soldiers could not determine fully what had transpired. Custer's force of roughly 210 men had been engaged by the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne about 3.5 miles (5.6 km) to the north of Reno and Benteen's defensive position. Evidence of organized resistance included an apparent skirmish line on Calhoun Hill and apparent breastworks made of dead horses on Custer Hill.[64] By the time troops came to recover the bodies, the Lakota and Cheyenne had already removed most of their dead from the field. The troops found most of Custer's dead men stripped of their clothing, ritually mutilated, and in a state of decomposition, making identification of many impossible.[65] The soldiers identified the 7th Cavalry's dead as best as possible and hastily buried them where they fell.

Custer's body was found with two gunshot wounds, one to his left chest and the other to the left temple of his head. Either wound would have been fatal, though he appeared to have bled from only the chest wound; some scholars believe his head wound may have been delivered postmortem. Some Lakota oral histories assert that Custer, having sustained a wound, committed suicide to avoid capture and subsequent torture. This would be inconsistent with his known right-handedness, but that does not rule out assisted suicide (other native accounts note several soldiers committing suicide near the end of the battle).[66] Custer's body was found near the top of Custer Hill, which also came to be known as "Last Stand Hill". There the United States erected a tall memorial obelisk inscribed with the names of the 7th Cavalry's casualties.[65]

Several days after the battle, Curley, Custer's Crow scout who had left Custer near Medicine Tail Coulee (a drainage which led to the river), recounted the battle, reporting that Custer had attacked the village after attempting to cross the river. He was driven back, retreating toward the hill where his body was found.[67] As the scenario seemed compatible with Custer's aggressive style of warfare and with evidence found on the ground, it became the basis of many popular accounts of the battle.

According to Pretty Shield, the wife of Goes-Ahead (another Crow scout for the 7th Cavalry), Custer was killed while crossing the river: "... and he died there, died in the water of the Little Bighorn, with Two-bodies, and the blue soldier carrying his flag".[68]:136 In this account, Custer was allegedly killed by a Lakota called Big-nose.[68]:141 However, in Chief Gall's version of events, as recounted to Lt. Edward Settle Godfrey, Custer did not attempt to ford the river and the nearest that he came to the river or village was his final position on the ridge.[52]:380 Chief Gall's statements were corroborated by other Indians, notably the wife of Spotted Horn Bull.[52]:379 Given that no bodies of men or horses were found anywhere near the ford, Godfrey himself concluded "that Custer did not go to the ford with any body of men".[52]:380

Cheyenne oral tradition credits Buffalo Calf Road Woman with striking the blow that knocked Custer off his horse before he died.[69]

Custer at Minneconjou Ford[edit]

Hurrah boys, we've got them! We'll finish them up and then go home to our station.

— Reported words of Lieutenant Colonel Custer at the battle's outset.[70]

Having isolated Reno's force and driven them away from their encampment, the bulk of the native warriors were free to pursue Custer. The route taken by Custer to his "Last Stand" remains a subject of debate. One possibility is that after ordering Reno to charge, Custer continued down Reno Creek to within about a half-mile (800 m) of the Little Bighorn, but then turned north and climbed up the bluffs, reaching the same spot to which Reno would soon retreat. From this point on the other side of the river, he could see Reno charging the village. Riding north along the bluffs, Custer could have descended into Medicine Tail Coulee. Some historians believe that part of Custer's force descended the coulee, going west to the river and attempting unsuccessfully to cross into the village. According to some accounts, a small contingent of Indian sharpshooters effectively opposed this crossing.

White Cow Bull claimed to have shot a leader wearing a buckskin jacket off his horse in the river. While no other Indian account supports this claim, if White Bull did shoot a buckskin-clad leader off his horse, some historians have argued that Custer may have been seriously wounded by him. Some Indian accounts claim that besides wounding one of the leaders of this advance, a soldier carrying a company guidon was also hit.[71] Troopers had to dismount to help the wounded men back onto their horses.[64]:117–19 The fact that either of the non-mutilation wounds to Custer's body (a bullet wound below the heart and a shot to the left temple) would have been instantly fatal casts doubt on his being wounded and remounted.[72]

Reports of an attempted fording of the river at Medicine Tail Coulee might explain Custer's purpose for Reno's attack, that is, a coordinated "hammer-and-anvil" maneuver, with Reno's holding the Indians at bay at the southern end of the camp, while Custer drove them against Reno's line from the north. Other historians have noted that if Custer did attempt to cross the river near Medicine Tail Coulee, he may have believed it was the north end of the Indian camp, only to discover that it was the middle. Some Indian accounts, however, place the Northern Cheyenne encampment and the north end of the overall village to the left (and south) of the opposite side of the crossing.[64]:10–20 The precise location of the north end of the village remains in dispute, however.

Custer's route over battlefield, as theorized by Curtis. (Credit: Northwestern University Library Edward S. Curtis's The North American Indian, 2003).

1:5260 of Custer battlefield – surveyed 1891, detailing U.S. soldiers' body locations

Edward Curtis, the famed ethnologist and photographer of the Native American Indians, made a detailed personal study of the battle, interviewing many of those who had fought or taken part in it. First he went over the ground covered by the troops with the three Crow scouts White Man Runs Him, Goes Ahead, and Hairy Moccasin, and then again with Two Moons and a party of Cheyenne warriors. He also visited the Lakota country and interviewed Red Hawk, "whose recollection of the fight seemed to be particularly clear".[73]:44 Then, he went over the battlefield once more with the three Crow scouts, but also accompanied by General Charles Woodruff "as I particularly desired that the testimony of these men might be considered by an experienced army officer". Finally, Curtis visited the country of the Arikara and interviewed the scouts of that tribe who had been with Custer's command.[73]:44 Based on all the information he gathered, Curtis concluded that Custer had indeed ridden down the Medicine Tail Coulee and then towards the river where he probably planned to ford it. However, "the Indians had now discovered him and were gathered closely on the opposite side".[73]:48 They were soon joined by a large force of Sioux who (no longer engaging Reno) rushed down the valley. This was the beginning of their attack on Custer who was forced to turn and head for the hill where he would make his famous "last stand". Thus, wrote Curtis, "Custer made no attack, the whole movement being a retreat".[73]:49

Other views of Custer's actions at Minneconjou Ford[edit]

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Other historians claim that Custer never approached the river, but rather continued north across the coulee and up the other side, where he gradually came under attack. According to this theory, by the time Custer realized he was badly outnumbered, it was too late to retreat to the south where Reno and Benteen could have provided assistance. Two men from the 7th Cavalry, the young Crow scout Ashishishe (known in English as Curley) and the trooper Peter Thompson, claimed to have seen Custer engage the Indians. The accuracy of their recollections remains controversial; accounts by battle participants and assessments by historians almost universally discredit Thompson's claim.

Archaeological evidence and reassessment of Indian testimony has led to a new interpretation of the battle. In the 1920s, battlefield investigators discovered hundreds of .45–55 shell cases along the ridge line known today as Nye-Cartwright Ridge, between South Medicine Tail Coulee and the next drainage at North Medicine Tail (also known as Deep Coulee). Some historians believe Custer divided his detachment into two (and possibly three) battalions, retaining personal command of one while presumably delegating Captain George W. Yates to command the second.

Evidence from the 1920s supports the theory that at least one of the companies made a feint attack southeast from Nye-Cartwright Ridge straight down the center of the "V" formed by the intersection at the crossing of Medicine Tail Coulee on the right and Calhoun Coulee on the left. The intent may have been to relieve pressure on Reno's detachment (according to the Crow scout Curley, possibly viewed by both Mitch Bouyer and Custer) by withdrawing the skirmish line into the timber near the Little Bighorn River. Had the U.S. troops come straight down Medicine Tail Coulee, their approach to the Minneconjou Crossing and the northern area of the village would have been masked by the high ridges running on the northwest side of the Little Bighorn River.

That they might have come southeast, from the center of Nye-Cartwright Ridge, seems to be supported by Northern Cheyenne accounts of seeing the approach of the distinctly white-colored horses of Company E, known as the Grey Horse Company. Its approach was seen by Indians at that end of the village. Behind them, a second company, further up on the heights, would have provided long-range cover fire. Warriors could have been drawn to the feint attack, forcing the battalion back towards the heights, up the north fork drainage, away from the troops providing cover fire above. The covering company would have moved towards a reunion, delivering heavy volley fire and leaving the trail of expended cartridges discovered 50 years later.

Last stand[edit]

Custer's Last Stand by Edgar Samuel Paxson

Painting of Gen'l Custer's last stand, looking in the direction of ford and Indian village

S. J. Morrow photograph of Gen'l Custer's last stand, looking in the direction of ford and Indian village (showing Horse Bones)

Scene of Custer's Last Stand, looking in the direction of the Indian village and the deep ravine. Photo by Stanley J. Morrow, spring 1877.

Scene of Custer's Last Stand, looking in the direction of the Indian village and the deep ravine. Taken November 2011.

Keogh Battlefield Marker 1879

Mitch Boyer (age at time of photo unknown).

Mitch Bouyer marker on Deep Ravine trail. Deep Ravine is to the right of this picture (south/southwest) and about 65 yards distant.

The 7th Cavalry's trumpet was found in 1878 on the grounds of the Little Bighorn Battlefield (Custer's Last Stand) and is on display in Camp Verde in Arizona

Fanciful 1876 illustration of Lieutenant Colonel Custer on horseback and his U.S. Army troops making their last charge at the Battle of the Little Bighorn

Lieutenant Colonel Custer and his U.S. Army troops are defeated in battle with Native American Lakota Sioux and Northern Cheyenne on the Little Bighorn Battlefield, June 25, 1876 at Little Bighorn River, Montana

In the end, the hilltop to which Custer had moved was probably too small to accommodate all of the survivors and wounded. Fire from the southeast made it impossible for Custer's men to secure a defensive position all around Last Stand Hill where the soldiers put up their most dogged defense. According to Lakota accounts, far more of their casualties occurred in the attack on Last Stand Hill than anywhere else. The extent of the soldiers' resistance indicated they had few doubts about their prospects for survival. According to Cheyenne and Sioux testimony, the command structure rapidly broke down, although smaller "last stands" were apparently made by several groups. Custer's remaining companies (E, F, and half of C) were soon killed.

By almost all accounts, the Lakota annihilated Custer's force within an hour of engagement.[74][75][76] David Humphreys Miller, who between 1935 and 1955 interviewed the last Lakota survivors of the battle, wrote that the Custer fight lasted less than one-half hour.[77] Other native accounts said the fighting lasted only "as long as it takes a hungry man to eat a meal." The Lakota asserted that Crazy Horse personally led one of the large groups of warriors who overwhelmed the cavalrymen in a surprise charge from the northeast, causing a breakdown in the command structure and panic among the troops. Many of these men threw down their weapons while Cheyenne and Sioux warriors rode them down, "counting coup" with lances, coup sticks, and quirts. Some Native accounts recalled this segment of the fight as a "buffalo run."[78]

Captain Frederick Benteen, battalion leader of Companies D, H and K, recalled his observations on the Custer battlefield on June 27, 1876

I went over the battlefield carefully with a view to determine how the battle was fought. I arrived at the conclusion I [hold] now—that it was a rout, a panic, until the last man was killed ...

There was no line formed on the battlefield. You can take a handful of corn and scatter [the kernels] over the floor, and make just such lines. There were none ... The only approach to a line was where 5 or 6 [dead] horses found at equal distances, like skirmishers [part of Lt. Calhoun's Company L]. That was the only approach to a line on the field. There were more than 20 [troopers] killed [in one group]; there were [more often] four or five at one place, all within a space of 20 to 30 yards [of each other] ... I counted 70 dead [cavalry] horses and 2 Indian ponies.

I think, in all probability, that the men turned their horses loose without any orders to do so. Many orders might have been given, but few obeyed. I think that they were panic stricken; it was a rout, as I said before.[79]

A Brulé Sioux warrior stated: "In fact, Hollow Horn Bear believed that the troops were in good order at the start of the fight, and kept their organization even while moving from point to point."[80] Red Horse, an Oglala Sioux warrior, commented: "Here [Last Stand Hill] the soldiers made a desperate fight."[81] One Hunkpapa Sioux warrior, Moving Robe, noted that "It was a hotly contested battle",[82] while another, Iron Hawk, stated: "The Indians pressed and crowded right in around Custer Hill. But the soldiers weren't ready to die. We stood there a long time."[83] In a letter from February 21, 1910, Private William Taylor, Company M, 7th Cavalry, wrote: "Reno proved incompetent and Benteen showed his indifference—I will not use the uglier words that have often been in my mind. Both failed Custer and he had to fight it out alone."[84]

Custer's final resistance[edit]

Recent archaeological work at the battlefield indicates that officers on Custer Hill restored some tactical control.[47]:255–259 E Company rushed off Custer Hill toward the Little Bighorn River but failed to reach it, which resulted in the destruction of that company. This left about 50-60 men, mostly from F Company and the staff, on Last Stand Hill. The remainder of the battle took on the nature of a running fight. Modern archaeology and historical Indian accounts indicate that Custer's force may have been divided into three groups, with the Indians attempting to prevent them from effectively reuniting. Indian accounts describe warriors (including women) running up from the village to wave blankets in order to scare off the soldiers' horses. One 7th Cavalry trooper claimed finding a number of stone mallets consisting of a round cobble weighing 8–10 pounds (about 4 kg) with a rawhide handle, which he believed had been used by the Indian women to finish off the wounded.[85]:314 Fighting dismounted, the soldiers' skirmish lines were overwhelmed. Army doctrine would have called for one man in four to be a horseholder behind the skirmish lines and, in extreme cases, one man in eight. Later, the troops would have bunched together in defensive positions and are alleged to have shot their remaining horses as cover. As individual troopers were wounded or killed, initial defensive positions would have been abandoned as untenable.[86]

Under threat of attack, the first U.S. soldiers on the battlefield three days later hurriedly buried the troopers in shallow graves, more or less where they had fallen. A couple of years after the battle, markers were placed where men were believed to have fallen, so the placement of troops has been roughly construed. The troops evidently died in several groups, including on Custer Hill, around Captain Myles Keogh, and strung out towards the Little Bighorn River.[86]

Last break-out attempt[edit]

According to Indian accounts, about forty men on Custer Hill made a desperate stand around Custer, delivering volley fire.[64] The great majority of the Indian casualties were probably suffered during this closing segment of the battle, as the soldiers and Indians on Calhoun Ridge were more widely separated and traded fire at greater distances for most of their portion of the battle than did the soldiers and Indians on Custer Hill.[64]:282

Modern documentaries suggest that there may not have been a "Last Stand", as traditionally portrayed in popular culture. Instead, archaeologists suggest that in the end, Custer's troops were not surrounded but rather overwhelmed by a single charge. This scenario corresponds to several Indian accounts stating Crazy Horse's charge swarmed the resistance, with the surviving soldiers fleeing in panic.[64][note 4] Many of these troopers may have ended up in a deep ravine 300–400 yards away from what is known today as Custer Hill. At least 28 bodies (the most common number associated with burial witness testimony), including that of scout Mitch Bouyer, were discovered in or near that gulch, their deaths possibly the battle's final actions.

Although the marker for Mitch Bouyer was found accurate through archaeological and forensic testing of remains, it is some 65 yards away from Deep Ravine.[14]:82 Historian Douglas Scott theorized that the "Deep Gulch" or "Deep Ravine" might have included not only the steep sided portion of the coulee, but the entire drainage including its tributaries, in which case the bodies of Bouyer and others were found where eyewitnesses had said they were seen.[85]

Other archaeological explorations done in Deep Ravine found no human remains associated with the battle.[85]:39–48 Over the years since the battle, skeletal remains that were reportedly recovered from the mouth of the Deep Ravine by various sources have been repatriated to the Little Big Horn National Monument. According to Scott, it is likely that in the 108 years between the battle and Scott's excavation efforts in the ravine, geological processes caused many of the remains to become unrecoverable. For example, near the town of Garryowen, portions of the skeleton of a trooper killed in the Reno Retreat were recovered from an eroding bank of the Little Big Horn, while the rest of the remains had apparently been washed away by the river.[85]

The shallow-draft steamer Far West was chartered by the Army to carry supplies for the Custer expedition. After the battle, captain and pilot Grant Marsh set a speed record bringing wounded men and news of the Custer disaster back to Fort Lincoln.[87][88]

Aftermath[edit]

After the Custer force was soundly defeated, the Lakota and Northern Cheyenne regrouped to attack Reno and Benteen. The fight continued until dark (approximately 9:00 pm) and for much of the next day, with the outcome in doubt. Reno credited Benteen's luck with repulsing a severe attack on the portion of the perimeter held by Companies H and M.[note 5] On June 27, the column under General Terry approached from the north, and the natives drew off in the opposite direction. The Crow scout White Man Runs Him was the first to tell General Terry's officers that Custer's force had "been wiped out." Reno and Benteen's wounded troops were given what treatment was available at that time; five later died of their wounds. One of the regiment's three surgeons had been with Custer's column, while another, Dr. DeWolf, had been killed during Reno's retreat.[89] The only remaining doctor was Assistant Surgeon Henry R. Porter.[90]

The first to hear the news of the Custer disaster were those aboard the steamboat Far West, which had brought supplies for the expedition. Curley, one of Custer's scouts, rode up to the steamboat, and tearfully conveyed the information to Grant Marsh, the boat's captain, and army officers. Marsh converted the Far West into a floating field hospital to carry the 52 wounded from the battle to Fort Lincoln. Traveling night and day, with a full head of steam, Marsh brought the steamer downriver to Bismarck, Dakota Territory, making the 710 mi (1,140 km) run in the record time of 54 hours and bringing the first news of the military defeat which came to be popularly known as the "Custer Massacre." It was the news story of the century, with the editor of the Bismarck paper keeping the telegraph operator busy for hours transmitting information to the New York Herald (for which he corresponded). News of the defeat arrived in the East as the U.S. was observing its centennial.[91][92] The Army began to investigate, although its effectiveness was hampered by a concern for survivors, and the reputation of the officers. Custer's wife, Elisabeth Bacon Custer, in particular, guarded and promoted the ideal of him as the gallant hero, attacking any who cast an ill light on his reputation.[93][94]

The Battle of the Little Bighorn had far-reaching consequences for the Natives. It was the beginning of the end of the 'Indian Wars' and has even been referred to as "the Indians' last stand"[95] in the area. Within 48 hours of the battle, the large encampment on the Little Bighorn broke up into smaller groups because there was not enough game and grass to sustain a large congregation of people and horses.[96]

Oglala Sioux Black Elk recounted the exodus this way: "We fled all night, following the Greasy Grass. My two younger brothers and I rode in a pony-drag, and my mother put some young pups in with us. They were always trying to crawl out and I was always putting them back in, so I didn't sleep much."[97]

The scattered Sioux and Cheyenne feasted and celebrated during July with no threat from soldiers. After their celebrations, many of the Natives returned to the reservation. Soon the number of warriors amounted to only about 600.[98] Both Crook and Terry remained immobile for seven weeks after the battle, awaiting reinforcements and unwilling to venture out against the Sioux and Cheyenne until they had at least 2,000 men. Crook and Terry finally took the field against the Natives forces in August. General Nelson A. Miles took command of the effort in October 1876. In May 1877, Sitting Bull escaped to Canada. Within days, Crazy Horse surrendered at Fort Robinson, Nebraska. The Great Sioux War ended on May 7 with Miles' defeat of a remaining band of Miniconjou Sioux.[96]

Ownership of the Black Hills, which had been a focal point of the 1876 conflict, was determined by an ultimatum issued by the Manypenny Commission, according to which the Sioux were required to cede the land to the United States if they wanted the government to continue supplying rations to the reservations. Threatened with forced starvation, the Natives ceded Paha Sapa to the United States,[99] but the Sioux never accepted the legitimacy of the transaction. They lobbied Congress to create a forum to decide their claim and subsequently litigated for 40 years; the United States Supreme Court in the 1980 decision United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians acknowledged[note 6] that the United States had taken the Black Hills without just compensation. The Sioux refused the money subsequently offered and continue to insist on their right to occupy the land.

This Helena, Montana newspaper article did not report the June 25 battle until July 6, referring to a July 3 story from a Bozeman, Montana newspaper—itself eight days after the event.[100]

The New York Times also appears to have first reported the event on July 6. The earliest journalistic communication cited in the Times article was dated July 2—a full week after the massacre.[101] Full text is here.

Former U.S. Army Crow Scouts visiting the Little Bighorn battlefield, circa 1913

Plenty Coups Edward Curtis Portrait (c1908). When the Crows got news from the battlefield, they went into grief. Crow woman Pretty Shield told how they were "crying ... for Son-of-the-morning-star [Custer] and his blue soldiers ..."[102] With the defeat of Custer, it was still a real threat that the Lakotas would take-over the eastern part of the Crow reservation and keep up the invasion. In the end, the army won the Sioux war. Crow chief Plenty Coups recalled with amazement, how his tribe now finally could sleep without fear for Lakota attacks. "... this was the first time I had ever known such a condition."[103]

Crow warrior Two Leggings joined the U.S. army for a short time after the defeat of Custer. Two Belly had given him and nearly 30 other Crows a lecture and explained how the Sioux had taken the hunting grounds of the Crow. "Two Belly said ... we should help the soldiers drive them back to their own country."[104]

Participants[edit]

7th Cavalry officers[edit]

Memorial Marker as seen from the east

Memorial Marker plaque

Memorial Marker as seen from the west

Marker indicating where General Custer fell among soldiers – denoted with black-face, in center of photo

Commanding Officer: Lt. Col. George Armstrong Custer (killed)

Maj. Marcus Reno

Adjutant: 1st Lt. William W. Cooke (killed)

Assistant Surgeon George Edwin Lord (killed)

Acting Assistant Surgeon James Madison DeWolf (killed)

Acting Assistant Surgeon Henry Rinaldo Porter

Chief of Scouts: 2nd Lt. Charles Varnum (detached from A Company, wounded)

2nd in command of Scouts: 2nd Lt. Luther Hare (detached from K Company)

Pack Train commander: 1st Lt. Edward Gustave Mathey (detached from M Company)

A Company: Capt. Myles Moylan, 1st Lt. Charles DeRudio[105]

B Company: Capt. Thomas McDougall, 2nd Lt. Benjamin Hodgson (killed) as Adjutant to Major Reno

C Company: Capt. Thomas Custer (killed), 2nd Lt. Henry Moore Harrington (killed)

D Company: Capt. Thomas Weir, 2nd Lt. Winfield Edgerly

E Company: 1st Lt. Algernon Smith (killed), 2nd Lt. James G. Sturgis (killed)

F Company: Capt. George Yates (killed), 2nd Lt. William Reily (killed)

G Company: 1st Lt. Donald McIntosh (killed), 2nd Lt. George D. Wallace

H Company: Capt. Frederick Benteen, 1st Lt. Francis Gibson

I Company: Capt. Myles Keogh (killed), 1st Lt. James Porter (killed)

K Company: 1st Lt. Edward Settle Godfrey

L Company: 1st Lt. James Calhoun (killed), 2nd Lt. John J. Crittenden (killed)

M Company: Capt. Thomas French

Native American leaders and "warriors"[edit]

Pretty Nose who, according to her grandson, was a woman war chief who participated in the battle

Marker stone on the battlefield

The English term "warriors" is used for convenience; however, the term easily leads to misconceptions and mistranslations (such as the vision of "soldiers falling into his camp"). The Lakota had formed a "Strongheart Society" of caretakers and providers for the camp, consisting of men who had demonstrated compassion, generosity and bravery. As the purpose of the tribes' gathering was to take counsel, they did not constitute an army or warrior class.[106]

Hunkpapa (Lakota): Sitting Bull, Four Horns, Crow King, Chief Gall, Black Moon, Rain-in-the-Face, Moving Robe Woman, Spotted Horn Bull, Iron Hawk, One Bull, Bull Head, Chasing Eagle, Little Big Man

Sihasapa (Blackfoot Lakota): Crawler, Kill Eagle

Minneconjou (Lakota): Chief Hump, Black Moon, Red Horse, Makes Room, Looks Up, Lame Deer, Dog-with-Horn, Dog Back Bone, White Bull, Feather Earring, Flying By

Sans Arc (Lakota): Spotted Eagle, Red Bear, Long Road, Cloud Man

Oglala (Lakota): Crazy Horse, He Dog, Kicking Bear, Flying Hawk, Chief Long Wolf, Black Elk, White Cow Bull, Running Eagle, Black Fox II

Brule (Lakota): Two Eagles, Hollow Horn Bear, Brave Bird

Two Kettles (Lakota): Runs-the-Enemy

Lower Yanktonai (Dakota): Thunder Bear, Medicine Cloud, Iron Bear, Long Tree

Wahpekute (Dakota): Inkpaduta, Sounds-the-Ground-as-He-Walks, White Eagle, White Tracking Earth

Black Powder (Sioux Firearms trader): Black Powder, Johann Smidt

Northern Cheyenne: Two Moons, Wooden Leg, Old Bear, Lame White Man, American Horse, Brave Wolf, Antelope Women, Thunder Bull Big Nose, Yellow Horse, Little Shield, Horse Road, Bob Tail Horse, Yellow Hair, Bear-Walks-on-a-Ridge, Black Hawk, Buffalo Calf Road Woman, Crooked Nose, Noisy Walking

Arapahoes: Waterman, Sage, Left Hand, Yellow Eagle, Little Bird

Arapaho participation[edit]

Modern-day accounts include Arapaho warriors in the battle, but the five Arapaho men who were at the encampments were there only by accident. While on a hunting trip they came close to the village by the river and were captured and almost killed by the Lakota who believed the hunters were scouts for the U.S. Army. Two Moons, a Northern Cheyenne leader, interceded to save their lives.[107]

Notable scouts/interpreters[edit]

Three of Custer's scouts accompanying Edward Curtis on his investigative tour of the battlefield, circa 1907. Left to right: Goes Ahead, Hairy Moccasin, White Man Runs Him, Curtis and Alexander B. Upshaw (Curtis's assistant and Crow interpreter).

The 7th Cavalry was accompanied by a number of scouts and interpreters:

Bloody Knife: Arikara/Lakota scout (killed)

Bob Tailed Bull: Arikara scout (killed)

Boy Chief: Arikara scout

Charley Reynolds: scout (killed)

Curley: Crow scout

Curling Head: Arikara scout

Fred Gerard: interpreter

Goes Ahead: Crow scout

Goose: Arikara scout (wounded in the hand by a 7th Cavalry trooper)

Hairy Moccasin: Crow scout

Half Yellow Face, leader of Crow Scouts, also known as Paints Half His Face Yellow[73]:46

Isaiah Dorman: interpreter (killed)

Little Brave: Arikara scout (killed)

Little Sioux: Arikara scout

Mitch Bouyer: scout/interpreter (killed)

One Feather: Arikara scout

Owl: Arikara scout

Curley, Custer's Crow scout and interpreter through the battle.

Grave of Curley

Peter Jackson: half-Pikuni and half Blackfoot brother of William, scout

Red Bear: Arikara scout

Red Star: Arikara scout

Running Wolf: Arikara scout

Sitting Bear: Arikara scout

Soldier: Arikara scout

Strikes The Lodge: Arikara scout

Strikes Two: Arikara scout

Two Moons: Arikara/Cheyenne scout

White Man Runs Him: Crow scout

White Swan: Crow Scout (severely wounded)

William Jackson: half-Pikuni and half Blackfoot scout

Young Hawk: Arikara scout

Order of battle[edit]

Native Americans

Native Americans Tribe Leaders

Native Americans

    

Lakota Sioux

  

Hunkpapa: Sitting Bull, Four Horns, Crow King, Chief Gall, Black Moon, Rain-in-the-Face, Moving Robe Women, Spotted Horn Bull, Iron Hawk, One Bull, Bull Head, Chasing Eagle

Sihasapa: Crawler, Kill Eagle

Minneconjou: Chief Hump, Black Moon, Red Horse, Makes Room, Looks Up, Lame Deer, Dog-with-Horn, Dog Back Bone, White Bull, Feather Earring, Flying By

Sans Arc: Spotted Eagle, Red Bear, Long Road, Cloud Man

Oglala: Crazy Horse, He Dog, Kicking Bear, Flying Hawk, American Horse the Elder, Chief Long Wolf, Black Elk, White Cow Bull, Running Eagle, Black Fox II

Brule: Two Eagles, Hollow Horn Bear, Brave Bird

Two Kettles: Runs-the-Enemy

Dakota Sioux

  

Lower Yanktonai: Thunder Bear, Medicine Cloud, Iron Bear, Long Tree

Wahpekute: Inkpaduta, Sounds-the-Ground-as-He-Walks, White Eagle, White Tracking Earth

Northern Cheyenne

  

Northern Cheyenne: Two Moons, Wooden Leg, Old Bear, Lame White Man †, American Horse, Brave Wolf, Antelope Women, Thunder Bull Big Nose, Yellow Horse, Little Shield, Horse Road, Bob Tail Horse, Yellow Hair, Bear-Walks-on-a-Ridge, Black Hawk, Buffalo Calf Road Woman, Crooked Nose, Noisy Walking†

Arapaho

  

Arapahoes: Waterman, Sage, Left Hand, Yellow Eagle, Little Bird

United States Army, Lieutenant Colonel George A. Custer, 7th United States Cavalry Regiment, Commanding.

7th United States Cavalry Regiment Battalion Companies and Others

Lieutenant Colonel George A. Custer †, commanding.

    

Custer's Battalion

   Lieutenant Colonel George A. Custer †

Company C: Captain Thomas Custer †

Company E: First Lieutenant Algernon Smith †

Company F: Captain George Yates †

Company I: Captain Myles Keogh †

Company L: First Lieutenant James Calhoun †

Reno's Battalion

   Major Marcus Reno

Company A: Captain Myles Moylan

Company G: First Lieutenant Donald McIntosh †

Company M: Captain Thomas French

Benteen's Battalion

   Captain Frederick Benteen

Company D: Captain Thomas Weir

Company H: Captain Frederick Benteen

Company K: First Lieutenant Edward Settle Godfrey

Pack Train

   First Lieutenant Edward Gustave Mathey

Company B: Captain Thomas McDougall

Scouts and Interpreters

   Second Lieutenant Charles Varnum (wounded), Chief of Scouts

Bloody Knife †, Charley Reynolds †, Isaiah Dorman †, Mitch Bouyer †, Bob Tailed Bull†, Little Brave†, White Swan (severely wounded), Goose (wounded), Curley, Curling Head, Fred Gerard, Goes Ahead, Boy Chief, Hairy Moccasin, Half Yellow Face (Paints Half His Face Yellow), Little Sioux, One Feather, Owl, Peter Jackson, William Jackson, Red Bear, Red Star, Running Wolf, Sitting Bear, Soldier, Strikes The Lodge, Strikes Two, Two Moons, White Man Runs Him, Young Hawk

Casualties[edit]

Native American warriors[edit]

Estimates of Native American casualties have differed widely, from as few as 36 dead (from Native American listings of the dead by name) to as many as 300.[108] Lakota chief Red Horse told Col. W. H. Wood in 1877 that the Native Americans suffered 136 dead and 160 wounded during the battle.[109] In 1881, Red Horse told Dr. C. E. McChesney the same numbers but in a series of drawings done by Red Horse to illustrate the battle, he drew only sixty figures representing Lakota and Cheyenne casualties. Of those sixty figures only thirty some are portrayed with a conventional Plains Indian method of indicating death. In the last 140 years, historians have been able to identify multiple Indian names pertaining to the same individual, which has greatly reduced previously inflated numbers. Today a list of positively known casualties exists that lists 99 names, attributed and consolidated to 31 identified warriors.[110]

Red Horse pictographic account of Lakota casualties in the Battle of the Little Bighorn, 1881

Red Horse

 

Red Horse pictographic account of the Battle of the Little Bighorn, 1881. 0000.png

 

Red Horse pictographic account of the Battle of the Little Bighorn, 1881. 0100.png

 

Plate XLIV

 

Plate XLV

 

Indians leaving the Battlefield Plate XLVIII

Native American noncombatants[edit]

Six unnamed Native American women and four unnamed children are known to have been killed at the beginning of the battle during Reno's charge. Among them were two wives and three children of the Hunkpapa Leader Pizi (Gall).[citation needed]

7th Cavalry[edit]

The 7th Cavalry suffered 52 percent casualties: 16 officers and 242 troopers killed or died of wounds, 1 officer and 51 troopers wounded. Every soldier of the five companies with Custer was killed (except for some Crow scouts and several troopers that had left that column before the battle or as the battle was starting). Among the dead were Custer's brothers Boston and Thomas, his brother-in-law James Calhoun, and his nephew Henry Reed.

In 1878, the army awarded 24 Medals of Honor to participants in the fight on the bluffs for bravery, most for risking their lives to carry water from the river up the hill to the wounded.[111] Few on the non-Indian side questioned the conduct of the enlisted men, but many questioned the tactics, strategy and conduct of the officers. Indian accounts spoke of soldiers' panic-driven flight and suicide by those unwilling to fall captive to the Indians. While such stories were gathered by Thomas Bailey Marquis in a book in the 1930s, it was not published until 1976 because of the unpopularity of such assertions.[112] Although soldiers may have believed captives would be tortured, Indians usually killed men outright and took as captive for adoption only young women and children.[112] Indian accounts also noted the bravery of soldiers who fought to the death.[113]

Red Horse pictographic account of dead U.S. cavalrymen in the Battle of the Little Bighorn, 1881

Red Horse pictographic account of the Battle of the Little Bighorn, 1881. 0300.png

 

Cavalrymen and two Indian Government scouts[?]

 

Red Horse pictographic account of the Battle of the Little Bighorn, 1881. 0500.png

 

Cavalrymen and dead cavalry horses

 

[114]

Civilians killed (armed and embedded within the Army)[edit]

Boston Custer: brother of George and Thomas, forager for the 7th

Mark Kellogg: reporter

Henry Armstrong Reed: Custer's nephew, herder for the 7th

Legacy[edit]

Reconstitution of the 7th Cavalry[edit]

Beginning in July, the 7th Cavalry was assigned new officers[115][note 7] and recruiting efforts began to fill the depleted ranks. The regiment, reorganized into eight companies, remained in the field as part of the Terry Expedition, now based on the Yellowstone River at the mouth of the Bighorn and reinforced by Gibbon's column. On August 8, 1876, after Terry was further reinforced with the 5th Infantry, the expedition moved up Rosebud Creek in pursuit of the Lakota. It met with Crook's command, similarly reinforced, and the combined force, almost 4,000 strong, followed the Lakota trail northeast toward the Little Missouri River. Persistent rain and lack of supplies forced the column to dissolve and return to its varying starting points. The 7th Cavalry returned to Fort Abraham Lincoln to reconstitute. The regimental commander, Colonel Samuel D. Sturgis, returned from his detached duty in St. Louis, Missouri. Sturgis led the 7th Cavalry in the campaign against the Nez Perce in 1877.

Expansion of the U.S. Army[edit]

The U.S. Congress authorized appropriations to expand the Army by 2,500 men to meet the emergency after the defeat of the 7th Cavalry. For a session, the Democratic Party-controlled House of Representatives abandoned its campaign to reduce the size of the Army. Word of Custer's fate reached the 44th United States Congress as a conference committee was attempting to reconcile opposing appropriations bills approved by the House and the Republican Senate. They approved a measure to increase the size of cavalry companies to 100 enlisted men on July 24. The committee temporarily lifted the ceiling on the size of the Army by 2,500 on August 15.[116]

"Sell or Starve"[edit]

Main article: Black Hills land claim

As a result of the defeat in June 1876, Congress responded by attaching what the Sioux call the "sell or starve" rider (19 Stat. 192) to the Indian Appropriations Act of 1876 (enacted August 15, 1876), which cut off all rations for the Sioux until they terminated hostilities and ceded the Black Hills to the United States.[117][118] The Agreement of 1877 (19 Stat. 254, enacted February 28, 1877) officially took away Sioux land and permanently established Indian reservations.

Controversies[edit]

Reno's conduct[edit]

The Battle of the Little Bighorn was the subject of an 1879 U.S. Army Court of Inquiry in Chicago, held at Reno's request, during which his conduct was scrutinized.[119] Some testimony by non-Army officers suggested that he was drunk and a coward. The court found Reno's conduct to be without fault. After the battle, Thomas Rosser, James O'Kelly, and others continued to question the conduct of Reno due to his hastily ordered retreat.[120] Defenders of Reno at the trial noted that, while the retreat was disorganized, Reno did not withdraw from his position until it became apparent that he was outnumbered and outflanked by the Indians. Contemporary accounts also point to the fact that Reno's scout, Bloody Knife, was shot in the head, spraying him with blood, possibly increasing his panic and distress.[47]

Custer's errors[edit]

General Terry and others claimed that Custer made strategic errors from the start of the campaign. For instance, he refused to use a battery of Gatling guns, and turned down General Terry's offer of an additional battalion of the 2nd Cavalry. Custer believed that the Gatling guns would impede his march up the Rosebud and hamper his mobility. His rapid march en route to the Little Bighorn averaged nearly 30 miles (48 km) a day, so his assessment appears to have been accurate. Custer planned "to live and travel like Indians; in this manner the command will be able to go wherever the Indians can", he wrote in his Herald dispatch.[121]

Death of Custer, scene by Pawnee Bill's Wild West Show performers c. 1905 of Sitting Bull's stabbing Custer, with dead Native Americans lying on ground

By contrast, each Gatling gun had to be hauled by four horses, and soldiers often had to drag the heavy guns by hand over obstacles. Each of the heavy, hand-cranked weapons could fire up to 350 rounds a minute, an impressive rate, but they were known to jam frequently. During the Black Hills Expedition two years earlier, a Gatling gun had turned over, rolled down a mountain, and shattered to pieces. Lieutenant William Low, commander of the artillery detachment, was said to have almost wept when he learned he had been excluded from the strike force.[121]

Custer believed that the 7th Cavalry could handle any Indian force and that the addition of the four companies of the 2nd would not alter the outcome. When offered the 2nd Cavalry, he reportedly replied that the 7th "could handle anything."[122] There is evidence that Custer suspected that he would be outnumbered by the Indians, although he did not know by how much. By dividing his forces, Custer could have caused the defeat of the entire column, had it not been for Benteen's and Reno's linking up to make a desperate yet successful stand on the bluff above the southern end of the camp.[123]

The historian James Donovan believed that Custer's dividing his force into four smaller detachments (including the pack train) can be attributed to his inadequate reconnaissance; he also ignored the warnings of his Crow scouts and Charley Reynolds.[124] By the time the battle began, Custer had already divided his forces into three battalions of differing sizes, of which he kept the largest. His men were widely scattered and unable to support each other.[125][126] Wanting to prevent any escape by the combined tribes to the south, where they could disperse into different groups,[46] Custer believed that an immediate attack on the south end of the camp was the best course of action.

Admiration for Custer[edit]

Criticism of Custer was not universal. While investigating the battlefield, Lieutenant General Nelson A. Miles wrote in 1877, "The more I study the moves here [on the Little Big Horn], the more I have admiration for Custer."[127] Facing major budget cutbacks, the U.S. Army wanted to avoid bad press and found ways to exculpate Custer. They blamed the defeat on the Indians' alleged possession of numerous repeating rifles and the overwhelming numerical superiority of the warriors.[note 8]

The widowed Elizabeth Bacon Custer, who never remarried, wrote three popular books in which she fiercely protected her husband's reputation.[128][note 9] She lived until 1933, hindering much serious research until most of the evidence was long gone.[129] In addition, Captain Frederick Whittaker's 1876 book idealizing Custer was hugely successful.[130] Custer as a heroic officer fighting valiantly against savage forces was an image popularized in Wild West extravaganzas hosted by showman "Buffalo Bill" Cody, Pawnee Bill, and others. It was not until over half a century later that historians took another look at the battle and Custer's decisions that led to his death and loss of half his command and found much to criticize.[131]

Gatling gun controversy[edit]

General Alfred Terry's Dakota column included a single battery of artillery, comprising two 3-inch Ordnance rifle and two Gatling guns.[132][133] (According to historian Evan S. Connell, the precise number of Gatlings has not been established: either two or three.)[134]

The Gatling gun, invented in 1861 by Richard Gatling. Custer declined an offer of a battery of these weapons, explaining to Terry that they would "hamper our movements". Said Custer: "The 7th can handle anything it meets."[135]

Custer's decision to reject Terry's offer of the rapid-fire Gatlings has raised questions among historians as to why he refused them and what advantage their availability might have conferred on his forces at the Battle of the Little Bighorn. [136][137][138]

One factor concerned Major Marcus Reno's recent 8-day reconnaissance-in-force of the Powder-Tongue-Rosebud Rivers, June 10 to 18.[139][140] This deployment had demonstrated that artillery pieces mounted on gun carriages and hauled by horses no longer fit for cavalry mounts (so-called condemned horses) were cumbersome over mixed terrain and vulnerable to breakdowns.[141][142][143][144] Custer, valuing the mobility of the 7th Cavalry and recognizing Terry's acknowledgement of the regiment as "the primary strike force" preferred to remain unencumbered by the Gatling guns.[145][146][147][148] Custer insisted that the artillery was superfluous to his success, in that the 7th Cavalry alone was sufficient to cope with any force they should encounter, informing Terry: "The 7th can handle anything it meets".[149][150][151][152] In addition to these practical concerns, a strained relationship with Major James Brisbin induced Custer's polite refusal to integrate Brisbin's Second Cavalry unit—and the Gatling guns—into his strike force, as it would disrupt any hierarchical arrangements that Custer presided over.[153][154][155]

Historians have acknowledged the firepower inherent in the Gatling gun: they were capable of firing 350 .45-70 caliber rounds per minute. Jamming caused by black powder residue could lower that rate,[156][157] raising questions as to their reliability under combat conditions.[158][159] Researchers have further questioned the effectiveness of the guns under the tactics that Custer was likely to face with the Lakota and Cheyenne warriors. The Gatlings, mounted high on carriages, required the battery crew to stand upright during its operation, making them easy targets for Lakota and Cheyenne sharpshooters.[160]

Historian Robert M. Utley, in a section entitled "Would Gatling Guns Have Saved Custer?" presents two judgments from Custer's contemporaries: General Henry J. Hunt, expert in the tactical use of artillery in Civil War, stated that Gatlings "would probably have saved the command", whereas General Nelson A. Miles, participant in the Great Sioux War declared "[Gatlings] were useless for Indian fighting." [161]

Weapons[edit]

Lakota and Cheyenne[edit]

A Henry Rifle and a Winchester Mod 1866 Rifle. These repeater rifles were capable of higher rates of fire than the Springfield Trapdoor.

The Lakota and Cheyenne warriors that opposed Custer's forces possessed a wide array of weaponry, from war clubs and lances to the most advanced firearms of the day.[162] The typical firearms carried by the Lakota and Cheyenne combatants were muzzleloaders, more often a cap-lock smoothbore, the so-called Indian trade musket or Leman guns[163][164] distributed to Indians by the US government at treaty conventions.[165] Less common were surplus .58 caliber rifled muskets of American Civil War vintage such as the Enfield and Springfield.[166] Metal cartridge weapons were prized by native combatants, such as the Henry and the Spencer lever-action rifles, as well as Sharps breechloaders.[167] Bows and arrows were utilized by younger braves in lieu of the more potent firearms; effective up to 30 yards (27 meters), the arrows could readily maim or disable an opponent.[168]

Sitting Bull's forces had no assured means to supply themselves with firearms and ammunition.[169] Nonetheless, they could usually procure these through post-traders, licensed or unlicensed, and from gunrunners who operated in the Dakota Territory: "...a horse or a mule for a repeater...buffalo hides for ammunition."[170] Custer's highly regarded guide, "Lonesome" Charley Reynolds, informed his superior in early 1876 that Sitting Bull's forces were amassing weapons, including numerous Winchester repeating rifles and abundant ammunition.[171]

Of the guns owned by Lakota and Cheyenne fighters at the Little Bighorn, approximately 200 were repeating rifles[172] corresponding to about 1 of 10 of the encampment's two thousand able-bodied fighters who participated in the battle.[173]

7th Cavalry[edit]

Colt Single Action Army, serial No 5773 7th Cavalry issued

Springfield Trapdoor Rifle with breech open. Custer's troops were equipped with these breech-loading, single-shot rifles.

The troops under Custer's command carried two regulation firearms authorized and issued by the U.S. Army in early 1876: the breech-loading, single-shot Springfield Model 1873 carbine, and the 1873 Colt single-action revolver.[174] The regulation M1860 saber or "long knives" were not carried by troopers upon Custer's order.[175][176]

Except for a number of officers and scouts who opted for personally owned and more expensive rifles and handguns, the 7th Cavalry was uniformly armed.[177][178][179]

Ammunition allotments provided 100 carbine rounds per trooper, carried on a cartridge belt and in saddlebags on their mounts. An additional 50 carbine rounds per man were reserved on the pack train that accompanied the regiment to the battlefield. Each trooper had 24 rounds for his Colt handgun.[180]

The opposing forces, though not equally matched in the number and type of arms, were comparably outfitted, and neither side held an overwhelming advantage in weaponry.[181]

Lever-action repeaters vs. single-shot breechloaders[edit]

Two hundred or more Lakota and Cheyenne combatants are known to have been armed with Henry, Winchester, or similar lever-action repeating rifles at the battle.[172][182] Virtually every trooper in the 7th Cavalry fought with the single-shot, breech-loading Springfield carbine and the Colt revolver.[183]

Historians have asked whether the repeating rifles conferred a distinct advantage on Sitting Bull's villagers that contributed to their victory over Custer's carbine-armed soldiers.[184]

Historian Michael L. Lawson offers a scenario based on archaeological collections at the "Henryville" site, which yielded plentiful Henry rifle cartridge casings from approximately 20 individual guns. Lawson speculates that though less powerful than the Springfield carbines, the Henry repeaters provided a barrage of fire at a critical point, driving Lieutenant James Calhoun's L Company from Calhoun Hill and Finley Ridge, forcing it to flee in disarray back to Captain Myles Keogh's I Company and leading to the disintegration of that wing of Custer's Battalion.[185]

Model 1873 / 1884 Springfield carbine and the U.S. Army[edit]

After exhaustive testing—including comparisons to domestic and foreign single-shot and repeating rifles—the Army Ordnance Board (whose members included officers Marcus Reno and Alfred Terry) authorized the Springfield as the official firearm for the United States Army.[186][187]

The Springfield, manufactured in a .45-70 long rifle version for the infantry and a .45-55 light carbine version for the cavalry, was judged a solid firearm that met the long-term and geostrategic requirements of the United States fighting forces.[188]

Tomahawk and sabre; or even odds, painting by Charles Schreyvogel (1861–1912). This kind of combat never occurred at the Battle of the Little Bighorn: none of the 7th Cavalry carried sabers on Custer's orders.

Historian Mark Gallear claims that U.S. government experts rejected the lever-action repeater designs, deeming them ineffective in a clash with fully equipped European armies, or in case of an outbreak of another civil conflict. Gallear's analysis dismisses the allegation that rapid depletion of ammunition in lever-action models influenced the decision in favor of the single-shot Springfield. The Indian Wars are portrayed by Gallear as a minor theatre of conflict whose contingencies were unlikely to govern the selection of standard weaponry for an emerging industrialized nation.[189]

The Springfield carbine is praised for its "superior range and stopping power" by historian James Donovan, and author Charles M. Robinson reports that the rifle could be "loaded and fired much more rapidly than its muzzle-loading predecessors, and had twice the range of repeating rifles such as the Winchester, Henry and Spencer."[190][191][192]

Gallear points out that lever-action rifles, after a burst of rapid discharge, still required a reloading interlude that lowered their overall rate of fire; Springfield breechloaders "in the long run, had a higher rate of fire, which was sustainable throughout a battle."[193]

The breechloader design patent for the Springfield's Erskine S. Allin trapdoor system was owned by the US government and the firearm could be easily adapted for production with existing machinery at the Springfield Armory in Massachusetts.[194] At time when funding for the post-war Army had been slashed, the prospect for economical production influenced the Ordnance Board member selection of the Springfield option.[195]

Malfunction of the Springfield carbine extractor mechanism[edit]

Whether the reported malfunction of the Model 1873 Springfield carbine issued to the 7th Cavalry contributed to their defeat has been debated for years.[196]

That the weapon experienced jamming of the extractor is not contested, but its contribution to Custer's defeat is considered negligible. This conclusion is supported by evidence from archaeological studies performed at the battlefield, where the recovery of Springfield cartridge casing, bearing tell-tale scratch marks indicating manual extraction, were rare. The flaw in the ejector mechanism was known to the Army Ordnance Board at the time of the selection of the Model 1873 rifle and carbine, and was not considered a significant shortcoming in the overall worthiness of the shoulder arm.[197] With the ejector failure in US Army tests as low as 1:300, the Springfield carbine was vastly more reliable than the muzzle-loading Springfields used in the Civil War.[198][199]

Gallear addresses the post-battle testimony concerning the copper .45-55 cartridges supplied to the troops in which an officer is said to have cleared the chambers of spent cartridges for a number of Springfield carbines.[200] This testimony of widespread fusing of the casings offered to the Chief of Ordnance at the Reno Court of Inquiry in 1879 conflicts with the archaeological evidence collected at the battlefield. Field data showed that possible extractor failures occurred at a rate of approximately 1:30 firings at the Custer Battlefield and at a rate of 1:37 at the Reno-Benteen Battlefield.[201][202][203]

Historian Thom Hatch observes that the Model 1873 Springfield, despite the known ejector flaw, remained the standard issue shoulder arm for US troops until the early 1890s.[204]

Survivor claims[edit]

John Martin wearing the US Army uniform, ca. 1904

Soldiers under Custer's direct command were annihilated on the first day of the battle (except for three Crow scouts and several troopers (including John Martin (Giovanni Martino)) that had left that column before the battle; one Crow scout, Curly, was the only survivor to leave after the battle had begun), although for years rumors persisted of other survivors.[note 10]

Over 120 men and women would come forward over the course of the next 70 years claiming they were "the lone survivor" of Custer's Last Stand.[205] The phenomenon became so widespread that one historian remarked, "Had Custer had all of those who claimed to be 'the lone survivor' of his two battalions he would have had at least a brigade behind him when he crossed the Wolf Mountains and rode to the attack."[206]

The historian Earl Alonzo Brininstool suggested he had collected at least 70 "lone survivor" stories.[207][208] Michael Nunnally, an amateur Custer historian, wrote a booklet describing 30 such accounts.[209] W. A. Graham claimed that even Libby Custer received dozens of letters from men, in shocking detail, about their sole survivor experience.[210] At least 125 alleged "single survivor" tales have been confirmed in the historical record as of July 2012.

Frank Finkel, from Dayton, Washington, had such a convincing story that historian Charles Kuhlman[211] believed the alleged survivor, going so far as to write a lengthy defense of Finkel's participation in the battle.[212] Douglas Ellison—mayor of Medora, North Dakota, and an amateur historian—also wrote a book in support of the veracity of Finkel's claim,[213] but most scholars reject it.[214][215]

Some of these survivors held a form of celebrity status in the United States, among them Raymond Hatfield "Arizona Bill" Gardner[216] and Frank Tarbeaux.[217] A few even published autobiographies that detailed their deeds at the Little Bighorn.[218][219][220]

A modern historian, Albert Winkler, has asserted that there is some evidence to support the case of Private Gustave Korn being a genuine survivor of the battle: 'While nearly all of the accounts of men who claimed to be survivors from Custer's column at the Battle of the Little Bighorn are fictitious, Gustave Korn's story is supported by contemporary records.' Several contemporary accounts note that Korn's horse bolted in the early stages of the battle, whilst he was serving with Custer's 'I' company, and that he ended up joining Reno's companies making their stand on Reno Hill.[221]

Almost as soon as men came forward implying or directly pronouncing their unique role in the battle, there were others who were equally opposed to any such claims. Theodore Goldin, a battle participant who later became a controversial historian on the event, wrote (in regards to Charles Hayward's claim to have been with Custer and taken prisoner):

The Indians always insisted that they took no prisoners. If they did—a thing I firmly believe—they were tortured and killed the night of the 25th. As an evidence of this I recall the three charred and burned heads we picked up in the village near the scene of the big war dance, when we visited the village with Capt. Benteen and Lieut. Wallace on the morning of the 27th... I'm sorely afraid, Tony, that we will have to class Hayward's story, like that of so many others, as pure, unadulterated B. S. As a clerk at headquarters I had occasion to look over the morning reports of at least the six troops at Lincoln almost daily, and never saw his name there, or among the list of scouts employed from time to time ... I am hoping that some day all of these damned fakirs will die and it will be safe for actual participants in the battle to admit and insist that they were there, without being branded and looked upon as a lot of damned liars. Actually, there have been times when I have been tempted to deny that I ever heard of the 7th Cavalry, much less participated with it in that engagement ... My Medal of Honor and its inscription have served me as proof positive that I was at least in the vicinity at the time in question, otherwise I should be tempted to deny all knowledge of the event.[222]

The only documented and verified survivor of Custer's command (having been actually involved in Custer's part of the battle) was Captain Keogh's horse, Comanche. The wounded horse was discovered on the battlefield by General Terry's troops, and although other cavalry mounts survived they had been taken by the Indians. Comanche eventually was returned to the fort and became the regimental mascot.[note 11] Several other badly wounded horses were found and killed at the scene.[223] Writer Evan S. Connell noted in Son of the Morning Star:[224]

Comanche in 1887

Comanche was reputed to be the only survivor of the Little Bighorn, but quite a few Seventh Cavalry mounts survived, probably more than one hundred, and there was even a yellow bulldog. Comanche lived on another fifteen years, and when he died, he was stuffed and to this day remains in a glass case at the University of Kansas. So, protected from moths and souvenir hunters by his humidity-controlled glass case, Comanche stands patiently, enduring generation after generation of undergraduate jokes. The other horses are gone, and the mysterious yellow bulldog is gone, which means that in a sense the legend is true. Comanche alone survived.

Battlefield preservation[edit]

Main article: Little Bighorn Battlefield National Monument

Photo taken in 1894 by H.R. Locke on Battle Ridge looking toward Last Stand Hill (top center). To the right of Custer Hill is Wooden Leg Hill, named for a surviving warrior. He described the death of a Sioux sharpshooter killed after being seen too often by the enemy.[225][226]

The battlefield in 2005

US Casualty Marker Battle of the Little Bighorn

The site of the battle was first preserved as a United States national cemetery in 1879 to protect the graves of the 7th Cavalry troopers. In 1946, it was re-designated as the Custer Battlefield National Monument, reflecting its association with Custer. In 1967, Major Marcus Reno was re-interred in the cemetery with honors, including an eleven-gun salute. Beginning in the early 1970s, there was concern within the National Park Service over the name Custer Battlefield National Monument failing to adequately reflect the larger history of the battle between two cultures. Hearings on the name change were held in Billings on June 10, 1991, and during the following months Congress renamed the site the Little Bighorn Battlefield National Monument.

Indian Memorial by Colleen Cutschall[227]

United States memorialization of the battlefield began in 1879 with a temporary monument to the U.S. dead. In 1881, the current marble obelisk was erected in their honor. In 1890, marble blocks were added to mark the places where the U.S. cavalry soldiers fell.

Nearly 100 years later, ideas about the meaning of the battle have become more inclusive. The United States government acknowledged that Native American sacrifices also deserved recognition at the site. The 1991 bill changing the name of the national monument also authorized an Indian Memorial to be built near Last Stand Hill in honor of Lakota and Cheyenne warriors. The commissioned work by native artist Colleen Cutschall is shown in the photograph at right. On Memorial Day 1999, in consultation with tribal representatives, the U.S. added two red granite markers to the battlefield to note where Native American warriors fell. As of December 2006, a total of ten warrior markers have been added (three at the Reno–Benteen Defense Site and seven on the Little Bighorn Battlefield).[228]

The Indian Memorial, themed "Peace Through Unity" l is an open circular structure that stands 75 yards (69 metres) from the 7th Cavalry obelisk. Its walls have the names of some Indians who died at the site, as well as native accounts of the battle. The open circle of the structure is symbolic, as for many tribes, the circle is sacred. The "spirit gate" window facing the Cavalry monument is symbolic as well, welcoming the dead cavalrymen into the memorial.[229]

In popular culture[edit]

See also: Cultural depictions of George Armstrong Custer

John Mulvany's 1881 painting Custer's Last Rally was the first of the large images of this battle. It was 11 ft by 20 ft and toured the country for over 17 years.[230]

In 1896, Anheuser-Busch commissioned from Otto Becker a lithographed, modified version of Cassilly Adams' painting Custer's Last Fight, which was distributed as a print to saloons all over America.[231]

Edgar Samuel Paxson completed his painting Custer's Last Stand in 1899. In 1963 Harold McCracken, the noted historian and Western art authority, deemed Paxson's painting "the best pictoral representation of the battle" and "from a purely artistic standpoint...one of the best if not the finest pictures which have been created to immortalize that dramatic event."[232]

In 1927, Little Big Horn opened in theaters in the U.S., featuring Roy Stewart with John Beck as Custer.[233]

The 1964 novel, Little Big Man by American author Thomas Berger, and 1970 film of the same name, includes an account of the battle, and portrays a manic and somewhat psychotic Custer (Richard Mulligan) realizing to his horror that he and his command are "being wiped out."[234]

In 2007, the BBC presented a one-hour drama-documentary titled Custer's Last Stand.[235]

The May 2011 episode of the BBC Radio 4 program In Our Time featured Melvyn Bragg (and guests) discussing the context, conditions, and consequences of the battle.[236]

In 2017, historian Daniele Bolelli covered the battle and the events leading to it in a three-part series on the "History on Fire" podcast.[237]

George Armstrong Custer (December 5, 1839 – June 25, 1876) was a United States Army officer and cavalry commander in the American Civil War[1] and the American Indian Wars.[2]

Custer graduated from West Point in 1861 at the bottom of his class,[3] but as the Civil War was just starting, trained officers were in immediate demand. He worked closely with General George B. McClellan and the future General Alfred Pleasonton, both of whom recognized his qualities as a cavalry leader, and he was promoted to brigadier general of volunteers at age 23. Only a few days after his promotion, he fought at the Battle of Gettysburg, where he commanded the Michigan Cavalry Brigade and despite being outnumbered, defeated J. E. B. Stuart's attack at what is now known as the East Cavalry Field. In 1864, he served in the Overland Campaign and in Philip Sheridan's army in the Shenandoah Valley, defeating Jubal Early at Cedar Creek. His division blocked the Army of Northern Virginia's final retreat and received the first flag of truce from the Confederates. He was present at Robert E. Lee's surrender to Ulysses S. Grant at Appomattox Court House, Virginia.

After the war, he was commissioned as a lieutenant colonel in the Regular Army and was sent west to fight in the Indian Wars. On June 25, 1876, while leading the 7th Cavalry Regiment at the Battle of the Little Bighorn in Montana Territory against a coalition of Native American tribes,[4] he was killed along with every soldier of the five companies he led after splitting the regiment into three battalions. This action became known as "Custer's Last Stand".[5]

His dramatic end was as controversial as the rest of his career, and reaction to his life and career remains deeply divided. His legend was partly of his own fabrication through his extensive journalism, and perhaps more through the energetic lobbying of his wife Elizabeth Bacon "Libbie" Custer throughout her long widowhood.[6]

Family and ancestry

Custer's paternal ancestors, Paulus and Gertrude Küster, came to the North American English colonies around 1693 from the Rhineland in Germany, probably among thousands of Palatines whose passage was arranged by the English government to gain settlers in New York and Pennsylvania.[7][8]

According to family letters, Custer was named after George Armstrong, a minister, in his devout mother's hope that her son might join the clergy.[9]

Birth, siblings, and childhood

Custer was born in New Rumley, Ohio, to Emanuel Henry Custer (1806–1892), a farmer and blacksmith, and his second wife, Marie Ward Kirkpatrick (1807–1882), who was of English and Scots-Irish descent.[10] He had two younger brothers, Thomas and Boston. His other full siblings were the family's youngest child, Margaret Custer, and Nevin Custer, who suffered from asthma and rheumatism. Custer also had three older half-siblings.[11] Custer and his brothers acquired a life-long love of practical jokes, which they played out among the close family members.[citation needed]

Emanuel Custer was an outspoken Jacksonian Democrat who taught his children politics and toughness at an early age.[12] In a February 3, 1887, letter to his son's widow Libby, Emanuel related an incident from when George Custer (known as Autie) was about four years old:

"He had to have a tooth drawn, and he was very much afraid of blood. When I took him to the doctor to have the tooth pulled, it was in the night and I told him if it bled well it would get well right away, and he must be a good soldier. When he got to the doctor he took his seat, and the pulling began. The forceps slipped off and he had to make a second trial. He pulled it out, and Autie never even scrunched. Going home, I led him by the arm. He jumped and skipped, and said 'Father you and me can whip all the Whigs in Michigan.' I thought that was saying a good deal but I did not contradict him."[13]

Education

USMA Cadet George Armstrong "Autie" Custer, ca. 1859 with a Colt Model 1855 Sidehammer Pocket Revolver.

In order to attend school, Custer lived with an older half-sister and her husband in Monroe, Michigan. Before entering the United States Military Academy, Custer attended the McNeely Normal School, later known as Hopedale Normal College, in Hopedale, Ohio. It was to train teachers for elementary schools. While attending Hopedale, Custer and classmate William Enos Emery were known to have carried coal to help pay for their room and board. After graduating from McNeely Normal School in 1856, Custer taught school in Cadiz, Ohio.[14] His first sweetheart was Mary Jane Holland.[15]

Custer entered West Point as a cadet on July 1, 1857, as a member of the class of 1862. His class numbered seventy-nine cadets embarking on a five-year course of study. With the outbreak of the American Civil War in 1861, the course was shortened to four years, and Custer and his class graduated on June 24, 1861. He was 34th in a class of 34 graduates: 23 classmates had dropped out for academic reasons while 22 classmates had already resigned to join the Confederacy.[16]

Throughout his life, Custer tested boundaries and rules. In his four years at West Point, he amassed a record total of 726 demerits, one of the worst conduct records in the history of the academy. The local minister remembered Custer as "the instigator of devilish plots both during the service and in Sunday school. On the surface he appeared attentive and respectful, but underneath the mind boiled with disruptive ideas."[17] A fellow cadet recalled Custer as declaring there were only two places in a class, the head and the foot, and since he had no desire to be the head, he aspired to be the foot. A roommate noted, "It was alright with George Custer, whether he knew his lesson or not; he simply did not allow it to trouble him."[18] Under ordinary conditions, Custer's low class rank would result in an obscure posting, the first step in a dead-end career, but Custer had the fortune to graduate as the Civil War broke out, and as a result the Union Army had a sudden need for many junior officers.

Civil War

McClellan and Pleasanton

Custer with former classmate, friend, and captured Confederate soldier, Lieutenant James Barroll Washington, an aide to General Johnston, at Fair Oaks, Virginia, 1862

Like the other graduates, Custer was commissioned as a second lieutenant; he was assigned to the 2nd U.S. Cavalry Regiment and tasked with drilling volunteers in Washington, D.C. On July 21, 1861, he was with his regiment at the First Battle of Bull Run during the Manassas Campaign, where Army commander Winfield Scott detailed him to carry messages to Major General Irvin McDowell. After the battle, he continued participating in the defense of Washington D.C. until October, when he became ill. He was absent from his unit until February 1862. In March, he participated with the 2nd Cavalry in the Peninsula Campaign in Virginia until April 4.

On April 5, Custer served in the 5th Cavalry Regiment and participated in the Siege of Yorktown from April 5 to May 4 and was aide to Major General George B. McClellan. McClellan was in command of the Army of the Potomac during the Peninsula Campaign. On May 24, 1862, during the pursuit of Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston up the Peninsula, when General McClellan and his staff were reconnoitering a potential crossing point on the Chickahominy River, they stopped, and Custer overheard General John G. Barnard mutter, "I wish I knew how deep it is." Custer dashed forward on his horse out to the middle of the river, turned to the astonished officers, and shouted triumphantly, "McClellan, that's how deep it is, General!"[19]

Custer was allowed to lead an attack with four companies of the 4th Michigan Infantry across the Chickahominy River above New Bridge. The attack was successful, resulting in the capture of 50 Confederate soldiers and the seizing of the first Confederate battle flag of the war. McClellan termed it a "very gallant affair" and congratulated Custer personally. In his role as aide-de-camp to McClellan, he began his life-long pursuit of publicity.[19] He was promoted to the rank of captain on June 5, 1862. On July 17, he was demoted to the rank of first lieutenant. He participated in the Maryland Campaign in September to October, the Battle of South Mountain on September 14, the Battle of Antietam on September 17, and the March to Warrenton, Virginia, in October.

Custer (extreme right) with President Lincoln, General McClellan and other officers at the Battle of Antietam, 1862

On June 9, 1863, he became aide to Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Alfred Pleasonton, who was commanding the Cavalry Corps, Army of the Potomac. Recalling his service under Pleasonton, he was quoted as saying that "I do not believe a father could love his son more than General Pleasonton loves me."[20] Pleasonton's first assignment was to locate the army of Robert E. Lee, moving north through the Shenandoah Valley in the beginning of what was to become the Gettysburg Campaign.

Brigade command

Custer (left) with General Pleasonton on horseback in Falmouth, Virginia, 1863

Custer (left) with Alfred Pleasonton in autumn 1863

Pleasonton was promoted on June 22, 1863, to major general of U.S. Volunteers. On June 29, after consulting with the new commander of the Army of the Potomac, George Meade, Pleasanton began replacing political generals with "commanders who were prepared to fight, to personally lead mounted attacks".[21] He found just the kind of aggressive fighters he wanted in three of his aides: Wesley Merritt, Elon J. Farnsworth (both of whom had command experience), and Custer. All received immediate promotions, Custer to brigadier general of volunteers,[22] commanding the Michigan Cavalry Brigade ("Wolverines"), part of the division of Brigadier General Judson Kilpatrick.[23] Despite having no direct command experience, he became one of the youngest generals in the Union Army at age 23. He immediately shaped his brigade to reflect his aggressive character.

Now a general officer, he had great latitude in choosing his uniform. Though often criticized as gaudy, it was more than personal vanity. Historian Tom Carhart observed that "A showy uniform for Custer was one of command presence on the battlefield: he wanted to be readily distinguishable at first glance from all other soldiers. He intended to lead from the front, and to him it was a crucial issue of unit morale that his men be able to look up in the middle of a charge, or at any other time on the battlefield, and instantly see him leading the way into danger."[24]

Hanover and Abbottstown

On June 30, 1863, Custer and the First and Seventh Michigan Cavalry had just passed through Hanover, Pennsylvania, while the Fifth and Sixth Michigan Cavalry followed about seven miles behind. Hearing gunfire, he turned and started to the sound of the guns. A courier reported that Farnsworth's Brigade had been attacked by rebel cavalry from side streets in the town. Reassembling his command, he received orders from Kilpatrick to engage the enemy northeast of town near the railway station. Custer deployed his troops and began to advance. After a brief firefight, the rebels withdrew to the northeast. This seemed odd, since it was supposed that Lee and his army were somewhere to the west. Though seemingly of little consequence, this skirmish further delayed Stuart from joining Lee. Further, as Captain James H. Kidd, commander of F troop, Sixth Michigan Cavalry, later wrote: "Under [Custer's] skillful hand the four regiments were soon welded into a cohesive unit...."[25]

Next morning, July 1, they passed through Abbottstown, Pennsylvania, still searching for Stuart's cavalry. Late in the morning they heard sounds of gunfire from the direction of Gettysburg. At Heidlersburg, Pennsylvania, that night they learned that General John Buford's cavalry had found Lee's army at Gettysburg. The next morning, July 2, orders came to hurry north to disrupt General Richard S. Ewell's communications and relieve the pressure on the Union forces. By mid afternoon, as they approached Hunterstown, Pennsylvania, they encountered Stuart's cavalry.[26] Custer rode alone ahead to investigate and found that the rebels were unaware of the arrival of his troops. Returning to his men, he carefully positioned them along both sides of the road where they would be hidden from the rebels. Further along the road, behind a low rise, he positioned the First and Fifth Michigan Cavalry and his artillery, under the command of Lieutenant Alexander Cummings McWhorter Pennington Jr. To bait his trap, he gathered A Troop, Sixth Michigan Cavalry, called out, "Come on boys, I'll lead you this time!" and galloped directly at the unsuspecting rebels. As he had expected, the rebels, "more than two hundred horsemen, came racing down the country road" after Custer and his men. He lost half of his men in the deadly rebel fire and his horse went down, leaving him on foot.[27] He was rescued by Private Norvell Francis Churchill of the 1st Michigan Cavalry, who galloped up, shot Custer's nearest assailant, and pulled Custer up behind him.[28] Custer and his remaining men reached safety, while the pursuing rebels were cut down by slashing rifle fire, then canister from six cannons. The rebels broke off their attack, and both sides withdrew.

After spending most of the night in the saddle, Custer's brigade arrived at Two Taverns, Pennsylvania, roughly five miles southeast of Gettysburg around 3 a.m. July 3. There he was joined by Farnsworth's brigade. By daybreak they received orders to protect Meade's flanks. He was about to experience perhaps his finest hours during the war.

Gettysburg

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Lee's battle plan, shared with less than a handful of subordinates, was to defeat Meade through a combined assault by all of his resources. General James Longstreet would attack Cemetery Hill from the west, Stuart would attack Culp's Hill from the southeast and Ewell would attack Culp's Hill from the north. Once the Union forces holding Culp's Hill had collapsed, the rebels would "roll up" the remaining Union defenses on Cemetery Ridge. To accomplish this, he sent Stuart with six thousand cavalrymen and mounted infantry on a long flanking maneuver.[29]

By mid-morning on July 3, Custer had arrived at the intersection of Old Dutch Road and Hanover Road, two miles east of Gettysburg. He was later joined by Brigadier General David McMurtrie Gregg, who had him deploy his men at the northeast corner. Custer then sent out scouts to investigate nearby wooded areas. Meanwhile, Gregg had positioned Colonel John Baillie McIntosh's brigade near the intersection and sent the rest of his command to picket duty two miles to the southwest. After additional deployments, 2,400 cavalry under McIntosh and 1,200 under Custer remained, together with Colonel Alexander Cummings McWhorter Pennington Jr.'s and Captain Alanson Merwin Randol's artillery, who had a total of ten three-inch guns.

About noon Custer's men heard cannon fire, Stuart's signal to Lee that he was in position and had not been detected. About the same time Gregg received a message warning that a large body of rebel cavalry had moved out on the York Pike and might be trying to get around the Union right. A second message from Pleasonton ordered Gregg to send Custer to cover the Union far left. Since Gregg had already sent most of his force off to other duties, it was clear to both Gregg and Custer that Custer must remain. They had about 2,700 men facing 6,000 Confederates.

Soon afterward fighting broke out between the skirmish lines. Stuart ordered an attack by his mounted infantry under General Albert G. Jenkins, but the Union line held, with men from the First Michigan cavalry, the First New Jersey Cavalry, and the Third Pennsylvania Cavalry. Stuart ordered Jackson's four gun battery into action. Custer ordered Pennington to answer. After a brief exchange in which two of Jackson's guns were destroyed, there was a lull.

About one o'clock, the massive Confederate artillery barrage in support of the upcoming assault on Cemetery Ridge began. Jenkins's men renewed the attack but soon ran out of ammunition and fell back. Resupplied, they again pressed the attack. Outnumbered, the Union cavalry fell back, firing as they went. Custer sent most of his Fifth Michigan cavalry ahead on foot, forcing Jenkins's men to fall back. Jenkins's men were reinforced by about 150 sharpshooters from General Fitzhugh Lee's brigade, and shortly after Stuart ordered a mounted charge by the Ninth Virginia Cavalry and the Thirteenth Virginia Cavalry. Now it was Custer's men who were running out of ammunition. The Fifth Michigan was forced back and the battle was reduced to vicious, hand-to-hand combat.

Seeing this, Custer mounted a counterattack, riding ahead of the fewer than 400 new troopers of the Seventh Michigan Cavalry, shouting, "Come on, you Wolverines!" As he swept forward, he formed a line of squadrons five ranks deep – five rows of eighty horsemen side by side – chasing the retreating rebels until their charge was stopped by a wood rail fence. The horses and men became jammed into a solid mass and were soon attacked on their left flank by the dismounted Ninth and Thirteenth Virginia Cavalry and on the right flank by the mounted First Virginia Cavalry. Custer extricated his men and raced south to the protection of Pennington's artillery near Hanover Road. The pursuing Confederates were cut down by canister, then driven back by the remounted Fifth Michigan Cavalry. Both forces withdrew to a safe distance to regroup.

It was then about three o'clock. The artillery barrage to the west had suddenly stopped. Union soldiers were surprised to see Stuart's entire force about a half mile away, coming toward them, not in line of battle, but "formed in close column of squadrons... A grander spectacle than their advance has rarely been beheld".[30] Stuart recognized he now had little time to reach and attack the Union rear along Cemetery Ridge. He must make one last effort to break through the Union cavalry.

Stuart passed by McIntosh's cavalry – the First New Jersey, Third Pennsylvania, and Company A of Purnell's Legion, which had been posted about halfway down the field – with relative ease. As Stuart approached, the Union troops were ordered back into the woods without slowing down Stuart's column, "advancing as if in review, with sabers drawn and glistening like silver in the bright sunlight...."[31]

Stuart's last obstacle was Custer and his 400 veteran troopers of the First Michigan Cavalry directly in the Confererate cavalry's path. Outnumbered but undaunted, Custer rode to the head of the regiment, "drew his saber, threw off his hat so they could see his long yellow hair" and shouted... "Come on, you Wolverines!"[32] Custer formed his men in line of battle and charged. "So sudden was the collision that many of the horses were turned end over end and crushed their riders beneath them...."[33] As the Confederate advance stopped, their right flank was struck by troopers of the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Michigan. McIntosh was able to gather some of his men from the First New Jersey and Third Pennsylvania and charged the rebel left flank. "Seeing that the situation was becoming critical, I [Captain Miller] turned to [Lieutenant Brooke-Rawle] and said: 'I have been ordered to hold this position, but, if you will back me up in case I am court-martialed for disobedience, I will order a charge.'[34] The rebel column disintegrated, and individual troopers fought with saber and pistol.

Within twenty minutes the combatants heard the sound of the Union artillery opening up on Pickett's men. Stuart knew that whatever chance he had of joining the Confederate assault was gone. He withdrew his men to Cress Ridge.[35]

Custer's brigade lost 257 men at Gettysburg, the highest loss of any Union cavalry brigade.[36] "I challenge the annals of warfare to produce a more brilliant or successful charge of cavalry", Custer wrote in his report.[37] "For Gallant And Meritorious Services", he was awarded a Regular Army brevet promotion to major.

Shenandoah Valley and Appomattox Court House

General Custer participated in Sheridan's campaign in the Shenandoah Valley. The civilian population was specifically targeted in what is known as the Burning.[38][39][40]

In 1864, with the Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac reorganized under the command of Major General Philip Sheridan, Custer (now commanding the 3rd Division) led his "Wolverines" to the Shenandoah Valley where by the year's end they defeated the army of Confederate Lieutenant General Jubal Early in the Valley Campaigns of 1864. During May and June, Sheridan and Custer (Captain, 5th Cavalry, May 8 and Brevet Lieutenant Colonel, May 11) took part in cavalry actions supporting the Overland Campaign, including the Battle of the Wilderness (after which Custer ascended to division command), and the Battle of Yellow Tavern (where J.E.B. Stuart was mortally wounded). In the largest all-cavalry engagement of the war, the Battle of Trevilian Station, in which Sheridan sought to destroy the Virginia Central Railroad and the Confederates' western resupply route, Custer captured Hampton's divisional train, but was then cut off and suffered heavy losses (including having his division's trains overrun and his personal baggage captured by the enemy) before being relieved. When Lieutenant General Early was ordered to move down the Shenandoah Valley and threaten Washington, D.C., Custer's division was again dispatched under Sheridan. In the Valley Campaigns of 1864, they pursued the Confederates at the Third Battle of Winchester and effectively destroyed Early's army during Sheridan's counterattack at Cedar Creek.

Sheridan and Custer, having defeated Early, returned to the main Union Army lines at the Siege of Petersburg, where they spent the winter. In April 1865 the Confederate lines finally broke, and Robert E. Lee began his retreat to Appomattox Court House, pursued by the Union cavalry. Custer distinguished himself by his actions at Waynesboro, Dinwiddie Court House, and Five Forks. His division blocked Lee's retreat on its final day and received the first flag of truce from the Confederate force. After a truce was arranged Custer was escorted through the lines to meet Longstreet, who described Custer as having flaxen locks flowing over his shoulders, and Custer said “in the name of General Sheridan I demand the unconditional surrender of this army.” Longstreet replied that he was not in command of the army, but if he was he would not deal with messages from Sheridan. Custer responded it would be a pity to have more blood upon the field, to which Longstreet suggested the truce be respected, and then added “General Lee has gone to meet General Grant, and it is for them to determine the future of the armies.”[41] Custer was present at the surrender at Appomattox Court House and the table upon which the surrender was signed was presented to him as a gift for his wife by Sheridan, who included a note to her praising Custer's gallantry. She treasured the gift of the historic table, which is now in the Smithsonian Institution.[42] On April 15, 1865, Custer was promoted to major general in the U.S. Volunteers, making him the youngest major general in the Union Army at age 25.

On April 25, after the war officially ended, Custer had his men search for, then illegally seize a large, prize racehorse named "Don Juan" near Clarksville, Virginia, worth then an estimated $10,000 (several hundred thousand today), along with his written pedigree. Custer rode Don Juan in the grand review victory parade in Washington, D.C., on May 23, creating a sensation when the scared thoroughbred bolted. The owner, Richard Gaines, wrote to General Grant, who then ordered Custer to return the horse to Gaines, but he did not, instead hiding the horse and winning a race with it the next year, before the horse died suddenly.[43]

Reconstruction duties in Texas

On June 3, 1865, at Sheridan's behest, Major General Custer accepted command of the 2nd Division of Cavalry, Military Division of the Southwest, to march from Alexandria, Louisiana, to Hempstead, Texas, as part of the Union occupation forces. Custer arrived at Alexandria on June 27 and began assembling his units, which took more than a month to gather and remount. On July 17, he assumed command of the Cavalry Division of the Military Division of the Gulf (on August 5, officially named the 2nd Division of Cavalry of the Military Division of the Gulf), and accompanied by his wife, he led the division (five regiments of veteran Western Theater cavalrymen) to Texas on an arduous 18-day march in August. On October 27, the division departed to Austin. On October 29, Custer moved the division from Hempstead to Austin, arriving on November 4. Major General Custer became Chief of Cavalry of the Department of Texas, from November 13 to February 1, 1866, succeeding Major General Wesley Merritt.

During his entire period of command of the division, Custer encountered considerable friction and near mutiny from the volunteer cavalry regiments who had campaigned along the Gulf coast. They desired to be mustered out of Federal service rather than continue campaigning, resented imposition of discipline (particularly from an Eastern Theater general), and considered Custer nothing more than a vain dandy.[44][45]

Custer's division was mustered out beginning in November 1865, replaced by the regulars of the U.S. 6th Cavalry Regiment. Although their occupation of Austin had apparently been pleasant, many veterans harbored deep resentments against Custer, particularly in the 2nd Wisconsin Cavalry, because of his attempts to maintain discipline. Upon its mustering out, several members planned to ambush Custer, but he was warned the night before and the attempt thwarted.[46]

Post-war options

Mathew Brady photograph of Custer. From the Liljenquist Family Collection of Civil War Photographs, Prints and Photographs Division, Library of Congress

Brevet Major General George Armstrong Custer, United States Army, 1865

Custer and Bloody Knife (kneeling left), Custer's favorite Indian Scout

"Our First Grizzly, killed by Gen. Custer and Col. Ludlow." By Illingworth, 1874, during Black Hills expedition (Left to right: Bloody Knife, George Armstrong Custer, Private John Noonan, and Captain William Ludlow)

Custer and his wife at Fort Abraham Lincoln, Dakota Territory, 1874

Hunting and camping party near Fort Abraham Lincoln (George Custer, center) 1875.(D.B. Berry) A good illustration of variety of uniforms worn by Cavalry Regiments in the west. From left to right: Lt. James Calhoun, Mr. Swett, Capt. Stephen Baker, Boston Custer, Lt. Winfield Scott Edgerly, Miss Watson, Capt. Myles Walter Keogh, Mrs. Maggie Calhoun, Mrs. Elizabeth Custer, Lt. Col. George Custer, Dr. H.O. Paulding, Mrs. Henrietta Smith, Dr. George Edwin Lord, Capt. Thomas Bell Weir, Lt. William Winer Cooke, Lt. R.E. Thompson, Miss ; Wadsworth, another Miss Wadsworth, Capt. Thomas Custer and Lt. Algernon Emery Smith. Identications c/o Denver Public Library[47]

On February 1, 1866, Major General Custer mustered out of the U.S. volunteer service and took an extended leave of absence and awaited orders until September 24.[48] He explored options in New York City,[49] where he considered careers in railroads and mining.[50] Offered a position (and $10,000 in gold) as adjutant general of the army of Benito Juárez of Mexico, who was then in a struggle with the Mexican Emperor Maximilian I (a satellite ruler of French Emperor Napoleon III), Custer applied for a one-year leave of absence from the U.S. Army, which was endorsed by Grant and Secretary Stanton. Sheridan and Mrs. Custer disapproved, however, and when his request for leave was opposed by U.S. Secretary of State William H. Seward, who was against having an American officer commanding foreign troops, Custer refused the alternative of resignation from the Army to take the lucrative post.[50][51]

Following the death of his father-in-law in May 1866, Custer returned to Monroe, Michigan, where he considered running for Congress. He took part in public discussion over the treatment of the American South in the aftermath of the Civil War, advocating a policy of moderation.[50] He was named head of the Soldiers and Sailors Union, regarded as a response to the hyper-partisan Grand Army of the Republic (GAR). Also formed in 1866, it was led by Republican activist John Alexander Logan.

In September 1866, Custer accompanied President Andrew Johnson on a journey by train known as the "Swing Around the Circle" to build up public support for Johnson's policies towards the South. Custer denied a charge by the newspapers that Johnson had promised him a colonel's commission in return for his support, but Custer had written to Johnson some weeks before seeking such a commission. Custer and his wife stayed with the president during most of the trip. At one point Custer confronted a small group of Ohio men who repeatedly jeered Johnson, saying to them: "I was born two miles and a half from here, but I am ashamed of you."[52]

Indian Wars

Main article: American Indian Wars § Great Plains

On July 28, 1866, Custer was appointed lieutenant colonel of the newly created 7th Cavalry Regiment,[53] which was headquartered at Fort Riley, Kansas.[54] He served on frontier duty at Fort Riley from October 18 to March 26, and scouted in Kansas and Colorado until July 28, 1867. He took part in Major General Winfield Scott Hancock's expedition against the Cheyenne. On June 26, Lt. Lyman Kidder's party, made up of ten troopers and one scout, were massacred while en route to Fort Wallace. Lt. Kidder was to deliver dispatches to Custer from General Sherman, but his party was attacked by Lakota Sioux and Cheyenne. Days later, Custer and a search party found the bodies of Kidder's patrol.

Following the Hancock campaign, Custer was arrested and suspended at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, until August 12, 1868, for being AWOL, after having abandoned his post to see his wife. At the request of Major General Sheridan, who wanted him for his planned winter campaign against the Cheyenne, he was allowed to return to duty before his one year term of suspension had expired and joined his regiment to October 7, 1868. He then went on frontier duty, scouting in Kansas and Indian Territory to October 1869.

Under Sheridan's orders, he took part in establishing Camp Supply in Indian Territory in early November 1868 as a supply base for the winter campaign. On November 27, 1868, he led the 7th Cavalry Regiment in an attack on the Cheyenne encampment of Chief Black Kettle – the Battle of Washita River. He reported killing 103 warriors and some women and children; 53 women and children were taken as prisoners. Estimates by the Cheyenne of their casualties were substantially lower (11 warriors plus 19 women and children).[55] Custer had his men shoot most of the 875 Indian ponies they had captured.[56] The Battle of Washita River was regarded as the first substantial U.S. victory in the Southern Plains War, and it helped force a large portion of the Southern Cheyenne onto a U.S.-assigned reservation.

In 1873, he was sent to the Dakota Territory to protect a railroad survey party against the Lakota. On August 4, 1873, near the Tongue River, the 7th Cavalry Regiment clashed for the first time with the Lakota. One man on each side was killed. In 1874 Custer led an expedition into the Black Hills and announced the discovery of gold on French Creek near present-day Custer, South Dakota. Custer's announcement triggered the Black Hills Gold Rush. Among the towns that immediately sprung up was Deadwood, South Dakota, notorious for its lawlessness.

Grant, Belknap and politics

Further information: Trader post scandal

Lieutenant Colonel George A. Custer, 7th U.S. Cavalry, ca. 1875

In 1875, the Grant administration attempted to buy the Black Hills region from the Sioux. When the Sioux refused to sell, they were ordered to report to reservations by the end of January, 1876. Mid-winter conditions made it impossible for them to comply. The administration labeled them "hostiles" and tasked the Army with bringing them in. Custer was to command an expedition planned for the spring, part of a three-pronged campaign. While Custer's expedition marched west from Fort Abraham Lincoln, near present-day Mandan, North Dakota, troops under Colonel John Gibbon were to march east[57] from Fort Ellis, near present-day Bozeman, Montana, while a force under General George Crook was to march north[57] from Fort Fetterman, near present-day Douglas, Wyoming.

Custer's 7th Cavalry was originally scheduled to leave Fort Abraham Lincoln on April 6, 1876, but on March 15 he was summoned to Washington to testify at congressional hearings. Rep. Hiester Clymer's Committee was investigating alleged corruption involving Secretary of War William W. Belknap (who had resigned March 2), President Grant's brother Orville and traders granted monopolies at frontier Army posts.[58] It was alleged that Belknap had been selling these lucrative trading post positions where soldiers were required to make their purchases. Custer himself had experienced first hand the high prices being charged at Fort Lincoln.[59]

Concerned that he might miss the coming campaign, Custer did not want to go to Washington. He asked to answer questions in writing, but Clymer insisted.[60] Recognizing that his testimony would be explosive, Custer tried "to follow a moderate and prudent course, avoiding prominence."[61] Despite this, he provided a quantity of unsubstantiated accusations against Belknap.[57] His testimony, given on March 29 and April 4, was a sensation, being loudly praised by the Democratic press and sharply criticized by Republicans. Custer wrote articles published anonymously in The New York Herald that exposed trader post kickback rings and implied that Belknap was behind them. During his testimony, Custer attacked President Grant's brother Orville on unproven grounds of extorting money in exchange for exerting undue influence.[57] Historian Stephen E. Ambrose speculated that around this time Custer was presented with the idea of becoming the Democratic candidate in the upcoming 1876 United States presidential election, adding further motivation for Custer to rejoin his regiment and win further accolades in the Sioux Wars.[62]

After Custer testified, Belknap was impeached and the case sent to the Senate for trial. Custer asked the impeachment managers to release him from further testimony. With the help of a request from his superior, Brigadier General Alfred Terry, Commander of the Department of Dakota, he was excused.[57] However, President Grant intervened, ordering that another officer fulfill Custer's military duty.[57] General Terry protested, arguing that he had no available officers of rank qualified to replace Custer. Both Sheridan and Sherman wanted Custer in command but had to support Grant. General Sherman, hoping to resolve the issue, advised Custer to meet personally with Grant before leaving Washington. Three times Custer requested meetings with the president, but each request was refused.[63]

Finally, Custer gave up and took a train to Chicago on May 2, planning to rejoin his regiment. A furious Grant ordered Sheridan to arrest Custer for leaving Washington without permission. On May 3, a member of Sheridan's staff arrested Custer as he arrived in Chicago.[64] The arrest sparked public outrage. The New York Herald called Grant the "modern Caesar" and asked, "Are officers... to be dragged from railroad trains and ignominiously ordered to stand aside until the whims of the Chief magistrate ... are satisfied?"[65] Grant relented but insisted that Terry—not Custer—personally command the expedition. Terry met Custer in St. Paul, Minnesota, on May 6. He later recalled that Custer "with tears in his eyes, begged for my aid. How could I resist it?"[66] Custer and Terry both wrote telegrams to Grant asking that Custer lead his regiment, with Terry in command.[57] Sheridan endorsed the effort.[57]

Grant was already under pressure for his treatment of Custer. His administration worried that if the "Sioux campaign" failed without Custer, then Grant would be blamed for ignoring the recommendations of senior Army officers. On May 8, Custer was told that he would lead the expedition, but only under Terry's direct supervision. Elated, Custer told General Terry's chief engineer, Captain Ludlow, that he would "cut loose" from Terry and operate independently.[67]

Battle of the Little Bighorn

Main article: Battle of the Little Bighorn

William W. Cooke, Custer's Adjutant officer

Bloody Knife, Custer's scout, on Yellowstone Expedition, 1873

The 7th Cavalry's trumpet was found in 1878 on the grounds of the Little Bighorn Battlefield (Custer's Last Stand) and is on display in Camp Verde in Arizona

By the time of Custer's Black Hills expedition in 1874, the level of conflict and tension between the U.S. and many of the Plains Indians tribes (including the Lakota Sioux and the Cheyenne) had become exceedingly high. European-Americans continually broke treaty agreements and advanced further westward, resulting in violence and acts of depredation by both sides. To take possession of the Black Hills (and thus the gold deposits), and to stop Indian attacks, the U.S. decided to corral all remaining free Plains Indians. The Grant government set a deadline of January 31, 1876, for all Lakota and Arapaho wintering in the "unceded territory" to report to their designated agencies (reservations) or be considered "hostile".[68]

At that time the 7th Cavalry's regimental commander, Colonel Samuel D. Sturgis, was on detached duty as the Superintendent of Mounted Recruiting Service and in command of the Cavalry Depot in St. Louis, Missouri,[69] which left Lieutenant Colonel Custer in command of the regiment. Custer and the 7th Cavalry departed from Fort Abraham Lincoln on May 17, 1876, part of a larger army force planning to round up remaining free Indians. Meanwhile, in the spring and summer of 1876, the Hunkpapa Lakota holy man Sitting Bull had called together the largest ever gathering of Plains Indians at Ash Creek, Montana (later moved to the Little Bighorn River) to discuss what to do about the whites.[70] It was this united encampment of Lakota, Northern Cheyenne, and Arapaho Indians that the 7th met at the Battle of the Little Bighorn in the Crow Indian Reservation[71] created in old Crow Country. (In the Fort Laramie Treaty (1851), the valley of the Little Bighorn is in the heart of the Crow Indian treaty territory and accepted as such by the Lakota, the Cheyenne and the Arapaho).[72] The Lakotas were staying in the valley without consent from the Crow tribe,[73] which sided with the Army to expel the Indian invaders.[74]

About June 15, Major Marcus Reno, while on a scout, discovered the trail of a large village on the Rosebud River.[75] On June 22, Custer's entire regiment was detached to follow this trail. On June 25, some of Custer's Crow Indian scouts identified what they claimed was a large Indian encampment in the valley near the Little Bighorn River. Custer had first intended to attack the Indian village the next day, but since his presence was known, he decided to attack immediately and divided his forces into three battalions: one led by Major Reno, one by Captain Frederick Benteen, and one by himself. Captain Thomas M. McDougall and Company B were with the pack train. Reno was sent north to charge the southern end of the encampment, Custer rode north, hidden to the east of the encampment by bluffs and planning to circle around and attack from the north,[76][77] and Benteen was initially sent south and west to scout Indian presence and potentially protect the column from the south.

Reno began a charge on the southern end of the village but halted some 500–600 yards short of the camp, and had his men dismount and form a skirmish line.[78] They were soon overcome by mounted Lakota and Cheyenne warriors who counterattacked en masse against Reno's exposed left flank,[79] forcing Reno and his men to take cover in the trees along the river. Eventually, however, the troopers engaged in a bloody retreat up onto the bluffs above the river, where they made their own stand.[80][81] This, the opening action of the battle, cost Reno a quarter of his command.

Custer may have seen Reno stop and form a skirmish line as Custer led his command to the northern end of the main encampment, where he may have planned to sandwich the Indians between his attacking troopers and Reno's command in a "hammer and anvil" maneuver.[82] According to Grinnell's account, based on the testimony of the Cheyenne warriors who survived the fight,[83] at least part of Custer's command attempted to ford the river at the north end of the camp but were driven off by Indian sharpshooters firing from the brush along the west bank of the river. From that point the soldiers were pursued by hundreds of warriors onto a ridge north of the encampment. Custer and his command were prevented from digging in by Crazy Horse however, whose warriors had outflanked him and were now to his north, at the crest of the ridge.[84] Traditional white accounts attribute to Gall the attack that drove Custer up onto the ridge, but Indian witnesses have disputed that account.[85]

Hurrah boys, we've got them! We'll finish them up and then go home to our station.

—Words reportedly said by General Custer early in the engagement.[86]

For a time, Custer's men appear to have been deployed by company, in standard cavalry fighting formation—the skirmish line, with every fourth man holding the horses, though this arrangement would have robbed Custer of a quarter of his firepower. Worse, as the fight intensified, many soldiers could have taken to holding their own horses or hobbling them, further reducing the 7th's effective fire. When Crazy Horse and White Bull mounted the charge that broke through the center of Custer's lines, order may have broken down among the soldiers of Calhoun's command,[87] though Myles Keogh's men seem to have fought and died where they stood. According to some Lakota accounts, many of the panicking soldiers threw down their weapons[88] and either rode or ran towards the knoll where Custer, the other officers, and about 40 men were making a stand. Along the way, the warriors rode them down, counting coup by striking the fleeing troopers with their quirts or lances.[89]

Initially, Custer had 208 officers and men under his direct command, with an additional 142 under Reno, just over 100 under Benteen, and 50 soldiers with Captain McDougall's rearguard, accompanying 84 soldiers under 1st Lieutenant Edward Gustave Mathey with the pack train. The Lakota-Cheyenne coalition may have fielded over 1,800 warriors.[90] Historian Gregory Michno settles on a low number of around 1,000 based on contemporary Lakota testimony, but other sources place the number at 1,800 or 2,000, especially in the works by Utley and Fox. The 1,800–2,000 figure is substantially lower than the higher numbers of 3,000 or more postulated by Ambrose, Gray, Scott, and others. Some of the other participants in the battle gave higher estimates:

Spotted Horn Bull – 5,000 braves and leaders

Maj. Reno – 2,500 to 5,000 warriors

Capt. Moylan – 3,500 to 4,000

Lt. Hare – not under 4,000

Lt. Godfrey – minimum between 2,500 and 3,000

Lt. Edgerly – 4,000

Lt. Varnum – not less than 4,000

Sgt. Kanipe – fully 4,000

George Herendeen – fully 3,000

Fred Gerard – 2,500 to 3,000

An average of the above is 3,500 Indian warriors and leaders.[91]

As the troopers of Custer's five companies were cut down, the native warriors stripped the dead of their firearms and ammunition, with the result that the return fire from the cavalry steadily decreased, while the fire from the Indians constantly increased. The surviving troopers apparently shot their remaining horses to use as breastworks for a final stand on the knoll at the north end of the ridge. The warriors closed in for the final attack and killed every man in Custer's command. As a result, the Battle of the Little Bighorn has come to be popularly known as "Custer's Last Stand".

Personal life

George and Libbie Custer, 1864

On February 9, 1864, Custer married Elizabeth Clift Bacon (1842–1933), whom he had first seen when he was ten years old.[92] He had been socially introduced to her in November 1862, when home in Monroe on leave. She was not initially impressed with him,[93] and her father, Judge Daniel Bacon, disapproved of Custer as a match because he was the son of a blacksmith. It was not until well after Custer had been promoted to the rank of brigadier general that he gained the approval of Judge Bacon. He married Elizabeth Bacon fourteen months after they formally met.[94]

In November 1868, following the Battle of Washita River, Custer was alleged (by Captain Frederick Benteen, chief of scouts Ben Clark, and Cheyenne oral tradition) to have unofficially married Mo-nah-se-tah, daughter of the Cheyenne chief Little Rock in the winter or early spring of 1868–1869 (Little Rock was killed in the one-day action at Washita on November 27).[95] Mo-nah-se-tah gave birth to a child in January 1869, two months after the Washita battle. Cheyenne oral history tells that she also bore a second child fathered by Custer in late 1869. Some historians, however, believe that Custer had become sterile after contracting gonorrhea while at West Point and that the father was in actuality his brother Thomas.[96] Clarke's description in his memoirs included the statement, "Custer picked out a fine looking one and had her in his tent every night."[97]

Death

It is unlikely that any Native American recognized Custer during or after the battle. Michno summarizes: "Shave Elk said, 'We did not suspect that we were fighting Custer and did not recognize him either alive or dead.' Wooden Leg said no one could recognize any enemy during the fight, for they were too far away. The Cheyennes did not even know a man named Custer was in the fight until weeks later. Antelope said none knew of Custer being at the fight until they later learned of it at the agencies. Thomas Marquis learned from his interviews that no Indian knew Custer was at the Little Bighorn fight until months later. Many Cheyennes were not even aware that other members of the Custer family had been in the fight until 1922 when Marquis himself first informed them of that fact."[98]

Several individuals claimed responsibility for killing Custer, including White Bull of the Miniconjous, Rain-in-the-Face, Flat Lip, and Brave Bear.[99] In June 2005, at a public meeting, Northern Cheyenne storytellers said that according to their oral tradition, Buffalo Calf Road Woman, a Northern Cheyenne heroine of the Battle of the Rosebud, struck the final blow against Custer, which knocked him off his horse before he died.[100]

A contrasting version of Custer's death is suggested by the testimony of an Oglala named Joseph White Cow Bull, according to novelist and Custer biographer Evan Connell. He says that Joseph White Bull stated he had shot a rider wearing a buckskin jacket and big hat at the riverside when the soldiers first approached the village from the east. The initial force facing the soldiers, according to this version, was quite small (possibly as few as four warriors) yet challenged Custer's command. The rider who was hit was mounted next to a rider who bore a flag and had shouted orders that prompted the soldiers to attack, but when the buckskin-clad rider fell off his horse after being shot, many of the attackers reined up. The allegation that the buckskin-clad officer was Custer, if accurate, might explain the supposed rapid disintegration of Custer's forces.[101] However, several other officers of the Seventh, including William Cooke, Tom Custer and William Sturgis, were also dressed in buckskin on the day of the battle, and the fact that each of the non-mutilation wounds to George Custer's body (a bullet wound below the heart and a shot to the left temple) would have been instantly fatal casts doubt on his being wounded or killed at the ford, more than a mile from where his body was found.[102] The circumstances are, however, consistent with David Humphreys Miller's suggestion that Custer's attendants would not have left his dead body behind to be desecrated.[103]

During the 1920s, two elderly Cheyenne women spoke briefly with oral historians about their having recognized Custer's body on the battlefield and said that they had stopped a Sioux warrior from desecrating the body. The women were relatives of Mo-nah-se-tah, who was alleged to have been Custer's lover in late 1868 and through 1869, and borne two children by him. Mo-nah-se-tah was among 53 Cheyenne women and children taken captive by the 7th Cavalry after the Battle of Washita River in 1868, in which Custer commanded an attack on the camp of Chief Black Kettle. Mo-nah-se-tah's father, Cheyenne chief Little Rock, was killed in the battle.[104] During the winter and early spring of 1868–1869, Custer reportedly sexually assaulted teenage Mo-nah-se-tah. Cheyenne oral history alleges that she later bore Custer's child in late 1869.[104][95] (Custer, however, had apparently become sterile after contracting venereal disease at West Point, leading some historians to believe that the father was really his brother Thomas).[95] In the Cheyenne culture of the time, such a relationship was considered a marriage. The women allegedly told the warrior: "Stop, he is a relative of ours," and then shooed him away. The two women said they shoved their sewing awls into his ears to permit Custer's corpse to "hear better in the afterlife" because he had broken his promise to Stone Forehead never to fight against Native Americans again.[105]

When the main column under General Terry arrived two days later, the army found most of the soldiers' corpses stripped, scalped, and mutilated.[106][107] Custer's body had two bullet holes, one in the left temple and one just below the heart.[108] Capt. Benteen, who inspected the body, stated that in his opinion the fatal injuries had not been the result of .45 caliber ammunition, which implies the bullet holes had been caused by ranged rifle fire.[109] Some time later, Lieutenant Edward S. Godfrey described Custer's mutilation, telling Charles F. Bates that an arrow "had been forced up his penis."[110]

The bodies of Custer and his brother Tom were wrapped in canvas and blankets, then buried in a shallow grave, covered by the basket from a travois held in place by rocks. When soldiers returned a year later, the brothers' grave had been scavenged by animals and the bones scattered. "Not more than a double handful of small bones were picked up."[111] Custer was reinterred with full military honors at West Point Cemetery on October 10, 1877. The battle site was designated a National Cemetery in 1886.[112]

Controversial legacy

George A. Custer in civilian clothes, December 1869

Public relations and media coverage during his lifetime

Custer has been called a "media personality",[113][114] and he valued good public relations and used the print media of his era effectively. He frequently invited journalists to accompany his campaigns (one, Associated Press reporter Mark Kellogg, died at the Little Bighorn), and their favorable reporting contributed to his high reputation, which lasted well into the latter 20th century.

Custer enjoyed writing, often writing all night long. He wrote a series of magazine articles of his experiences on the frontier, which were published in book form as My Life on the Plains in 1874. The work is still a valued primary source for information on U.S.-Native relations.[citation needed]

Posthumous legacy

After his death, Custer achieved lasting fame. Custer's wife, Elizabeth, who had accompanied him in many of his frontier expeditions, did much to advance this view with the publication of several books about her late husband: Boots and Saddles, Life with General Custer in Dakota,[115] Tenting on the Plains, or General Custer in Kansas and Texas[116] and Following the Guidon.[117] The deaths of Custer and his troops became the best-known episode in the history of the American Indian Wars, due in part to a painting commissioned by the brewery Anheuser-Busch as part of an advertising campaign. The enterprising company ordered reprints of a dramatic work that depicted "Custer's Last Stand" and had them framed and hung in many United States saloons. This created lasting impressions of the battle and the brewery's products in the minds of many bar patrons.[118] Henry Wadsworth Longfellow wrote an adoring (and in some places, erroneous) poem.[119] President Theodore Roosevelt's lavish praise pleased Custer's widow.[120]

President Grant, a highly successful general but recent antagonist, criticized Custer's actions in the battle of the Little Bighorn. Quoted in the New York Herald on September 2, 1876, Grant said, "I regard Custer's Massacre as a sacrifice of troops, brought on by Custer himself, that was wholly unnecessary – wholly unnecessary."[121] General Phillip Sheridan took a more moderately critical view of Custer's final military actions.[122]

General Nelson Miles (who inherited Custer's mantle of famed Indian fighter) and others praised him as a fallen hero betrayed by the incompetence of subordinate officers. Miles noted the difficulty of winning a fight "with seven-twelfths of the command remaining out of the engagement when within sound of his rifle shots."[123]

The assessment of Custer's actions during the American Indian Wars has undergone substantial reconsideration in modern times. Documenting the arc of popular perception in his biography Son of the Morning Star (1984), author Evan Connell notes the reverential tone of Custer's first biographer Frederick Whittaker (whose book was rushed out the year of Custer's death.)[124] Connell concludes:

These days it is stylish to denigrate the general, whose stock sells for nothing. Nineteenth-century Americans thought differently. At that time he was a cavalier without fear and beyond reproach.[125]

Criticism and controversy

Debate over tactics

When writing about Custer, neutral ground is elusive. What should Custer have done at any of the critical junctures that rapidly presented themselves, each now the subject of endless speculation and rumination? There will always be a variety of opinions based upon what Custer knew, what he did not know, and what he could not have known...

—from Touched by Fire: The Life, Death, and Mythic Afterlife of George Armstrong Custer by Louise Barnett.[121]

The controversy over blame for the disaster at Little Bighorn continues to this day. Major Marcus Reno's failure to press his attack on the south end of the Lakota/Cheyenne village and his flight to the timber along the river after a single casualty have been cited as a factor in the destruction of Custer's battalion, as has Captain Frederick Benteen's allegedly tardy arrival on the field, and the failure of the two officers' combined forces to move toward the relief of Custer.[126] Some of Custer's critics have asserted tactical errors.[122]

While camped at Powder River, Custer refused the support offered by General Terry on June 21 of an additional four companies of the Second Cavalry. Custer stated that he "could whip any Indian village on the Plains" with his own regiment, and that extra troops would simply be a burden.

At the same time, he left behind at the steamer Far West, on the Yellowstone, a battery of Gatling guns, knowing he was facing superior numbers. Before leaving the camp all the troops, including the officers, also boxed their sabers and sent them back with the wagons.[127]

On the day of the battle, Custer divided his 600-man command, despite being faced with vastly superior numbers of Sioux and Cheyenne.

The refusal of an extra battalion reduced the size of his force by at least a sixth, and rejecting the firepower offered by the Gatling guns played into the events of June 25 to the disadvantage of his regiment.[128]

Custer's defenders, however, including historian Charles K. Hofling, have asserted that Gatling guns would have been slow and cumbersome as the troops crossed the rough country between the Yellowstone and the Little Bighorn.[129] Custer rated speed in gaining the battlefield as essential and more important. Supporters of Custer claim that splitting the forces was a standard tactic, so as to demoralize the enemy with the appearance of the cavalry in different places all at once, especially when a contingent threatened the line of retreat.[130]

Attacks on Indigenous peoples

Sharply criticizing the self-styled "Indian fighter", U.S. Indigenous people's organized movements have emphasized Custer's role in the U.S. government's treaty violations and other injustices against Native Americans.

Standing Rock Sioux theologian and author Vine Deloria Jr. made an emotionally-charged comparison between Custer and Nazi SS officer Adolf Eichmann, referring to Custer as the "Eichmann of the Plains" in a 1996 Los Angeles Times interview.[131] In his 1969 book Custer Died for Your Sins, Deloria condemned Custer's violations of the 1868 Fort Laramie Treaty that established the Black Hills region as unceded territory of the Sioux and Arapaho peoples.[132] Custer's violations of the Fort Laramie Treaty included an 1874 gold expedition and the 1876 Battle of Greasy Grass (Battle of the Little Bighorn).[133]

Critics have also highlighted Custer's 1868 Washita River surprise attack that killed Cheyenne non-combatants including mothers, children, and elders. Custer was following Generals William Sherman and Philip Sheridan's orders for "total war" on the Indigenous nations. Describing total war methods, Sherman wrote, "We must act with vindictive earnestness against the Sioux, even to their extermination, men, women, and children...during an assault, the soldiers can not pause to distinguish between male and female, or even discriminate as to age."[134] There is "credible evidence" that following the attack, Custer and his men took "sexual liberties" with female captives, in the euphemism of one historian.[135] Another historian writes, "There was a saying among the soldiers of the western frontier, a saying Custer and his officers could heartily endorse: 'Indian women rape easy.'"[136]

Indigenous criticism of Custer's posthumous legacy may have begun immediately after Custer died. Good Fox (Lakota) recounted:

"I was told that after the battle two Cheyenne women came across Custer's body. They knew him, because he had attacked their peaceful village on the Washita. These women said, 'You smoked the peace pipe with us. Our chiefs told you that you would be killed if you ever made war on us again. But you would not listen. This will make you hear better.' The women each took an awl from their beaded cases and stuck them deep into Custer's ears."[137]

In 1976, the American Indian Movement (AIM) celebrated the centennial anniversary of Sioux, Cheyenne, and Arapaho victory in the Battle of Greasy Grass, performing a victory dance around the marker of Custer's death.[138] AIM continued protesting there demanding the official renaming of the “Custer Battlefield,” finally winning this demand in 1991.[139]

In May 2021, the United Tribes of Michigan unanimously passed a resolution calling for the removal of a Custer statue in Monroe, Michigan. The resolution stated in part:

"(It) is widely perceived as offensive and a painful public reminder of the legacy of Indigenous people's genocide and present realities of systemic racism in our country... Custer is notoriously known as the 'Indian Killer' [...] Custer does not deserve any glory, nor the right to further torment minoritized citizens 145 years postmortem."[140]

Monuments and memorials

Marker indicating where Custer fell on "Last Stand Hill" during Battle of the Little Bighorn – Crow Agency, Montana

Custer Memorial at his birthplace in New Rumley, Ohio

Monroe, Michigan, Custer's childhood home, unveiled the George Armstrong Custer Equestrian Monument in 1910

Counties are named in Custer's honor in six states: Colorado, Idaho (which is named for the General Custer Mine, which was named for Custer), Montana, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and South Dakota.

Townships in Illinois, Michigan, and Minnesota were named for Custer.

Other municipalities named after Custer include the villages of Custer, Michigan, and Custar, Ohio; the city of Custer, South Dakota; and the unincorporated town of Custer, Wisconsin.

Custer National Cemetery is within Little Bighorn Battlefield National Monument, the site of Custer's death.

The George Armstrong Custer Equestrian Monument of Custer, by Edward Clark Potter, was erected in Monroe, Michigan, Custer's boyhood home, in 1910.

Fort Custer National Military Reservation, near Augusta, Michigan, was built in 1917 on 130 parcels of land, as part of the military mobilization for World War I. During the war, some 90,000 troops passed through Camp Custer.

The establishment of Fort Custer National Cemetery (originally Fort Custer Post Cemetery) took place on September 18, 1943, with the first interment. On Memorial Day 1982, more than 33 years after the first resolution had been introduced in Congress, impressive ceremonies marked the official opening of the cemetery.[141]

Custer Hill is the main troop billeting area at Fort Riley, Kansas. Custer's 1866 residence on the post has been preserved and is currently maintained as the Custer House Museum and meeting space (also sometimes referred to as Custer Home).

The 85th Infantry Division was nicknamed The Custer Division.

The Black Hills of South Dakota is full of evidence of Custer, with a county, town, and Custer State Park all located in the area.

A prominent mountain peak in the Black Hills bears his name.[citation needed]

The Custer house at Fort Abraham Lincoln, near present-day Mandan, North Dakota, has been reconstructed as it was in Custer's day, along with the soldiers' barracks, block houses, etc. Annual re-enactments are held of Custer's 7th Cavalry's leaving for the Little Bighorn.[142]

On July 2, 2008, a marble monument to Brigadier General Custer was dedicated at the site of the 1863 Civil War Battle of Hunterstown, in Adams County, Pennsylvania.

Custer Monument at the United States Military Academy was first unveiled in 1879. It now stands next to his grave in the West Point Cemetery.

Custer Memorial Monument at his birthplace was erected by the Ohio State Archaeological and Historical society in 1931. It is located near the remains of the foundation of his birthplace homestead in New Rumley, Ohio. Custer Monument is managed locally by the Custer Memorial Association.

Miscellany

This article contains a list of miscellaneous information. Please relocate any relevant information into other sections or articles. (December 2017)

In addition to "Autie", Custer acquired a number of nicknames. During the Civil War, after his promotion to become the youngest brigadier general in the Army at age 23, the press frequently called him "The Boy General". During his years on the Great Plains in the American Indian Wars, his troopers often referred to him with grudging admiration as "Iron Butt" and "Hard Ass" for his physical stamina in the saddle and his strict discipline, as well as with the more derisive "Ringlets" for his long, curling blond hair, which he frequently perfumed with cinnamon-scented hair oil.[143]

Custer was quite fastidious in his grooming. Early in their marriage, Libbie wrote, "He brushes his teeth after every meal. I always laugh at him for it, also for washing his hands so frequently."[144]

He was 5'11" tall and wore a size 38 jacket and size 9C boots.[145] At various times he weighed between 143 pounds (at the end of the 1869 Kansas campaign)[146] and a muscular 170 pounds. A splendid horseman, "Custer mounted was an inspiration."[147] He was quite fit, able to jump to a standing position from lying flat on his back. He was a "power sleeper", able to get by on very short naps after falling asleep immediately on lying down.[148] He "had a habit of throwing himself prone on the grass for a few minutes' rest and resembled a human island, entirely surrounded by crowding, panting dogs."[149]

Throughout his travels, he gathered geological specimens, sending them to the University of Michigan. On September 10, 1873, he wrote Libbie, "the Indian battles hindered the collecting, while in that immediate region it was unsafe to go far from the command...."[150]

He was well-liked by his native scouts, whose company he enjoyed. He often ate with them. A May 21, 1876, diary entry by Kellogg records, "General Custer visits scouts; much at home amongst them."[151]

Before leaving the steamer Far West for the final leg of the journey, Custer wrote all night. His orderly John Burkman stood guard in front of his tent and on the morning of June 22, 1876, found Custer "hunched over on the cot, just his coat and his boots off, and the pen still in his hand."[152]

During his service in Kentucky, Custer bought several thoroughbred horses. He took two on his last campaign, Vic (for Victory) and Dandy. During the march he changed horses every three hours.[153] He rode Vic into his last battle.

Custer took his two staghounds Tuck and Bleuch with him during the last expedition. He left them with orderly Burkman when he rode forward into battle. Burkman joined the packtrain. He regretted not accompanying Custer but lived until 1925, when he took his own life.[154]

The common media image of Custer's appearance at the Last Stand—buckskin coat and long, curly blonde hair—is wrong. Although he and several other officers wore buckskin coats on the expedition, they took them off and packed them away because it was so hot. According to Soldier, an Arikara scout, "Custer took off his buckskin coat and tied it behind his saddle."[155] Further, Custer—whose hair was thinning—joined a similarly balding Lieutenant Varnum and "had the clippers run over their heads" before leaving Fort Lincoln.[156]

  • Condition: New
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  • Subject: George Custer Last Stand Indian Wars
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