Warfare Ancient Rome Greek Mycenae Carthage Persia Alexander Sulla Pompey Caesar

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Seller: ancientgifts ✉️ (5,285) 100%, Location: Lummi Island, Washington, US, Ships to: WORLDWIDE, Item: 383428587916 Warfare Ancient Rome Greek Mycenae Carthage Persia Alexander Sulla Pompey Caesar. Warfare In The Classical World by John Warry. NOTE: We have 75,000 books in our library, almost 10,000 different titles. Odds are we have other copies of this same title in varying conditions, some less expensive, some better condition. We might also have different editions as well (some paperback, some hardcover, oftentimes international editions). If you don’t see what you want, please contact us and ask. We’re happy to send you a summary of the differing conditions and prices we may have for the same title. DESCRIPTION: Oversized softcover: 302 pages. Publisher: Salamander Books (1998) 302 pages. Dimensions: 9¼ x 6½ x 1 inches; 1¾ pounds. From Homeric and Mycenaen warfare, up through the Roman period, and concluding with the coming of the barbarians. With a center section of superb black and white illustrations. This authoritative volume traces the evolution of the art of warfare in the Greek and Roman worlds between 1600 B. C. and A. D. 800, from the rise of Mycenaean civilization to the fall of Ravenna, and the eventual decline of the Roman Empire. The book is also, of course, about the great military commanders, such as Alexander and Julius Caesar - men whose feats of generalship still provide material for discussion and admiration in the world's military academies. CONDITION: NEW: New oversized softcover. Salamander Books (1998) 302 pages. Unblemished, unmarked, pristine in every respect. Pages are pristine; clean, crisp, unmarked, unmutilated, tightly bound, unambiguously unread. Satisfaction unconditionally guaranteed. In stock, ready to ship. No disappointments, no excuses. PROMPT SHIPPING! HEAVILY PADDED, DAMAGE-FREE PACKAGING! Selling rare and out-of-print ancient history books on-line since 1997. We accept returns for any reason within 30 days! #051.1a. PLEASE SEE IMAGES BELOW FOR JACKET DESCRIPTION(S) AND FOR PAGES OF PICTURES FROM INSIDE OF BOOK. PLEASE SEE PUBLISHER, PROFESSIONAL, AND READER REVIEWS BELOW. PUBLISHER REVIEW: REVIEW: Classical or "Ancient" warfare has been a perennial favorite among general military readers, collectors and war-gamers. Full details are provided here of the great commanders of the classical world. This superbly volume traces the evolution of the art of warfare in the Greek and Roman worlds between 1600 B.C. and A.D. 800, from the rise of Mycenaean civilization to the fall of Ravenna and the collapse of the western Roman Empire. John Warry tells of an age of great military commanders such as Alexander the Great, Hannibal, and Julius Caesar - men whose feats of generalship still provide material for discussion and admiration in the military academies of the world. Rich illustrations with full details of soldiers in uniform, equipment, weapons, warships, siege machines, war elephants, etc. PROFESSIONAL REVIEWS: REVIEW: From the rise of Greece to the fall of Rome, this illustrated volume is a wonderful account of the warriors and battles that dominated Europe and the Near East for more than 1,000 years. The story begins at Troy, drawing upon Homeric legend and modern archaeological evidence. It continues through Greece's Persian and Peloponnesian Wars, Alexander the Great, Rome's Punic Wars, Hannibal, Julius Caesar, and the barbarian invasions. Warfare in the Classical World will excite both readers who have a mature interest in the period and as well for those becoming acquainted with ancient history for the first time. REVIEW: The prose is very readable, and the numerous large illustrations, especially those showing the common soldiers of different cultures and eras, keep one turning the pages. Surely the ultimate book on this subject, with an accessible but scholarly text. READER REVIEWS: REVIEW: An absolutely outstanding book about the Greek and Roman soldier and the warfare in the classical age. Mr. Warry's book is easy to follow and has the most oustanding illustrations of arms, equipment, fortifications, ships, seige engines, and individual soldiers. It is a great place to learn the basics of ancient warfare such as the different type of troops from light to heavy infantry or the types of cavalry and chariots. It is easy to imagine yourself as one of these soldiers and what it must have been like to go into battle as a Greek Hoplite or as a Roman Legionnaire. I have to admit I was reading this book when I first got the idea to write my own book about a roman soldier, (The Chief Centurion) Warry's book helps you visualize clearly just what this soldier looked and felt like as he marched for miles with his full gear and then went into battle with the enemy whether that enemy was a Carthagenian, Persian, Gaul, or Jew. I strongly recomnend this book for anyone who wants to have a handy, easily readable book on the Art of Ancient Warfare. REVIEW: This is a beautifully balanced book. It covers the classical period between 1600BC and 800AD in a very organized and readable way. Each period is prefaced with the heading "Ancient Authorities" and outlines where the following information is sourced. Then the period is discussed in flowing narrative which highlights the key personalities and events of the time along with an in depth look at the mechanics of warfare. The strategy and tactics presented is blended nicely with the historical discussion. In summary, this is a terrific encyclopedia and ranks as one of the nicest books I have seen on the subject. Superb. ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND: Ancient Celtic Warfare: The Celts were a linguistic group which spanned across a wide geographic area and included numerous cultures and ethnicities. Because of this fact, the traditions, practices, and lifestyles of Celtic-speaking peoples varied considerably. The importance of warfare and the traditions surrounding war were one common thread of similarities throughout Celtic societies and cultures. This was true from the earliest emergence of the Hallstatt culture (12th-6th century BC) to the La Tene culture (5th-1st Century BC). Warfare was interwoven into Celtic social structures, art, religion, and lifestyle. The Celts acquired a warrior reputation among their neighbors in the ancient world. Celtic societies tended to be more loosely organized than their Mediterranean counterparts, Celtic craftsmen worked iron, bronze, and gold with tremendous skill. Many technological innovations related to metalworking originated with the Celts. Relatively little is known about Celtic society due to the bias of Classical sources describing the Celts and the ambiguity of archaeological evidence. It is apparent that the structure of Celtic societies was quite diverse, with sacral kingship, tribal coalitions, and even republican political structures existing in different times and places. La Tene warrior burials contain objects related to warfare such as swords, spears and helmets, as well as drinking ware related to feasting. Based on archaeological evidence (some graves contain much more valuable goods than others) it is postulated that there was a hierarchical social structure and the aristocracy placed a heavy emphasis on warrior status and prestige. Early Irish literature also attests to the presence of several different social classes, including nobles, free people, and slaves. Client-ship was an important part of this society, as the aristocracy used the bonds of patronage they had with their followers to maintain their own social status. A patron would offer hospitality, legal protection, economic support, and other rewards to their followers in exchange for loyalty and service. Their followers were expected to repay them with the products of their farms, to labor for them, and to follow them into battle when called. Celts of sufficiently high status to have clients might themselves have a patron of higher status, with chieftains and even kings being clients of more powerful rulers. Warfare and raiding offered an opportunity for individuals to improve their social standing and acquire loot with which to provide their clients. Many raids were carried out to steal cattle or treasure, the two most important sources of wealth in Celtic society. However, some raids were attempts to conquer nearby groups or polities. The competition for political power in Celtic Europe was at times violent. Kings or chieftains might attempt to forcibly subjugate other groups to increase their prestige. At other times, the defeated were compelled to offer up tribute and hostages to the victors. Proto-Celtic and Celtic burials can tell us a lot about the development of warrior culture in Central Europe. The practice of burying important individuals with objects related to warfare and status dates back to the 12th century BC Urnfield culture of Central Europe. So-called 'warrior burials' are distinguished from the mass of more ordinary burials in prehistoric cemeteries by the richness and significance of their burial rites. Important individuals were distinguished by the inclusion of items like horse gear and weapons, especially swords. Vehicles such as carts or wagons were also included in high- status burials, offering a precursor to the role that the chariot played in later Celtic warfare and burial rites. These objects may have been owned by the individuals in life, but the selection of items to include in a burial might also be influenced by local traditions and beliefs. For example, the placement of certain weapons or pieces of equipment may have been more ceremonial or religiously motivated. This is especially likely to be true of more ornate swords, daggers, and helmets. The importance of horse ownership and warrior status was shared by the Hallstatt culture which developed in the same region and flourished from around the 12th to 6th century BC when it was succeeded by the La Tene culture. Treasures such as drinking cups and horns also played an important role in Hallstatt burial rites, and the ability to provide sumptuous feasts became a primary method of signaling power and status. This mode of distinguishing elites quickly spread and burials with Hallstatt weapons and horse gear have been found as far afield as Britain and Ireland. On the other hand, the practice of burying elites with vehicles remained localized in Central Europe, particularly Germany and Bohemia. The warrior burials of the La Tene period date to roughly between the 6th and 1st century BC. La Tene warrior burials contain objects related to warfare such as swords, spears, and helmets, as well as drinking ware related to feasting. More important individuals were buried with horses or chariots. A kind of hierarchy of warriors appears on the Gundestrup Cauldron from Jutland, Denmark, an instantly recognizable and very famous archaeological artifact. This scene is often interpreted as portraying a belief in an afterlife where individuals could advance in social status. On the bottom register, a line of spearmen marches on foot towards a giant figure, probably a god related to war. A man with a boar-crested helmet and a sword follows the spearmen, and behind him are three carnyx (a wind instrument) players. At the far left, the oversized god dips a man into a cauldron of rebirth. In the top register, a bunch of warriors or chieftains on horseback ride away from the god. The Celts were renowned for their skill on horseback, and horses played an important role in Celtic culture. The importance of horse ownership and charioteering to social status and wealth in Celtic culture is a testament to the role of mounted warfare in Celtic Europe. The 2nd century AD Roman Historian Pausanias describes a tactic called trimarcisia in his “Description of Greece”. Each mounted warrior would be accompanied by two grooms who each had a horse in case their master’s horse was wounded. If the warrior was wounded, one of the grooms would return him to their camp, while the other one remained to fight in his place. Roman sources describe the Celts bringing both wagons and chariots into battle, and these vehicles have been found in Iron Age Celtic burials associated with warriors. Two-wheeled chariots drawn by a team of two horses are known from both archaeological and artistic evidence such as coins and burials. According to Romans, the Celts used their chariots to get into the fray and intimidate their enemies before jumping off and fighting on foot. According to Julius Caesar: “…[The Britons'] mode of fighting with their chariots is this: firstly, they drive about in all directions and throw their weapons and generally break the ranks of the enemy with the very dread of their horses and the noise of their wheels; and when they have worked themselves in between the troops of horse, leap from their chariots and engage on foot…” First century Roman authors like Lucan, Pomponius Mela, and Silius Italicus describe the Celts as riding scythed chariots into battle. The 6th century Byzantine historian Jordanes made a similar claim about the Britons in his “Getica”. Although there is no evidence that the Celts used scythed chariots, their use is described in the 8th century Irish epic set in the 1st century AD, “The Cattle Raid of Cooley”: “…When the spasm had run through the high hero Cúchulainn he stepped into his sickle war-chariot that bristled with points of iron and narrow blades, with hooks and hard prongs, and heroic frontal spikes, with ripping instruments and tearing nails on its shafts and straps and loops and cords. The body of the chariot was spare and slight and erect, fitted for the feats of a champion, with space for the lordly warrior's eight weapons, speedy as the wind or as a swallow or a deer darting over the level plain. The chariot was settled down on two fast steeds, wild and wicked, neat-headed and narrow bodied, with slender quarters and roan breast, firm in hoof and harness, a notable sight in the trim chariot-shafts...” By the 1st century BC chariots had begun to phase out of use in continental Europe, gradually being replaced by mounted soldiers. Britain and Ireland were more isolated from the changes in warfare which affected the continent, and British tribes continued to use chariots well into the Roman period. War chariots are attested to during the invasion of Britain by Julius Caesar in 54 BC. The Caledonians of modern day Scotland are also described as using war chariots at the Battle of Mons Graupius in 83 AD The noise and clamor of Celtic chariots is remarked upon by both Caesar and the 1st century historian Tacitus. The Celtic panoply generally consisted of a sword, spears, and a shield. The main sources of evidence about ancient Celtic arms and armor come from archaeological finds, Greek and Roman literary accounts, and art depicting Celtic warriors. The Celts are known for having used long oval shields which were long enough to protect the greater part of the body. These were decorated with bronze or iron bosses, some of which were quite ornate such as the archaeological find known as the 'Battersea Shield'. Swords were worn on the hip or side, hanging from a bronze or iron chain. Different types of spears were used, with some lighter javelins being thrown from horseback, while larger spears were used as lances. Composite armor made of fabric or leather, not unlike the Greek linothorax, is portrayed in Celtic art and was certainly used. As early as the 4th century AD chain mail was prevalent among Celtic warriors, and many Classical depictions of Celts portray them wearing mail shirts. Chain mail has been found in Late Iron Age burials from Western, Central, and especially Eastern Europe. The Romans likely first encountered chain armor in areas with Celtic presences like northern Italy, and chain mail may have originated among the Celts before spreading to Europe and Asia Minor as the 1st century BC Roman author Varro BC) claimed. These shirts were made with thousands of interlocking iron circles and allowed the wearer more freedom of movement than solid bronze or iron cuirasses. Surviving examples of Celtic mail shirts are typically long, falling just below the waist and they would have weighed more than 30 pounds. To help redistribute the weight of the iron mail, they were made with broad shoulder straps which had the benefit of adding extra protection. A few surviving examples of breastplates have also been found in Hallstatt and La Tene graves, although these were very rare. The Stična Breastplate is a riveted bronze cuirass from a 6th century BC Hallstatt warrior’s grave in modern-day Slovenia. Similar cuirasses have been found in 8th century BC Hallstatt burials in Marmesse, France. These cuirasses bear some similarity to Greek and Etruscan 'bell cuirasses' produced in the Mediterranean during the Archaic Period (8th to 6th century BC) and to the 'muscle cuirass' which developed in the 5th century BC. The 1st century BC 'Warrior of Grezan' is one of the oldest and best examples of Celtic art depicting a warrior, may depict the figure wearing a breastplate. La Tene helmets of various shapes and designs appear in graves from the 5th century BC on. However, Celtic helmets are rare, and it is likely that helmets were not widely used by some tribes. Their scarcity backs up Greek and Roman claims that some Celtic tribes scorned the use of helmets. The only area where significant numbers of Celtic helmets have been found is Italy. Many surviving examples of Celtic helmets (such as the “Waterloo Helmet”) are ceremonial and were not intended for use in actual combat. These were status symbols, made with expensive materials like gold and coral in addition to bronze and iron. The often impractical designs indicate that they were intended to make the wearer more visible in parades or processions, rather than to provide protection in actual combat. Celtic helmets began to be less ornate and more practical in the later La Tene period, perhaps indicating that their use was becoming more widespread. Celtic warriors played an increasingly prominent role in the art and literature of the Greeks and Romans from the 4th century BC onwards. A coalition of Celtic tribes under a high king known as Brennus invaded Italy and sacked Rome in 390 BC. Another ruler with the same name helped to lead an invasion of Southeastern Europe with a coalition of tribes which culminated in the invasion of Greece around 280 BC. The aggressive migration of the Celts into the Mediterranean led to increasingly intense conflicts with the Hellenistic kingdoms and the Roman Republic. Greek and Roman authors describing conflicts with Celtic tribes noted the differences in Celtic tactics and equipment. However, these accounts are heavily colored by bias and exaggeration. Celtic tactics were generally denigrated as inferior, feeding into Greco- Roman stereotypes about northern peoples being wild and unintelligent. Celtic warriors were considered to have foolhardy courage in battle, which could quickly turn to panic when the battle turned against them. Greek and Roman authors accused the Celts of barbarous and brutal behavior such as human sacrifice and even cannibalism. While human sacrifice was practiced to some extent in Celtic cultures, stories like Pausanias’ account of Celts eating Greek babies when they sacked Callium in 279 BC are pure fiction. Celtic arms and armor were adopted by the groups they came into conflict with such as the Thracians and the Romans. The Roman gladius is an important example of this, as it was descended from Celtic or Celtiberian swords which could be used for both cutting and thrusting. The gladius replaced the more pointed, blunt-edged swords that Romans had used until the 3rd century BC. There are several theories regarding this, including the idea that the gladius was introduced by Celtiberian tribes in the Iberian Peninsula, by Celtic or Celtiberian mercenaries fighting for Hannibal in the Second Punic War, or by Gallic tribes in Europe. The later adoption of the spatha, a longer sword than the gladius, was largely due to the increasing numbers of Celtic cavalry auxiliaries in the 2nd to 3rd century CE Roman army, and changes in Roman tactics. Other examples of Celtic arms adopted by the Romans are the Montefortino and Coolus helmet-types. The image of undisciplined, savage hordes massing on the edges of the empire was cultivated by Greco-Roman authors who wanted to contrast their own self-proclaimed civility with the barbarism of foreign peoples. Many of the more famous examples of Classical art depict Celts in the nude, signifying their supposed barbarity. The 'Dying Gaul' and the 'Ludovisi Gaul Killing His Wife' are two examples of Classical art which use nudity to express the barbarity of their subjects, although they also idealize their nobility in defeat. Some ancient Roman authors claimed that they charged into battle fully naked, rumors which probably inspired artistic representations of nude Celtic warriors. These Classical stereotypes of the Celts were the underpinnings of early historical scholarship and still inform public perception of the Celts to a great degree. Although archaeological evidence has disproved many of these ideas, they still linger on in the modern imagination. [Ancient History Encyclopedia]. The Roman Army: The Roman army, famed for its discipline, organization, and innovation in both weapons and tactics, allowed Rome to build and defend a huge empire which for centuries would dominate the Mediterranean world and beyond. The Roman army, arguably one of the longest surviving and most effective fighting forces in military history, has a rather obscure beginning. The Greek biographer Plutarch credits the fabled founder of Rome, Romulus, with creating the legionary forces (as they would be known in the Republic and Imperial periods), yet the Roman historian Livy says that the early Roman army fought more along the lines of Greek hoplites in a phalanx, most likely as a form of civil militia, with recruitment dependant on a citizen’s social standing. King Servius Tullius (circa 580- 530 B.C.) introduced six classes of wealth upon Rome’s citizens; the lowest group had no property and were excluded from the military, whilst the highest group, the equites, formed the cavalry. The earliest contemporary account of a Roman legion is by Polybius, and it dates to around 150-120 B.C.; this is referred to as the Manipular Legion, although the Manipular legion probably developed around the middle of the 4th century B.C. It is thought that the Manipular legion, which was based around smaller units of 120-160 men called maniples (Latin for 'handfuls'), was developed to match the looser formations that Rome’s enemies fought in and would be able to out maneuver phalanx formations. The advantage of such a change can be seen when Rome came to fight Macedonia’s phalanxes; Polybius 18.29-30 describes the merits of the Roman maniples in being able to outmaneuver their enemy. As the nature of Rome’s army changed from limited, seasonal campaigns, and a provincial empire began to come into existence, the legions began to develop more permanent bases. Livy dates this progression by saying that from 362 B.C. Rome had two legions, and four legions from 311 B.C. The Manipular Army was purely citizen at this time, and it would have been the force that saw off Hannibal in the second Punic War (218- 202 B.C.); however, there were more than four legions by then. As the nature of Rome’s army changed from limited, seasonal campaigns, and a provincial empire began to come into existence due to the success of such battles as Cynoscephalae (197 B.C.) and Pydna (168 B.C.), the legions began to develop more permanent bases, in turn creating a manpower shortage. Gaius Marius was elected consul in 107 B.C. he began to enlist volunteers from citizens without property and equipped them with arms and armor at the expense of the state. The development from the maniple to the cohort is also credited to Marius, though this change may have been finalized by Marius, rather than wholly implemented by him. The Social War of 91- 87 B.C. (from the Latin socii allies) highlights that manpower was still a problem for the Roman army, as citizenship was granted to the allied Italians at the end of the war, granting a greater pool of men for the army. Come the turn of the Republic, and the beginning of Imperial Rome, Augustus reorganized the Roman army, increasing the length of service and creating a military treasury, amongst other things. The army continued to develop, including different tactics and formations that were more effective against Rome’s new enemies. By the 2nd century A.D. Rome was deploying armored cavalry units, and whilst it had used siege weapons previously, employing arrow and stone throwing siege-engines, it was in the 3rd century A.D. that Rome started to notice the use of artillery, with the addition of the onager, a large stone-thrower. There are many classical writers who are useful to consult when looking at the Roman army, both Greek and Roman. Polybius is very useful at assessing the Roman Army, providing information on their weapons (6.23), discipline (6.38) and rewards for courage (6.39.1-3; 5-11), as well as describing them in battle. The Jewish historian Josephus (circa 34-100 A.D.), whilst possibly reusing Polybius, covers the training and discipline of the Roman army (3.71-6; 85-8; 102-7). Frontius (circa 40- 103 A.D.) wrote a work entitled Stratagems; covered in it is the discipline of Scipio, Corbulo, Piso, and M. Antonius (4.1.1; 4.1.21; 4.1.26; 4.1.37) amongst other issues. Vegetius (circa 5th century A.D.) wrote an Epitome of Military Science that covers the choosing of suitable recruits, weapons training, training in battle maneuvers, and other practical issues that relate to the Roman Army. The citizen soldiers of the Manipular army would be enrolled for a specific amount of time, rather than signing up for years of service as they would do in the Imperial period. This meant that the legions of the Republic had no long continual existences because they were disbanded after the campaign they had been serving on was finished. The result of the Marian reforms was a professional standing army for the Roman State, or in the coming years, individual generals who gained the loyalty of their legions. The majority of Roman soldiers would have been recruited around the age of 18- 20 years, and in the 1st century A.D. there is a decrease in Italian recruits as recruits from the provinces increased. Conscription into the army probably happened through the cities, since volunteers were not always forthcoming. By this time, whether or not you were a Roman citizen did not matter so much, as long as you were freeborn. This was taken seriously, and as such, a state oath was made as to your freedom: Trajan to Pliny: "[An officer had discovered two newly enrolled soldiers were slaves]... it needs to be investigated whether they deserve capital punishment. It depends whether they were volunteers or conscripts or given as substitutes. If they are conscripts, the recruiting officer was at fault; if substitutes, those who gave them are to blame; if they presented themselves in full awareness of their own status, that is to be held against them. It is hardly relevant that they have not yet been assigned to units. The day on which they were first approved and took the oath required the truth of their origin from them." Pliny's Letters, (10.30), circa 112 A.D. The army provided little social mobility, and it took a very long time to complete your service; further, you would probably serve abroad, and whilst the pay was not bad, it was nothing special, and many deductions were made from it for food and clothing (RMR, 68, papyrus, Egypt, A.D. 81 shows so) and there were very harsh disciplinary orders. However, at the same time, the army provided a guaranteed supply of food, doctors, and pay, and it also provided stability. Whilst the pay was not brilliant, it could be supplemented by personal war booty, pay from emperors (normally in their will), also, there was the possibility to progress through the ranks and this had clear monetary benefits. The average centurion got 18 times the pay of the standard soldier, 13,500 denarii, and centurions of first cohort got 27,000, whilst the primi ordines got 54,000. By the 2nd century A.D., there would not have been much active service either, and hence less threat of death, since this was a fairly peaceful time in Rome’s history. Because of this later stability and settlement, many Army bases incorporated baths and amphitheatres, so the army clearly did have its advantages. However, it was not until Septimius Severus that standard soldiers could legally marry during service (not that this had stopped unofficial marriages beforehand, and furthermore, centurions were allowed to marry beforehand). Likewise, soldiers could also own slaves. Tacitus. (Hist. 2.80.5), gives a good example of army living conditions. Whilst Dionysus and Plutarch do not mention the introduction of maniples per se, they do talk of tactical and equipment changes that would be in line with changes that a change to maniples would require. Livy describes how a manipular formation was presented in battle: "…what had before been a phalanx, like the Macedonian phalanxes, came afterwards to be a line of battle formed by maniples, with the rearmost troops drawn up in a number of companies." "The first line, or hastati, comprised fifteen maniples, stationed a short distance apart; the maniple had twenty light-armed soldiers, the rest of their number carried oblong shields; moreover those were called “light-armed” who carried only a spear and javelins. This front line in the battle contained the flower of the young men who were growing ripe for service. Behind these came a line of the same number of maniples, made up of men of a more stalwart age; these were called the principes; they carried oblong shields and were the most showily armed of all." "This body of thirty maniples they called antepilani, because behind the standards there were again stationed other fifteen companies, each of which had three sections, the first section in every company being known as pilus. The company consisted of three vexilla or “banners”; a single vexillum had sixty soldiers, two centurions, one vexillarius, or color-bearer; the company numbered a hundred and eighty —six men. The first banner led the triarii, veteran soldiers of proven valor; the second banner the rorarii, younger and less distinguished men; the third banner the accensi, who were the least dependable, and were, for that reason, assigned to the rear most line…" (Livy, Ab urbe condita, 8.8). The standard force of the Roman Imperial army was the legions, a heavy infantry, initially composed of Roman citizens, but it was organized very differently to the Manipular army. The number of legions in existence at one time often varied, but a rough average is 28. The make-up of each Legion was as follows: •10 cohorts to one legion. •six centuries to one cohort. •10 tents to one cohort. •eight soldiers to one tent. •120 cavalry - not really a fighting force, but messengers and scouts. The Legions were later supplemented by the auxiliaries, who were normally non-citizens, and combined cavalry and infantry, there were four main forms of Auxiliary force: 1. Alae quingenariae; one ala of 16 turma; one turma of 30 men; 480 men. 2. Infantry cohort; one cohort of six centuries; one century of 80 men; 480 men. 3. Cohorts equitates; mixed infantry and cavalry. The Auxiliaries were commanded by Prefects of the equestrian rank. However, as the auxiliaries developed, a forth kind of troop was introduced, this reflected the fact the auxiliaries had developed into a status very similar to that of the legionaries. 4. Numeri; from the 2nd century onwards, formed from local tribes, around 500 men, they didn’t have to speak Latin, and often fought in keeping with their local tradition. When a soldier of the Auxiliaries was discharged, he received a military diploma, which granted him and his children Roman citizenship and gave legal acceptance of any marriage; for many this was a very attractive reward for joining (and surviving) service in the Auxiliaries. The Praetorian Guard was in effect the Emperor’s personal body guard and consisted of 9 cohorts. They were commanded by two Praetorian Guards of Equestrian rank; these men were very powerful. Since they were close to the Emperor they had a unique position for assassination attempts. The Praetorians were primarily recruited from Italy, and it seems likely that they were never conscripted due to the many benefits that they had over regular legionnaires. Their service was only for 16 years and they had better pay than the standard legionary soldier, which, at the end of Augustus’ rule, was 225 denarii per year (Tacitus Annals, 1.17), Domitian then increased this to 300, Septimus Severus to 450, and Caracalla to 675. In addition to this there was the Roman Fleet (classis), the Urban Cohort (3-4 cohorts stationed in Rome that acted as a police force to maintain civil order, under the command of the Urban Prefect), and the Equites Singulares, the cavalry for the Praetorian Guard, which varied in strength from 500-1000 men. In total, for most of the Imperial period Rome had a military force of around 350,000, taking into consideration there were 28 legions of around 5,500, and then 160,000 divided amongst the auxilia, the troops in Rome, and the fleet. There were various levels of command within the Legion. The foremost commander was the Legatus legionis, who was often an ex-praetor. Underneath him came the six military tribunes, made up of one tribunus laticlavius who aided the legate and was second in command and would have been of senatorial rank, and five tribuni augusticlavii of equestrian rank. Then came the praefectus castorum, who dealt with camp logistics and took control if the Legatus legionis and tribunus laticlavius were absent. And then there were the 60 centurions. The centurions had their own rankings, the titles of which are probably based on the organization of the Manipular Army. For the 2nd-10th Cohorts of a Legion, the centurions were ranked, highest to lowest: pilus prior, princeps prior, hastatus prior, pilus posterior, princeps posterior, and the hastatus posterior. For the first cohort, there were five centurions, called the primi ordines, and they were ranked (again, highest to lowest), primus pilus, princeps prior, hastatus prior, princeps posterior, and hastatus posterior. Our main sources on Roman military equipment come from artistic depictions, military documents, other literature, and surviving archaeological artifacts. The Imperial period presents us with the largest amount of surviving material. The standard weapons of the Roman Imperial Army were quite similar to those used in the Republic. The pilum was a heavy spear that was thrown before hand-to-hand combat. Caesar, Gallic War, 1.25 shows how they were employed, and Polybius 6.23. 9-11 how they were constructed. The pilum was thrown in order to kill the enemy but was designed so that if it became stuck in an enemy’s shield, it would be a maximum nuisance. The Republican gladius hispaniensis (Spanish sword) was the other standard weapon of the Roman infantry, and was worn on the right hip, being designed for stabbing and thrusting. However, it could also cut, having sharp edges. Livy (31.34.4.) describes the terror of the Macedonian army after seeing the damage that the sword could wreak. The Imperial sword is referred to as the Mainz-type sword (after the location where examples have been found) and is similar. The sword would have been mainly used for stabbing. The Mainz-type then developed into the Pompeii type (examples found at Pompeii and Herculaneum), which had a shorter tip and which may have made it easier to use as a cutting weapon, as well as a stabbing weapon. Both of these swords would have been carried on the right side of the body. Polybius gives a comprehensive overview of the Republic scutum shield (6.23.2-5), which was circular. Vegetius 2.18 suggests that each cohort had different emblems on their shields and that each soldier would inscribe his name, cohort, and century on the back (much like a modern-day ‘dog tag’). However, there does not seem to be any non-contentious material to support Vegetius, and considering his later date, he may be transferring contemporary practices to earlier times. The Imperial scutum differed from the Republican one in that it was rectangular when seen from the front, (this is the stereotypical ‘Roman shield’), with a boss in the center, made of iron or a bronze alloy that was probably used to bash the opponent. Polybius 6.23.14 describes the various types of breast-plate or cuirass that the Republic troops could equip themselves with. There were three main types of armor employed by the Imperial army; the lorica hamate, iron mail tunics; scale armor, which was made up of metal scales woven onto a cloth base; and the well-known lorica segmenta, which consisted of strips of iron joined by leather straps. The other major part of a legionary’s equipment was his helmet, of which there were many variants, especially early on in Rome’s history when soldiers had to provide their own arms. The most typical were made from a single sheet of iron in a bowl shape with a neck guard at the back, a pronounced brow and hinged check guards; all designed to minimize damage and reflect blows made at the wearer’s face. The Monterfortino style helmet (named after the grave of Montefortino in Ancona where a number of examples were found) was the standard helmet of the 2nd century B.C. Polybius 6.23.12 describes the famous feathered crest of this helmet. Roman siege weapons tended to be variations or copies of Hellenistic versions; they came in a variety of sizes, shapes, and functions. Most of them are described by Vitruvius X. There were catapults and ballistae (both variations of stone throwers); the smaller Scorpiones, (similar in shape if not design to ballistae) which was a personnel artillery piece, firing bolts; further to this the Romans would employ battering rams and siege towers. Vitruvius passes over the more obvious-to-construct siege ladders. Also, whilst not an actual ‘weapon’ per se, walls could be undermined by sappers. Josephus, The Jewish War 3. 245-6- describes in quite gory detail the effectiveness of stone throwers. However, siege weapons were also sometimes (but rarely) deployed in open warfare: Tacitus, (Histories 3.23) relates how at the second battle of Bedriacum in 69 A.D. where “an exceptionally large catapult… would have inflicted carnage far and wide…” if it were not for two soldiers who snuck up to it and cut its ropes and gears. It is important to remember what the army would be doing when not fighting in the field; mostly it was training. Route marches might take place three times a month and sometimes maneuvers would be practiced in the field. However, there were civilian duties too. Infrastructures were improved with bridge and road building. Hospitals had to be manned, kilns worked, fuel fetched, and bread baked, to name just a few camp activities. The Vindolanda writing tablets act as a brilliant insight to life at a Roman camp, and contain personal letters and camp accounts. Likewise, Josephus, Jewish War, 3. 76- 93, whilst possibly based on Polybius (and therefore not reflecting an overly accurate account for the time in which he was writing), shows the very ordered nature of the Roman army at camp. However, the whole legion need not be based in camp at the same time. Vindolanda Inventory No. 154, of the 1st Tungrian Cohort, shows how the troops were divided across the province, acting as provincial policemen or guards to the governor, to name just two duties outside of the Roman fort that soldiers might be sent to do. The army was a key part of Imperial Rome, and the emperors relied on the army’s allegiance; this can be seen by the coin of Vitellus which reads, that he is in power in “agreement with the army”, and by the fact that the emperor was seen as a soldier, and how this was one of the reasons for Nero’s failings; Dio Cassius, 69.9, tells of the vital role of the Praetorian guard in Claudius’ ascension to power. Of the Maniples, the standard formation of the maniples was triplex acies, with troops drawn up three lines deep, the hastati at the front, the principes in the middle, and the triarii at the back. Each soldier would take up a space around 6 foot square, enabling him to throw his pilum and effectively wield his sword (Pol.18.30.8). The multiple maniples were often spaced a distance equal to their own width away from the next maniple, in a staggered chess board like formation, which has been termed quincunx. Once battles had started it was often up to junior commanders, rather than the general himself, to oversee the motivation of the troops; Plutarch records a unique situation: "The Romans, when they attacked the Macedonian phalanx, were unable to force a passage, and Salvius, the commander of the Pelignians, snatched the standard of his company and hurled it in among the enemy. Then the Pelignians, since among the Italians it is an unnatural and flagrant thing to abandon a standard, rushed on towards the place where it was, and dreadful losses were inflicted and suffered on both sides." (Plut.Vit.Aem. Paul.1.20). The Romans also developed many military tactics and methods which would be used for centuries to come, as well as tactics unique to a given situation. When Brutus was besieged by Mark Antony in Mutina, in 43 B.C., the siege was lifted when word got to Brutus about the enemy’s plans and actions. Letters were attached to pigeons’ necks and they, “longing for light and food, made for the highest buildings and were caught by Brutus.” (Frontinus, Stratagems, 3.13.8). When Quintus Sertorius, an eques of notable military distinction, was outmatched by the enemy cavalry, so “during the night he dug trenches and drew up his forces in front of them. When the cavalry squadrons arrived… he withdrew his line of battle. The cavalry pursued him closely, fell into the ditches, and in this way were defeated.” (Frontinus, 2.12.2). There were also formations against cavalry, Cassius Dio (Roman History, 71.7) describes a defensive formation particularly useful against cavalry: “The Romans… formed into a compact mass so that they faced the enemy at once, and most of them placed their shields on the ground and put one foot on them so that they did not slip so much.” If completely surrounded, this would form a Hollow Square. The semi-legendary Battle of Lake Regillus, circa 496 B.C., took place at Lake Regillius between Tusculum and Rome, and happened at the very beginning of the Roman Republic. It was fought between Rome and the Latins. The Latins were led by Rome’s last and exiled king, Tarquinius Superbus. and this was the king’s last attempt to regain power in Rome. The Romans were led by the Dictator Postumius. After much uncertainty on the battlefield there were three measures which Postumius had to put in place to ensure his victory. Firstly, he ordered his own cohort to treat any fleeing Romans as they would the enemy in order to rally them; then he had to order the cavalry to fight on foot since the infantry were so exhausted; thirdly he provided further incentive to his troops by promising rewards to those who entered the enemy camp first and second. This resulted in such a rush of Roman troops that Tarquinius and the Latins fled the field of battle, and Postumius returned to Rome to celebrate a triumph. Livy, Ab.Urbe Condita, 2.19-20, provides a full account of the battle. Zama (202 B.C.) was the last battle in the Second Punic War and ended 17 years of war between the two states of Rome and Carthage. The Roman legionaries and Italian cavalry (with a supporting body of Numidian cavalry) were led by Publius Cornelius Scipio. The Carthaginians were led by Hannibal, who fielded an army of mercenaries, local citizens, veterans from his battles in Italy, and war elephants. The Roman victory saw an end to Carthaginian resistance, with the Carthaginian senate pressing for peace again. The Romans granted peace, put only at a high price for Carthage. The battles of Lake Trasimine and Cannae (217 and 216 B.C) were two shocking defeats in the Second Punic War at the beginning of Hannibal’s entry to Italian lands. Livy, Ab Urbe Condita, 22.4-7 deals with Trasimine and 22.47-8 with Cannae. Cannae was the greatest defeat that the Roman army ever suffered, despite the Romans greatly outnumbering Hannibal’s forces (by what exact figure is debated), and the Romans were eventually overcome by what was a pincer movement that entrapped the Romans in the surrounding Carthaginian assembly. Both of these battles saw incredibly fierce fighting. At Lake Trasimene the Romans had been ambushed by Hannibal, and this led to such fierce fighting: "...that an earthquake, violent enough to overthrow large portions of many of the towns of Italy, turn swift streams from their courses, carry the sea up into rivers, and bring down mountains with great landslides, was not even felt by any of the combatants." At the battle of Teutoburg Forest (9 A.D.) three legions were ambushed and slaughtered by a gathering of Germanic tribes, commanded by Arminius, chief of the Cherusci. The Romans were led by Publius Quinctilius Varus. Tacitus (Annals,1.55-71) describes the scenario and battle in detail but Suetonius, best sums up the effect of this defeat: “[the defeat] of Varus threatened the security of the empire itself; three legions, with the commander, his lieutenants, and all the auxiliaries, being cut off. Upon receiving intelligence of this disaster, he gave orders for keeping a strict watch over the city, to prevent any public disturbance, and prolonged the appointments of the prefects in the provinces, that the allies might be kept in order by experience of persons to whom they were used." He made a vow to celebrate the great games in honor of Jupiter, Optimus, Maximus, "if he would be pleased to restore the state to more prosperous circumstances." This had formerly been resorted to in the Cimbrian and Marsian wars. In short, we are informed that he was in such consternation at this event, that he let the hair of his head and beard grow for several months, and sometimes knocked his head against the door-post, crying out, " Varus! Give me back my legions!" And ever after he observed the anniversary of this calamity, as a day of sorrow and mourning. (Suetonius, Augustus, 2). For the best part of half a millennium the Roman army acted as the long arm of Roman imperialism over an area of land that encompassed the lands touched and influenced by the Mediterranean. It united Italy, divided Roman allegiances, acting both as the State's enforcer and the enforcer of individuals of power; it was able to subdue German tribes, Carthaginians, Greeks, Macedonians, and many other peoples. It was a force to be reckoned with, and it still is because to understand how the Roman army operated is no easy task, and this definition has only brushed the top-soil off the vast wealth of details on the Roman army that have been buried in time. [Ancient History Encyclopedia] The Ancient Roman Navy: Roman Naval Warfare. Military supremacy of the seas could be a crucial factor in the success of any land campaign, and the Romans well knew that a powerful naval fleet could supply troops and equipment to where they were most needed in as short a time as possible. Naval vessels could also supply beleaguered ports under enemy attack and, in turn, blockade ports under enemy control. A powerful navy was also indispensable to deal with pirates, who wreaked havoc with commercial sea-traders and even, on occasion, blockaded ports. Naval warfare had its own unique dangers, though, with adverse weather being the biggest threat to success, which is why naval campaigns were largely limited to between April and November. Ancient naval vessels were made of wood, water-proofed using pitch and paint, and propelled by both sail and oars. Ships with multiple levels of rowers, such as the trireme, were fast and maneuverable enough to attack enemy vessels by ramming. The largest ships were the quinqueremes, with three banks of rowers, two each for the upper two oars and one rower on the lower oar (around 300 in total). Ships could also be fitted with a platform via which marines could easily board enemy vessels - a device known as the corvus (raven). Built for speed, most warships were lightweight, cramped, and without room for storage or even a large body of troops. Such logistical purposes were better achieved using troop carrier vessels and supply ships under sail. Aside from the bronze covered battering ram below the water-line on the ship's prow, other weapons included artillery ballista which could be mounted on ships to provide lethal salvoes on enemy land positions from an unexpected and less protected flank or also against other vessels. Fire balls (pots of burning pitch) could also be launched at the enemy vessel to destroy it by fire rather than ramming. Fleets came to be commanded by a prefect (praefectus) appointed by the emperor, and the position required someone with great skill and leadership qualities to successfully marshal a fleet of sometimes unwieldy vessels. The captain of a vessel held centurion rank or the title of trierarchus. Fleets were based at fortified ports such as Portus Julius in Campania which included artificial harbors and lagoons connected by tunnels. Crews of Roman military vessels could be trained in such ports but they were, in reality, more soldiers than sailors as they were expected to act as light-armed land troops when necessary. Indeed, they are typically referred to as miles (soldiers) in documents and funeral monuments, and they also received the same pay as infantry auxiliaries and were similarly subject to Roman military law. Crews were typically recruited locally and drawn from the poorer classes (the proletarii) but could also include recruits from allied states, prisoners of war, and slaves. Training was, therefore, a crucial requirement, so that the collective manpower was used most efficiently and discipline was maintained in the frenzy and horror of battle. Rome's navy swept away the Carthaginians and Cilician pirates, bringing total domination of the Mediterranean. Roman naval tactics differed little from the methods employed by the earlier Greeks. Vessels were propelled by rowers and sail to transport troops, and in naval battles the vessels became battering rams using their bronze-wrapped rams. In actual battle, sailing maneuverability was limited and so rowers propelled the vessels when at close quarters with the enemy. Sails and rigging were stored on shore which saved weight, increased the vessel's stability, and left more room for marines. The objective was to position the ram to punch a hole in the enemy vessel and then withdraw to allow water into the stricken ship. Alternatively, a well-aimed swipe could break one bank of the enemy's oars and thus disable it. To achieve this sort of damage, the best angle of attack was to the enemy's flank or rear. Therefore, not only was maneuverability under oar a necessity but so too was speed. This is why, over time, vessels had more and more rowers, not along the ship's length which would make the ship unseaworthy, but by piling rowers on top of each other. Thus the trireme of the Greeks, with three levels of rowers, had evolved from the brireme with two levels, and the trireme eventually evolved into the Roman quinquereme. Rome had employed naval vessels from the early Republic in the 4th century B.C., especially in response to the threat from pirates in the Tyrrhenian Sea, but it was in 260 B.C. that they built, in a mere 60 days, their first significant navy. A fleet of 100 quinqueremes and 20 triremes was assembled in response to the threat from Carthage. In typically Roman fashion, the designers copied from, and improved upon, a captured Carthaginian quinquereme. The Romans had also recognized the inferiority of their seamanship compared to the much more experienced Carthaginians. For this reason they employed the corvus. This was an 11 meter long platform which could be lowered from the ship's bow on to the decks of enemy vessels and fixed via a huge metal spike. Roman troops (around 120 on each ship) could then board the opposing vessel and make short work of the enemy crew. The first engagement where the corvi were employed with great effect was the Battle of Mylae off the coast of northern Sicily in 260 B.C. The two fleets were evenly matched with 130 vessels apiece, but the Carthaginians, not expecting the Romans to be any great shakes at naval warfare, did not even bother to form battle lines. The corvus proved a devastatingly successful attack weapon against the disorganized Carthaginians, and a Roman victory was the result, albeit, an unexpected one. Not only did the commander and consul Caius Duilius have the satisfaction of seeing his opposite number flee his flagship in a rowing boat, but he was also granted a military triumph for this, Rome's first great victory at sea. The Battle of Ecnomus, in 256 B.C. off the southern coast of Sicily, was one of, if not the, largest sea battles in ancient times, and it would show that Mylae had been no fluke. The Romans, buoyed by their first success, had expanded their fleet so that they now had 330 quinqueremes with a total of 140,000 men ready for battle. The Carthaginians set sail with 350 ships, and the two massive fleets met off the coast of Sicily. The Romans organized themselves into four squadrons arranged in a wedge shape. The Carthaginians sought to entice the front two Roman squadrons away from the rear and catch them in a pincer movement. However, whether through a lack of maneuverability or proper communication of intentions, the Carthaginian fleet instead attacked the Roman rear transport squadron whilst the front two Roman squadrons caused havoc inside the Carthaginian center. In the close-quarter fighting, seamanship counted for little and the corvii for everything. Once again, victory was Rome's. Carthage lost 100 ships to a mere 24 Roman losses. The war dragged on, though, as Rome's immediate invasion of North Africa proved a costly failure. A notable expedition led by Gnaeus Servilius Rufus in 217 B.C. cleared Italian waters of Carthaginian raiders and the Romans did eventually defeat the Carthaginian fleet, but largely because they were able to replace lost ships and men quicker in what became a war of real attrition. Victories were mixed with defeat at Drepna in 249 B.C. and disasters such as the loss of 280 ships and 100,000 men in a single storm off the coast of Camarina in south-east Sicily. Eventually however Rome prevailed. The war had cost Rome 1,600 ships but the prize was worth it: domination of the Mediterranean. This sea control became useful in Rome's wars with the successor kingdoms of Alexander in the Macedonian Wars. Between 198 and 195 B.C., for example, Rome repeatedly launched successful sea-borne raids against Philip V of Macedonia's ally Nabis, the Spartan tyrant. With the decline of Rhodes, which had for centuries policed the Mediterranean and Black Sea to protect her lucrative trade routes, piracy became rife in the 1st century B.C. More than 1,000 pirate ships, often organized along military lines with fleets and admirals, were now the scourge of sea-trade. They also grew in confidence, acquiring triremes and even raiding Italy itself, attacking Ostia and disrupting the all-important grain supply. In 67 B.C. Rome once more amassed a fleet, and Pompey the Great was given the task of ridding the seas of the pirate pest in three years. With 500 ships, 120,000 men, and 5,000 cavalry at his disposal, Pompey divided his force into 13 zones and, himself leading a squadron, first cleared Sicily, then North Africa, Sardinia, and Spain. Finally, he sailed for Cilicia in Asia Minor, where the pirates had their bases and where they had been deliberately allowed to gather by Pompey for a last decisive battle. Attacking by sea and land, and victorious in the battle of Coracesium, Pompey negotiated a pirate surrender with a sweetener of free land for those who gave themselves up peacefully. The last threat to Rome's complete control of the Mediterranean was gone. Now the only threat to Rome was Rome herself and, so it was, civil war ravaged Italy. Julius Caesar emerged the victor, and the remnants of Pompey's fleet became the backbone of the Roman navy, which was used to good effect in the expeditions to invade Britain - the larger second expedition in 54 B.C. involved a fleet of 800 ships. Following Caesar's assassination, the fleet came under the control of Sextus Pompeius Magnus, ironically, the son of Pompey. By 38 B.C. Octavian, Caesar's heir, had to amass another fleet to meet the threat of Sextus. Giving command to Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa, 370 vessels were dispatched to attack Sicily and the fleet of Sextus. Once again, a lack of well-trained seamen forced commanders to innovate, and Agrippa went for brute force over maneuverability and employed a catapult propelled grapnel on his vessels. This device allowed ships to be winched into close quarters to facilitate boarding by marines. The weapon proved devastatingly effective in 36 B.C. at the 600-ship battle of Naulochos (Sicily again), and Sextus was defeated. In 31 B.C., near Actium on the western coast of Greece, there occurred one of the most significant naval battles in history. Still battling for control of the Roman Empire, Octavian now faced Mark Antony and his ally, Egyptian Queen, Cleopatra. Both sides amassed a fleet and made ready to attack the other. Mark Antony led a fleet of 500 warships and 300 merchant ships against Octavian's similar-sized force, although Antony had larger and less maneuverable Hellenistic-type vessels. Agrippa, still in command, launched his attack early in the sailing season and so caught Antony by surprise. The northern outposts of Antony's forces were the target, a move which created a diversion whilst Octavian landed his army. In any case, Antony refused to be drawn from his fortified harbor in the Gulf of Ambricia. Blockade was Agrippa's only option. Perhaps, Antony was playing for time, waiting for his legions to assemble from around Greece. Octavian, though, would not be drawn into a land battle and dug-in his fleet behind a defensive mole 8 km to the north. As disease ravaged his troops and his supply lines became increasingly threatened by Agrippa, Antony had little choice but to try and break out on the 2nd of September. Not helped by a defector giving Octavian his plans and several generals switching sides, Antony could only muster 230 ships against Agrippa's 400. Agrippa's strategy was to hold station at sea and lure Antony away from the coast. However, this would have exposed Antony to the greater maneuverability of Agrippa's vessels, so he tried to hug the coast and avoid encirclement. As the wind rose around noon, Antony saw his chance for escape as his fleet was under sail whilst Agrippa's had stowed their sails on shore, standard practice in ancient naval warfare. The two fleets met and engaged and in the confusion, Cleopatra's 60-ship squadron fled the battle. Antony quickly followed suit; abandoning his flagship for another vessel, he followed his lover and left his fleet to be crushed by Agrippa and Octavian's combined forces. Soon after, Antony's land army, now leaderless, surrendered to Octavian with a negotiated peace. The propaganda of the victors predictably blamed Cleopatra and Antony's cowardice for the defeat, but the fact that Antony had engaged Agrippa under sail suggests that, heavily outnumbered, he had, from the start, intended flight rather than combat. Following victory at Actium, the new emperor Octavian, now calling himself Augustus, established two 50-ship fleets - the classis Ravennatium based at Ravenna and the classis Misenatium based at Misenum (near Naples), which were in operation until the 4th century A.D. There were also later fleets based at Alexandria, Antioch, Rhodes, Sicily, Libya, Pontus, and Britain, as well as one operating on the Rhine and another two on the Danube. These fleets allowed Rome to quickly respond to any military needs throughout the empire and to supply the army in its various campaigns. In truth though, there was no real naval competition to Rome's fleets. This is evidenced by the fact that in the following centuries, Rome was involved in only one more major naval battle - in 324 A.D. between emperor Constantine and his rival Licinius - and so, in the ancient Mediterranean at least, after Actium, the days of large-scale naval battles were over. [Ancient History Encyclopedia]. Rhine River Excavations of Roman Riverine Warships: Roman raiders and their lost arks. When workmen were digging foundations to erect a new Hilton hotel in Mainz, West Germany (in 1982), they excavated the well-preserved remains of nine Roman warships. Such are the small ironies of history. And now, less than a year later, two more vessels have been uncovered, buried under 12 to 15 feet of clay. The oldest of the ships was built in 81 A.D., according to the rather precise evidence of the rings in the oak. Most of the ships, however, date from the fourth century, when the empire was far into its famous decline, leading to the sack of Rome by Alaric the Goth in 410. Historians believe the garrison at Maiz, along with this shipyard by the Rhine, must have been abandoned about 10 years earlier. These ancient warships, 30 to 70 feet long, were sleek, purposeful vessels with uncompromisingly straight keels and massive timber frames. There was accommodation for sail amidships, but they were chiefly propelled by oars. In their sharp lines, one feels the thrust of a score of Caesars. Around 12 B.C., we know, the Emperor Drusus cut a canal from the Rhine to the Zuyder Zee. Some of these ships, part of the classis Germanicus (Rome's German navy), must have traveled on that canal. How tirelessly the empire laid down arterial roads and bridges and waterways so that its armies could move further, and yet further, from the heart of Rome! These navies of Rome's many frontiers ferried troops and supplies, patrolled against the hostile natives, kept communications open - ruthlessly, making straight lines in a tangled and untidy world. It must have all seemed irresistibly logical to the Romans - the most logical of men. But in the end, the solution became the problem. One thing led to another - one more bridge, one more canal, one more bronze-beaked ship. There were hardly enough oak trees in the German forests to keep up with the ships. In one 18-year period the Roman navies lost nearly 1,000. There were not enough freed slaves - from Gaul, from Spain, from Africa - to man all those oars. The last words of the Emperor Septimus in 200 A.D. were: "Pay the soldiers more." But there was no longer enough gold to ship out of Rome on those roads and waterways, financing all the garrisons of this garrison state. For what the Romans finally ran out of was will. What was it all for? National security? World order? Manifest destiny? The Romans thought they knew in the beginning. Toward the end, there was the Emperor Marcus Aurelius, advising: "Stop being whirled about." Don't worry about what other people think, he told himself. Live in the present. Throw away material things. Discover inner peace. What did all that have to do with warships at Mainz - with all the frontier wars that Marcus Aurelius fought as a reflex of Roman duty? The Roman parallel is always fascinating to Americans. What can we learn from these 11 time-warp souvenirs, raised from the mud like monsters in a horror movie? Some will see them as an argument for more defense; others, as an argument for less defense. Most people will "learn" what they are already convinced of. The ships sit, submerged in huge metal basins in an empty trolley barn, too waterlogged to be withdrawn from water. Polyethylene glycol is being tried as a liquid replacement. But for the moment, air is the enemy. In contrast to their military pretensions, the Roman warships now seem profoundly vulnerable - documentation for a modern historian's conclusion: "The complete failure of Rome against Germany...usefully illustrates the limitations of sea-power." And what else? Something in us parallel-seekers wants to know. Something in us doesn't want to know. [Christian Science Monitor]. Carthaginian Naval Warfare: The Carthaginians were famed in antiquity for their seafaring skills and innovation in ship design. The empire their navy protected stretched from Sicily to the Atlantic coast of Africa. Able to match the tyrants of Sicily and the Hellenistic kingdoms Carthage’s dominance of the seas would be challenged and ultimately replaced by the Romans, who were able to create a navy that became just as successful as their land army. Carthage took over the old Phoenician colonies in the Mediterranean and created many new ones so that its empire included North Africa, the Iberian peninsula, Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, and many other islands. To maintain trade contacts between these cities and to police their interests the Carthaginians used a naval fleet which became the envy of the ancient world. Such was its strength that Rome, although successful in land battles, was forced to build its first ever fleet in order to defeat Carthage and claim the western Mediterranean for its own. For three centuries prior to the Punic Wars, though, the Carthaginian fleet ruled the waves. Inheriting the skills passed on to them by the mother country Phoenicia the Carthaginians were admired across the ancient Mediterranean not only for their seamanship but also the quality of their ships. Such were the requirements of Carthage’s large navy that ships were constructed using mass-produced pieces marked with numbers for ease of assembly. The wood used for ships was oak, fir, and pine. The size of the fleet changed depending on the period, but according to the ancient historian Polybius, Carthage had a fleet of 350 ships in 256 B.C. During the Punic Wars with Rome between 264 B.C. and 146 B.C. the fleet had to be constantly renewed to recover from losses in battles and storms. The naval fleet of Carthage was composed of large warships propelled by sail and oars which were used to ram enemy vessels using a bronze ram mounted on the prow below the waterline. Direction was controlled by two steering-oars fixed to either side of the stern. Each oar was fitted with a horizontal bar for the helmsmen to handle. The Phoenicians had invented the trireme with three banks of rowers, but after using these in their early history the Carthaginians would later progress in the 4th century B.C. to the bigger and faster ships with four and five men per oar, the quadrireme and quinquereme. The quinquereme, so called for its arrangement of five rowers per vertical line of three oars, became the most widely used in the Punic fleet. Catapults could be mounted on the deck of these large vessels but were probably limited to siege warfare and not used in ship-to-ship battles. The main aim in a naval battle was to ram and hole an enemy vessel or break its bank of oars. Sails were not used in battle conditions, but oar-power could give a ship a speed of 7-8 knots. Crews had to be well-trained to not only maneuver a ship as best as possible but also know when not to drive too far into an enemy ship and so become stuck when the ram impaled it. The second stage was to assault the enemy with missiles and, if necessary, board using grappling hooks and fight hand-to-hand. Polybius describes the skills and tactics of the Carthaginian navy in battle thus: "They much surpassed the Romans in speed, owing to the superior build of their ships and the better training of the rowers, as they had freely developed their line [formation] in the open sea. For if any ships found themselves hard pressed by the enemy it was easy for them, owing to their speed, to retreat safely to open water and from thence, fetching round on the ships that pursued…them, they either got in their rear or attacked them in the flank. As the enemy then had to turn round they found themselves in difficulty owing to the weight of the hulls and the poor oarsmanship of the crews, [so the Carthaginians] rammed them repeatedly and sunk many." Attempts to ram enemy ships could be made in two ways. The first, the diekplous or breakthrough, was when ships formed a single line and sailed right through the enemy lines at a selected weak point. The defending ships would try not to create any gaps in their formation and perhaps stagger their lines to counter the diekplous. The diekplous was used with great effect in 217 B.C. by a Roman fleet to defeat the Carthaginians at the battle of Ebro. The second tactic, known as periplous, was to try and sail down the flanks of the enemy formation and attack from the sides and rear. This strategy could be countered by spreading one’s ships as wide as possible but not too much so as to allow a diekplous attack. Positioning a fleet with one flank protected by a shoreline could also help counter a periplous maneuver, especially from a more numerous enemy. While all this chaotic ramming was going on, smaller vessels were used to haul stricken ships away from the battle lines or even to tow away captured vessels. Aside from naval battles, the Carthaginian fleet was also vital for transporting armies, resupplying them by providing an escort for transport ships, coastal raids, attacking enemy supply ships, blockading enemy ports, and relieving Carthaginian forces when they were themselves besieged. The Carthaginian navy was also employed to sink trading vessels from rival states if they attempted to promote commercial activity in places Carthage considered it held a trade monopoly. Command of the navy was in the hands of an admiral selected by the council of Carthage. He had equal status to the commander of the land army, and only very rarely were the two forces commanded by the same person. Each ship was run by three officers, one of whom was the navigator. A typical quinquereme crew would have consisted of 300 rowers taken from the citizenry of Carthage and allied cities such as Utica. In later times slaves were also used to meet the high demands of warfare. The lesser-skilled slaves could be used to good effect in the larger ships where two men manipulated most of the oars. This arrangement allowed one skilled oarsman to guide the oar but also benefit from the power of the second man. The find of the Marsala shipwreck, a 3rd-century B.C. Carthaginian naval vessel that sank off Sicily, revealed not only the labeled pieces of the ship’s hull for easy assembly but also what the crew ate and drank: dried meat (poultry, horse, beef, goat, pork, and venison), almonds and walnuts, washed down with wine. Oarsmen could not relax when beached as they were expected to fight in landing operations but not in ship-to-ship battles. Crews might also be employed in the building of siege engines, too. The larger ships were decked and would have carried complements of armed men, both archers and marines armed with spears, javelins, and swords, who could board enemy vessels given the opportunity. The Punic naval fleet had its own harbor separate from but connected to the merchant harbor at Carthage. The naval harbor was massive and circular whilst the merchant ships anchored in a rectangular one. Both ports were manmade, about two meters deep, and they possibly date to 220-210 B.C. The center of the naval harbor was dominated by a tower structure known as the ‘the admiral’s island’ which connected to the outer ring via a causeway. Appian gives an idea of the great size of the naval harbor by describing the central island’s capacity for 30 ships and the 21-meter wide entrance. The outer ring of ship sheds could hold another 170 ships. From recent archaeology we now know that the harbor was 325 meters in diameter and matches Appian’s description. The roofed sheds fronted by Ionic columns allowed the relatively light wooden ships to be pulled up a wooden slipway for repair and to avoid them becoming water-logged when not needed. The sheds were 30-48 meters long and 6 meters wide. The harbor also had a large platform (choma) which infantry and even chariots could use to board the ships. Both harbors were protected by massive fortification walls. The first known sea battle involving the Carthaginian navy was in 535 B.C. against the Phocaeans off Corsica. Carthage’s seemingly never-ending battle for control of Sicily produced many naval battles throughout the 5th and 4th centuries B.C. with losses more or less equaling victories. Wars against Dionysius I of Syracuse (four), Timoleon, and Agathocles all saw naval engagements, blockades, and coastal raids. Carthage also provided its fleet for logistical support to the Romans in their war against Pyrrhus in the early 3rd century B.C. However, the best documented naval engagements, and those most vital to Carthage’s survival, came during the Punic Wars with Rome now as enemy number one. In the First Punic War (264 and 241 B.C.) Rome quickly realized that to defeat Carthage they would have to do what they had never done before - build their own naval fleet. Accordingly, in the spring of 260 B.C. Rome constructed a fleet of 20 triremes and 100 quinquereme warships in only 60 days. Copying the design of a captured Carthaginian ship, the Romans then added a whole new feature: the corvus (raven). This was a rotating 11-meter long platform with a giant holding spike (like a beak, hence the bird name) which could be lowered onto an enemy vessel to allow a heavy infantry unit (perhaps 80-120 men) to board them. The idea would negate the superior seamanship of the Carthaginians and make naval combat more like a land battle. This masterstroke of inventiveness was an immediate success when their fleet of 145 ships defeated the Carthaginian fleet of 130 ships at the battle of Mylae (Milazzo) in 260 B.C. The Carthaginians, so dismissive of their opponent’s seafaring skills, had not even bothered to form battle lines. When the Carthaginian flagship was captured, the commander was forced to flee in a rowing boat. The Roman commander Duilius was honored with a Roman triumph, the first in Rome’s history to be awarded for a naval victory. Carthage seemed to have no answer to the corvus and more defeats came at Sulcis in 258 B.C. and in the battle of Ecnomus in 256 B.C. The latter was one of the largest naval engagements in history with the Romans commanding 330 ships and the Carthaginians a similar number. The Romans formed four distinct battle groups which disrupted the Carthaginian lines. 100 of the enemy ships were destroyed compared to 24 Roman losses. Carthage fought back in 249 B.C. with an important victory at Drepana (Trapani) where their superior seamanship saw them outmaneuver the Roman fleet out at sea. The Carthaginian fleet was ably led by Adherbal who captured 93 of the 120 enemy ships. The Roman commander, Publius Claudius Pulcher, who had rashly decided to attack at night, was tried for treason back in Rome. Round one of the Punic Wars was finally won by the Romans with their victory off the Aegates Islands (Isole Egadi) on 10th March, 241 B.C. The Carthaginian fleet, led by Hanno and sent to relieve the besieged city of Drepana on Sicily, was defeated by a 200-ship Roman fleet commanded by the consul Gaius Lutatius Catulus. Catulus had spent all the previous summer training his crews and the effort paid off when 50 Carthaginian ships were sunk, 70 captured, and 10,000 prisoners taken. This loss was not huge, but after decades of war, it drove the cash-strapped Carthaginians to seek peace terms. The Second Punic War (218-201 B.C.) was largely fought on land, but the fleets of both sides were crucial in transporting land armies, resupplying them, and blockading ports throughout the conflict. Hamilcar Barca had already sailed in 237 B.C. with an army to conquer much of southern Spain. In 216 B.C. the fleet was used to transport an army to Sardinia in a failed attempt to take back the island and another army to Spain to relieve the pressure from Scipio Africanus the Elder. In 213 B.C. an army was transported to Sicily, but again the Carthaginians could not prevent Marcellus from taking Syracuse. In 205 B.C. Carthage sent yet another army, led by Mago, to relieve his brother Hannibal who was by now cornered in southern Italy. Unfortunately, they could only land in Liguria, northern Italy because of the Roman naval dominance and their control of the major ports further south. In 204 B.C. Scipio managed to cross to Africa unimpeded with an army of 30,000 men. In 202 B.C. the Roman general then defeated an army led by Hannibal at the Battle of Zama. The second and most decisive round was over with Rome once again the victor. Land battles had been decisive in the war but so too had Carthage’s lack of naval dominance. Crucially, Carthage had not been able to resupply Hannibal, join the armies of the two brothers together, or prevent Scipio from landing in Africa. The Roman dominance of the seas following the First Punic War had made them unstoppable. Part of the peace terms after the Second Punic War stipulated that Carthage could never again possess a fleet and the once great navy was limited to a paltry 10 ships. The Third Punic War (149-146 B.C.) turned out to be something of a mismatch. Carthage, without a navy, could do nothing to prevent the Romans landing an army of over 80,000 men in North Africa. Despite valiant resistance behind Carthage’s impressive fortifications and a brave attempt to break the siege with a fleet of 50 secretly constructed ships, Rome was able to carry out the senator Cato’s famous command to the letter, Carthage was destroyed. Rome had lost 600 ships in the Punic Wars (most of those due to storms) and more men than its opponent but its ability to replace them and the superiority of the land army meant Carthage was not only defeated time and again but the city obliterated and the population sold into slavery. The Carthaginian navy had initially been the Mediterranean’s innovators in ship design and they had enjoyed many victories against multiple enemies but by the time of the Punic Wars the world had changed. Very few ancient wars up to that time were ever settled by sea engagements alone as land warfare remained the principal means to inflict total defeat on the enemy. Even before the Punic Wars had started, Carthage had gone a generation without having to fight a naval battle with the consequence that its mariners had little real battle experience. Rome took up naval warfare with great success and displayed an astounding ability to replace its fleets almost at will. In Spain and North Africa Romans defeated the Carthaginian armies on land. Hannibal’s four great victories in Italy proved to be the exception, not the rule, and his gamble that Rome would collapse from within failed. Thus, Rome, with its professional army and navy of highly-trained and well-disciplined troops led by a clear command structure lusting for military glory within their term of office, swept aside Carthage both on land and at sea. Carthage was not helped by overly-conservative commanders but, in any case, it simply did not have the military or financial means to compete with the Mediterranean’s new superpower. Ancient warfare had evolved into a multi-weapon, multi-trooped, and multiple theatre activity at which the Romans excelled above all others. [Ancient History Encyclopedia]. The Punic Wars (Carthage versus Rome): The Punic Wars were a series of conflicts fought between the forces of ancient Carthage and Rome between 264 B.C. and 146 B.C. The name Punic comes from the word Phoenician (Phoinix in the Greek, Poenus from Punicus in Latin) as applied to the citizens of Carthage, who were of Phoenician ethnicity. As the history of the conflict was written by Roman authors, they labeled it 'The Punic Wars'. Carthage grew from a small port-of-call to the richest and most powerful city in the Mediterranean region before 260 B.C. She had a powerful navy, a mercenary army and, through tribute, tariffs, and trade, enough wealth to do as she pleased. Through a treaty with the small city of Rome, she barred Roman trade in the Western Mediterranean and, as Rome had no navy, was able to easily enforce the treaty. Roman traders caught in Carthaginian waters were drowned and their ships taken. As long as Rome remained the little city of trade by the Tiber River, Carthage reigned supreme; but the island of Sicily would be the flashpoint for growing Roman resentment of the Carthaginians. Sicily lay partly under Carthaginian and partly under Roman control. When Heiro II of neighboring Syracuse fought against the Mamertines of Messina, the Mamertines asked first Carthage and then Rome for help. The Carthaginians had already agreed to help and felt betrayed by the Mamertines’ appeal to Rome. The Carthaginians changed sides, sending forces to Hiero II. The Romans fought for the Mamertines of Messina and, in 264 B.C., Rome and Carthage declared war on each other for the control of Sicily. Although Rome had no navy and knew nothing of sea battles, they swiftly built and equipped 330 ships. As they were far more used to fighting land battles, they devised the clever device of the corvus, a moveable gangplank, which could be attached to an enemy’s ship and held in place with hooks. By immobilizing the other ship, and attaching it to their own, the Romans could manipulate a sea engagement through the strategies of a land battle. Even so, they lacked the expertise at sea of the Carthaginians and, more importantly, were lacking a general with the skill of the Carthaginian Hamilcar Barca. Hamilcar was surnamed Barca (meaning `lightning’) because of his speed in attacking anywhere and the suddenness of the action. He struck without warning up and down the coast of Italy destroying Roman outposts and cutting supply lines. Had the Carthaginian government better supplied and reinforced Hamilcar, they most probably would have won the war but, instead, they contented themselves with hoarding their wealth and trusted to Hamilcar and his mercenaries to take care of the war. He defeated the Romans at Drepana in 249 B.C. but then was forced to withdraw due to a lack of man power and supplies. According to the historian Durant, “Worn out almost equally, the two nations rested for nine years. But while in those years Carthage did nothing…a number of Roman citizens voluntarily presented to the state a fleet of 200 men-of-war, carrying 60,000 troops.” The Romans, more experienced at sea battles now and better equipped and led, won a series of decisive victories over Carthage and in 241 B.C. the Carthaginians sued for peace. This war was costly to both sides but Carthage suffered more seriously owing to the corruption and incompetence of her government (which embezzled funds which should have gone to the military and consistently refused to send much needed supplies and reinforcements to generals in the field), the mostly mercenary army (who often simply refused to fight), and an over-reliance on the brilliance of Hamilcar Barca. Further, however, they seriously underestimated their enemy. While Carthage would largely ignore the war, leaving the fighting to Hamilcar and his mercenaries, Rome would be building and equipping more ships and training more men. Even though Rome had never had a navy before the First Punic War, they emerged in 241 B.C. as masters of the sea and Carthage was a defeated city. During the war, the Carthaginian government had repeatedly failed to pay its mercenary army and, also in 241 B.C., these mercenaries laid siege to the city. Hamilcar Barca was called upon to raise the siege and did so, even though Carthage had refused him the much needed supplies and reinforcements on his campaigns on her behalf and he had led most of these mercenaries in battle himself. The Mercenary War lasted from 241-237 B.C. and, while Carthage was engaged in this conflict, Rome occupied the Carthaginian colonies of Sardinia and Corsica. While Carthage was unhappy with this development, there was little they could do about it. They concentrated their efforts on the conquest of Spain rather than trying to drive the Romans out of their former colonies. In 226 B.C. the Ebro Treaty was signed between Carthage and Rome agreeing that the Romans would hold Spanish territory north of the Ebro River, Carthage would hold the area they had already conquered south of the river, and neither nation would cross the boundary. To the south of the border lay the city of Saguntum, a Roman ally, and, in 219 B.C., the great Carthaginian general Hannibal (Hamilcar’s son) lay siege to the city and took it. The Romans objected to this attack and demanded that Carthage deliver Hannibal to Rome. The Carthaginian senate refused to comply and so began the Second Punic War (218-202 B.C.). Hannibal, a sworn enemy of Rome, received intelligence that Roman armies were moving against him and, in a bold gamble, marched his forces over the Alps and into northern Italy. Hannibal then proceeded to win every single engagement against the Romans, conquering northern Italy and gathering former allies of Rome to his side. Having lost many of his elephants on his march over the mountains, and lacking necessary siege engines and troops, Hannibal was caught in southern Italy in a cat and mouse game with the Roman army under Quintus Fabius Maximus. Fabius refused to engage Hannibal directly relying, instead, on cutting off his supplies and starving his army. Fabius’ strategy might have worked had not the Romans become impatient with their legions’ inactivity. Further, Hannibal used counter-intelligence to reinforce and spread the rumor that Fabius refused to fight because he was in the pay of the Carthaginians. Fabius was replaced by Caius Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paulus who threw off caution and led their troops against Hannibal in the region of Apulia. At the Battle of Cannae in 216 B.C., Hannibal placed his Gauls in the center of his lines, expecting they would give way before the Roman forces. When they did exactly that, and the Romans pressed what they saw as an advantage and followed them, Hannibal closed from behind and the sides, enveloping the Roman forces and crushing them. 44,000 Roman soldiers died at Cannae compared with 6000 of Hannibal’s forces. Hannibal won his greatest victory but could not build upon it as Carthage refused to send him the reinforcements and supplies he needed. Shortly after this, the Roman general, Publius Cornelius Scipio (later known as Scipio Africanus, who had fought against Hannibal at Cannae) was defeating the Carthaginian forces in Spain (under Hannibal’s brother, Hasdrubal). Recognizing that Hannibal’s army would be recalled if Carthage were attacked, Scipio manned a fleet and sailed to North Africa where he took the Carthaginian city of Utica. Carthage recalled Hannibal from Italy to save their city but Scipio was a great admirer of Hannibal and had studied his tactics carefully. At the Battle of Zama in 202, Hannibal sent an elephant charge against the Romans which Scipio, mindful of Hannibal’s strategies, deflected easily. The Romans killed the Carthaginians on the elephants and sent the animals back into the Carthaginian ranks, then followed with a combined cavalry charge and infantry advance which caught the enemy between and crushed them. Hannibal returned to the city and told the senate that Carthage should immediately surrender. Scipio allowed Carthage to retain her colonies in Africa but she had to surrender her navy and was not allowed to make war under any circumstances without Rome’s approval. Carthage was also to pay Rome a war debt of 200 talents every year for fifty years. Carthage was, again, a defeated city but, retaining its trading ships and ten warships to protect them, was able to struggle on and begin to prosper. The Carthaginian government, however, still as corrupt and selfish as it had always been, taxed the people heavily to help pay the war debt while they, themselves, contributed nothing. Hannibal came out of retirement to try to rectify the situation, was betrayed by the rich Carthaginians to the Romans, and fled. He died by his own hand, drinking poison, in 184, aged sixty-seven. Carthage continued paying the war debt to Rome for the proscribed fifty years and, when it was done, considered their treaty with Rome completed also. They went to war against Numidia, were defeated, and had to then pay that nation another war debt. As they had gone to war without Rome’s approval, the Roman senate considered Carthage a threat to the peace again. The Roman senator Cato the Elder took the threat so seriously that he would end all of his speeches, no matter the subject, with the phrase, “And, further, I think that Carthage should be destroyed.” In 149 B.C. Rome sent an embassy to Carthage suggesting exactly that course: that the city should be dismantled and moved inland away from the coast. The Carthaginians refused to comply with this and so began the Third Punic War (149-146 B.C.). The Roman general Scipio Aemilianus besieged the city for three years and, when it fell, sacked it and burned it to the ground. Rome emerged as the pre-eminent power in the Mediterranean and Carthage lay in ruin for over one hundred years until it was finally re-built following the death of Julius Caesar. The Punic Wars provided Rome with the training, the navy, and the wealth to expand from a small city to an empire which would rule the known world. [Ancient History Encyclopedia]. War Horses and Chariots in the Ancient World: By the mid-second millennium B.C., the use of horses in warfare had become common throughout the Near East and Egypt. This development was made possible by advances both in the design of chariots, in particular the invention of the spoked wheel, which replaced the solid wooden wheel and reduced a chariot’s weight, and the introduction of all-metal bits, which gave chariot drivers more control over their horses. Though chariot warfare was expensive, and its effectiveness was determined by the durability of the chariots and suitability of the terrain, the vehicles became essential battlefield equipment. According to archaeologist Brian Fagan of the University of California, Santa Barbara, Bronze Age chariots acted largely as mobile archery platforms, with the bulkier four-wheeled ones also being used to carry kings into battle or to allow generals to observe the fighting. Lighter two-wheeled versions, such as those found in Tutankhamun’s tomb, were better suited to carrying a single archer and a driver. One of the most informative sources for the use of chariot horses in the ancient Near East is a tablet discovered in 1906–1907 in the royal archive at the Hittite site of Hattusa in Anatolia. The “Kikkuli Text,” written in cuneiform script and dating to around 1400 B.C., is named after its author. Kikkuli introduces himself in the first line as a “horse trainer from the land of the Mitanni,” a state in what is now northern Syria and southeastern Turkey. He then describes an approximately 184-day training cycle that begins in the fall, in which he includes instructions for the horses’ feeding, watering, and care, recommending stable rest, massages, and blankets. For nearly a millennium, warhorses were used almost exclusively to pull chariots, but after about 850 B.C. chariotry began to decline. Horses, however, never lost their usefulness in battle. Within about 150 years, cavalry, which is suitable to almost any terrain, virtually replaced chariotry in the Near East, and, eventually, horse-drawn chariots were employed primarily for racing, in ceremonial parades, and as prestige vehicles. In time this happened not only in this region, but across most of Europe as well. The rise of true cavalry was the determining force behind many of the major events that influenced European history, including Charles Martel’s defeat of the Saracens at the Battle of Poitiers in A.D. 732, the creation of the Holy Roman Empire, and the victory of William the Conqueror at the Battle of Hastings in A.D. 1066. “I think that the most important development in history with respect to animals was the adoption of the horse as a weapon of war,” says Fagan. [Archaeological Institute of America]. Ancient Viking Warfare: During the Viking Age (about 790-1100 AD) Viking warfare and the component raids are inextricably connected with the expansion of Scandinavian influence along the North Atlantic and into the Mediterranean. The Vikings’ heavy use of ships, good strategic mobility and strong grasp on logistics ensured they could cause havoc abroad for years at a time. It was these factors that distinguished Viking warfare from that of their contemporaries. Contrary to public imagination (and the stereotypical depictions portrayed by television of savage berserk-warriors frothing at the mouth and committing unspeakable brutalities), Viking warriors were probably no more brutal than their Medieval peers. Scandinavian society at the time was not made up of unified kingdoms as we know them today. These only crystallized into those entities towards the end of the Viking Age. Contrary to the contemporary use of the name ‘Viking’ being applied to a general population group, the original meaning of the term is specifically ‘raider’ or ‘pirate’. The original phrase the name is derived from, fara i víking (‘to go on expedition’), specifically referred to armed raids of warriors. They were not merely harmless adventurers, but rather to a specific population subset who unleashed their swords and axes upon profitable objectives abroad. The majority of these raids were undertaken by individual war-bands that teamed up on an ad hoc basis. Leadership ranged from small, local chieftains to earls and kings. The Vikings’ characteristic hit-and-run tactics were bolstered by the establishment of over-wintering bases. From these bases campaigns could be launched and more land could be conquered. These eventually lead to the establishment of several full-fledged Viking territories far from the Scandinavian heartlands. Our current knowledge of Viking weaponry and armor is heavily reliant on the archaeological record. There simply are not many surviving technical descriptions to be found in the sources. Viking weapons included swords (both single- and double-edged), axes, daggers (or a short-sword/sax/seax as common among Germanic peoples around this time), spears, and bows and arrows. Their armor included shields, helmets, and mail shirts. Viking war-bands hailed from all sorts of different regions across Scandinavia. So while there are general trends in weaponry and armor, there was also significant regional variation resulting in nothing which could be described as a standard outfit. Axes were a typical and very popular Viking weapon. Unlike swords axes may have been used throughout Viking society. They were known mostly from finds of numerous axe-heads. These appeared not only in richer graves alongside other weapons but also as the sole weapon in more austere burials. Their presence perhaps indicating that unlike swords, axes may have been used across a broader economic spectrum. Viking swords were made of iron. They were meant to be held in one hand. They had broad grooves along the centre (‘fullers’) cutting down their weight to some extent. Double-edged swords coming in at around 90 cm in length seem to have been the preferred standard. They could be beautifully decorated with geometric patterns, motifs of animals. In the Late Viking Age some were decorated even with Christian symbols, in silver and/or copper inlay. A wooden scabbard finished off the set. Because swords were the most costly weapons around at the time they were not in every warrior’s financial reach. The owners of swords must have made a bit of a statement even with the mere possession of such expensive weaponry. A short-sword or dagger could get its owner out of a pinch in close-quarter combat or as a backup weapon. They were called sax or seax following the Saxon terminology. Other Viking weapons include heavy thrusting spears or lances crafted from iron and sporting leaf-shaped blades. Their shafts were most likely up to 6 or 7 feet long. Bows and arrows also found employment as weapons. Interestingly, the literature also alludes to the possible use by Scandinavians of some sort of siege engines. Their wooden remains would have long since turned to dust, so historians and archaeologists can only guess at their precise design and usage. Shields were part of the standard Viking weaponry kit. Laws even stated ship’s crewmembers were all required to carry shields. Shields were made of wood and circular in shape. They were probably covered by leather. They came in a variety of distinguishing colors. Chain-mail shirts are known but rare. They were probably too costly to be worn by just any fighter. It’s possible that leather may have been used instead. However it is hard to determine how common leather armor was given the archaeological record (leather decomposes). Helmets were worn but, contrary to popular depiction, were not horned. A Viking warrior would not much fancy getting a helmet caught in their opponents’ beards or suffering other impractical consequences. The few helmets that have survived show a simple iron design of a conical cap with eye-guards. It’s possible they also included a nose-guard and probably a mail sheet dangling off the back to protect the owner’s neck. It is probable that similarly structured leather helmets were also in use, and may have been more common than iron helmets. As the 8th century drew to a close in Europe, the first reports of Viking raids trickled in. For example there was a now-famous raid on the monastery at Lindisfarne off the coast of Northumberland. This occurred in what is now England in 793. There followed raids on the island of Rathlin and Iona near mainland Ireland in 795. These early raids were undertaken on a small scale. They were probably conducted by small groups gathered by local-level Viking leaders. They focused on vulnerable, exposed targets such as the afore-mentioned coastal monasteries or trading centers. They typically did not head far inland. Characteristic was the Vikings’ hit-and-run strategy. They moored their ships on the doorstep of whatever they were attacking. They rounded up valuables and the occasional slave. Then they sailed or rowed off into the distance before any effective defense could be mounted against them. Viking ships were a key element of this form of warfare. Viking ships were extremely fast and light. These characteristics facilitated quick coastal strikes and also allowed them to head up rivers and penetrate inland. By the 830’s a general increase in both the size and the frequency of Viking raids. There were independent reports from Britain, Ireland, and Western Europe as well. The raids in Western Europe were particularly frequent in Frankish territories. Ramping up the number of ships in their fleets from the earlier handfuls to hundreds, the Vikings now began attacking targets further inland. For instance there were a series of raids in 834-836 on the major trading center of Dorestad. Dorestad was some 50 miles from the open sea in what is now the Netherlands. Viking raids are no longer lead merely by (now) unknown local chieftains. The raids are led by named kings or earls from the upper levels of Scandinavian society. These leaders are not necessarily rulers of large territories. But they are leaders of status within Scandinavia, and are in addition to the lesser chieftains who would also have continued conducting smaller scale raids. Occasionally ‘great’ war-bands in the late 9th century would be composed of the forces of several kings or earls, jointly lead, implying a merging of smaller independent forces. The apparent lack of formal structure makes their achievements in long-term campaigning and strategic and logistical planning even more impressive. First in Ireland and then also in England, the Vikings also began to over-winter in hostile territories, taking over or setting up bases. However establishing these winter bases also reduced their much-prized mobility. In Ireland for instance this led to the Vikings suffering quite a number of defeats. And the characteristic of increasing from small-scale to large-scale raiding accompanied by over-wintering was not a pattern that applied equally to all Viking-conquered territories. Danish chieftains settled in Frisia early on in the 9th century and politically resolved conflicts with the area’s Frankish overlordship. In Norse Scotland the Vikings established permanent settlements early on, probably from the start of the 9th century. Like the rest of early medieval warfare in Western Europe, Viking warfare could not simply ignore the deleterious effects of winter on campaigning and logistics. As such warfare was generally a seasonal affair, as it was during the Roman Republic a millennium before. Initially winters were spent back home in Scandinavia. However as time progressed pattern increasingly transitioned to over-wintering bases and settlements in Viking-held territories abroad. From such settlements the Vikings could participate in local politics, tactfully choosing sides, reaching agreements with their enemies, securing the payment of tribute, and launching new campaigns. Even when it comes to inland battles the Vikings’ beloved ships remained crucial wherever they could be put to use. The ships had a shallow enough draught to paddle up the larger rivers, carrying anything from men to supplies and loot. This meant that whenever the Vikings campaigned near areas their ships could reach they had no need for annoyingly slow overland baggage trains. However the picture imparted by historical records and archaeology pertaining to the actual specifics of Viking combat in battles is a bit fuzzy. Thus time has left us with little knowledge of specific battle tactics. Those references that we do have suggest that the shield-wall was the most common tactical formation. Archery was probably also used to break up the shield-wall. The shield-wall was not an ideal position in which to receive arrows. It provided a large target, with little maneuverability). The longbows known to have existed in this period would have penetrated shields and armor, though not necessarily deeply. Horses were used for their mobility, but probably dismounted for battle. Battle standards were carried near the leader or leaders, probably to indicate status. Some of these standards depicted ravens, such as the one used by Harald Hardrada at Stamford Bridge against the Anglo-Saxons in 1066 AD. Although shouting matches may have sufficed regarding communication in smaller skirmishes, one can of course only shout so loudly. Animal horns may also have been used to bellow out signals. For conveying more articulate orders and information, it is likely messengers would have dashed across the battlefield at high speed. One Viking force where such communicative measures would have been invaluable is that of the Danish ‘great army’ that razed havoc across England from 865 AD onward. The campaign lasted for years and brought the kingdoms of East Anglia and Northumbria as well as most of Mercia to their knees. Even Wessex, under its leader King Alfred, struggled to resist the Viking forces. However King Alfred eventually won a decisive victory against the Viking forces. The Vikings’ great army disbanded around 880 AD. Its constituent war-bands seemingly jumping to take advantage of a succession struggle in the Kingdom of the Franks. There the flexible and opportunistic Vikings were active between 879-891. Although history has left us with little knowledge of the precise organization or command structure, a large Viking army would have been composed of several war-bands. Local kings, earls, and chieftains may all have led individual portions of the army. Each likely held specific command roles and probably following some sort of hierarchic order. A good example of this would be the Battle of Ashdown in 871AD wherein King Alfred beat the great Danish army. One of the Danish wings was led by two kings. Historical accounts record that the other was captained by ‘many earls’. As the Scandinavian kingdoms began consolidate and to take on more unified shapes, kings such as the early 11th century Danish King Sweyn Forkbeard were probably responsible for a more tightly-knit hierarchy. Likely they personally commanded the crews of several ships. The King’s forces would have been augment by the personal forces of their main subordinate chieftains. The total numbers of warriors then easily reached into the thousands. Connections between the various kinds of leaders, and between them and their crews, could have taken the shape of kinship or personal ties, social ties, or could be loot- or tribute-driven. There probably was no such thing as a systematic levy for Viking fleets. The term leidangr indicated a force directly under control of the king. The term may have as in later times been used to describe just such a force. However the use of the term to specifically denote such forces is only known from sources dating to the mid-12th century and beyond. It’s likely that prior to that time, Viking Age ventures were mainly private affairs. It is assumed by historians that Viking battle units would have mirrored the crews of ships, i.e., that those crews would have fought together on land as a unit. This makes sense considering the Vikings’ heavy reliance on ships and the sense of companionship amongst fellow crew members. As for the raiders and warriors themselves, they were generally young men. This is in accord with both the historical records provided by Viking sagas, as well as the skeletal remains that have been found. However none of the skeletal remains support the existence of female Viking warriors. Historical accounts detailing the Vikings’ years-long campaigns in the late 9th century CE paint a picture of adolescents or young adults joining up and remaining active into their thirties and even beyond. The more experienced warriors must have been invaluable. They must have brought to their unit stability and knowledge. Historical evidence has shown that troops may also have been partially drawn from areas outside of Scandinavia. There’s a southern Baltic connection is attested to with regard to garrisons in Denmark. Even the Scandinavian forces active in England in the 10th century were of mixed origins. They did not reflect any kind of homogeneous ‘national’ army. Contrary to appearances mass media stereotypes, Viking warfare is actually not such a huge anomaly on the early medieval European landscape. Besides the fact that technologically the playing field was fairly level, raiding with the objective of plunder was hardly an exclusively Viking affair. It was quite typical of pre-Viking Ireland and Britain. It was also was widespread throughout Medieval Europe in general, and the classical world as well. Tribute-taking also occurred outside Viking spheres, even being central to relations between kings in early medieval Britain. Although they were brutal by modern standards, the Vikings were hardly out of place in Early Medieval Europe when compared to other populations. War ships were also used by both the Anglo-Saxons and the Franks. However the Vikings were more innovative on several fronts. The first innovation was their naval technology. They excelled at building faster, more seaworthy ships with shallow draughts. These ships were perfect for lightning-strike hits. The second innovation was the way the Vikings put their ships to use in their archetypal hit-and-run raids. Other key elements that tie in with this are a strong focus on strategic mobility. Ships were supplemented by the use of horses on land. The Vikings possessed good logistic awareness and capabilities allowing for good supplying on campaign. The development of specialized cargo ships was another key element essential to both the two preceding elements. The Vikings possessed good military intelligence and a nose for picking vulnerable targets, as well as responding quickly to changing situations. The fluid structure of individual war-bands led by private leaders was also an essential element in their success. Perhaps the most important constituent element in the Viking’s success was over-wintering. The bases built or taken over became supreme rallying points from which to spread out across the surrounding area. For those looking to withstand the combination of these elements direct battle against the Vikings was usually more of a temporary solution. Even if defeated the Vikings would return. Likewise the payment of tribute only bought peace for a while. As one historian pointed out, "it was only when both issues of mobility and supply were tackled that the Viking raids could successfully be contained." Examples of such efforts employed successfully against the Vikings include fortified bridges used in the late 9th century by Charles the Bald, King of West Francia. The fortified bridges were used to block the Vikings’ access to the rivers. Also in the late 9th century Alfred the Great of Wessex simultaneously employed ship-led coastal defenses and the building of fortified towns (burhs) across Wessex, which eventually halted the Viking advance. Aided by their swords and ships the Scandinavians greatly extended their influence during the Viking Age. Their sphere of influence extended from the North Atlantic to the Mediterranean, to Russia, and even as far as Constantinople. However contemporary accounts forming their present-day image (especially in popular culture) give the impression that European seas and rivers were positively teeming with Vikings marauders. Viking warriors are often depicted as savage and brutal and, importantly, heathen. They’re depicted as showing no quarter to their unfortunate prey and being disproportionately successful on the battlefield. These characterizations are not only pulled out of context but also exaggerated or even wrong. Accounts contemporary to these events were often penned by monks. Monks were in the first line of fire when the Vikings started plundering monasteries. It is thus hardly surprising they did not sing the Vikings’ praises. They were outraged at the fact that these heathens attacked churches and slew churchmen, despite the fact that even Christian rulers as well had attacked churches and slain fellow Christians. Particularly in the early years Viking raids were only sporadic affairs and hardly brought local institutions tumbling down. And although Vikings were brutal by modern standards, their behavior was by the standards of early medieval unexceptional. Historians might remind you that Julius Caesar murdered almost a million (Helvetii) Celts who simply wanted to cross a river while migrating to France. Charlemagne “the Great” put thousands to the sword who would not convert to Christianity. Jews were routinely massacred by “Christians”. And future centuries would see Protestants and Catholics butchering each other over dogmatic disputes. As one historian summarized the Vikings’ successes on the battlefield, "owe less to the wild warriors of romantic imagination, and more to careful strategies and logistical planning, a skilful combination of warfare and diplomacy, and good underlying organization." The famous berserks who appear in Old Norse literature who in their fury roar, bite their shields, and are invulnerable, are more so fictional literary figures. They may have been based on a cult of masked warriors that existed in Germanic antiquity and are often connected to Odin. However to imagine entire Viking armies of that composition is simply far-fetched. That Viking warriors were effective and recognized as such, however, is reflected in them serving the Byzantine Emperor in the elite corps known as the Varangian Guard [Ancient History Encyclopedia]. SHIPPING & RETURNS/REFUNDS: We always ship books domestically (within the USA) via USPS INSURED media mail (“book rate”). Most international orders cost an additional $15.49 to $46.49 for an insured shipment in a heavily padded mailer. There is also a discount program which can cut postage costs by 50% to 75% if you’re buying about half-a-dozen books or more (5 kilos+). Our postage charges are as reasonable as USPS rates allow. ADDITIONAL PURCHASES do receive a VERY LARGE discount, typically about $5 per book (for each additional book after the first) so as to reward you for the economies of combined shipping/insurance costs. Your purchase will ordinarily be shipped within 48 hours of payment. We package as well as anyone in the business, with lots of protective padding and containers. All of our shipments are fully insured against loss, and our shipping rates include the cost of this coverage (through stamps.com, Shipsaver.com, the USPS, UPS, or Fed-Ex). International tracking is provided free by the USPS for certain countries, other countries are at additional cost. We do offer U.S. Postal Service Priority Mail, Registered Mail, and Express Mail for both international and domestic shipments, as well United Parcel Service (UPS) and Federal Express (Fed-Ex). Please ask for a rate quotation. We will accept whatever payment method you are most comfortable with. If upon receipt of the item you are disappointed for any reason whatever, I offer a no questions asked 30-day return policy. Send it back, I will give you a complete refund of the purchase price; 1) less our original shipping/insurance costs, 2) less non-refundable PayPal/eBay payment processing fees. Please note that PayPal does NOT refund fees. Even if you “accidentally” purchase something and then cancel the purchase before it is shipped, PayPal will not refund their fees. So all refunds for any reason, without exception, do not include PayPal/eBay payment processing fees (typically between 3% and 5%) and shipping/insurance costs (if any). If you’re unhappy with PayPal and eBay’s “no fee refund” policy, and we are EXTREMELY unhappy, please voice your displeasure by contacting PayPal and/or eBay. We have no ability to influence, modify or waive PayPal or eBay policies. ABOUT US: Prior to our retirement we used to travel to Europe and Central Asia several times a year. Most of the items we offer came from acquisitions we made in Eastern Europe, India, and from the Levant (Eastern Mediterranean/Near East) during these years from various institutions and dealers. Much of what we generate on Etsy, Amazon and Ebay goes to support The Hermitage Museum in St. Petersburg, as well as some other worthy institutions in Europe and Asia connected with Anthropology and Archaeology. Though we have a collection of ancient coins numbering in the tens of thousands, our primary interests are ancient jewelry and gemstones. Prior to our retirement we traveled to Russia every year seeking antique gemstones and jewelry from one of the globe’s most prolific gemstone producing and cutting centers, the area between Chelyabinsk and Yekaterinburg, Russia. From all corners of Siberia, as well as from India, Ceylon, Burma and Siam, gemstones have for centuries gone to Yekaterinburg where they have been cut and incorporated into the fabulous jewelry for which the Czars and the royal families of Europe were famous for. My wife grew up and received a university education in the Southern Urals of Russia, just a few hours away from the mountains of Siberia, where alexandrite, diamond, emerald, sapphire, chrysoberyl, topaz, demantoid garnet, and many other rare and precious gemstones are produced. Though perhaps difficult to find in the USA, antique gemstones are commonly unmounted from old, broken settings – the gold reused – the gemstones recut and reset. Before these gorgeous antique gemstones are recut, we try to acquire the best of them in their original, antique, hand-finished state – most of them centuries old. We believe that the work created by these long-gone master artisans is worth protecting and preserving rather than destroying this heritage of antique gemstones by recutting the original work out of existence. That by preserving their work, in a sense, we are preserving their lives and the legacy they left for modern times. Far better to appreciate their craft than to destroy it with modern cutting. Not everyone agrees – fully 95% or more of the antique gemstones which come into these marketplaces are recut, and the heritage of the past lost. But if you agree with us that the past is worth protecting, and that past lives and the produce of those lives still matters today, consider buying an antique, hand cut, natural gemstone rather than one of the mass-produced machine cut (often synthetic or “lab produced”) gemstones which dominate the market today. We can set most any antique gemstone you purchase from us in your choice of styles and metals ranging from rings to pendants to earrings and bracelets; in sterling silver, 14kt solid gold, and 14kt gold fill. When you purchase from us, you can count on quick shipping and careful, secure packaging. We would be happy to provide you with a certificate/guarantee of authenticity for any item you purchase from us. There is a $3 fee for mailing under separate cover. I will always respond to every inquiry whether via email or eBay message, so please feel free to write. Condition: New and unblemished. Please see detailed condition description below., Format: Oversized softcover, Length: 302 pages, Dimensions: 9¼ x 6½ x 1 inch; 1¼ pounds, Publisher: Salamander Books Ltd (UK 1998)

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